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SUMMARY
In my study I attempt to show that all of the emerging market financial crises of the 1990s 
have particularly affected those economies that exhibit certain fundamental weaknesses.
Chapter One discusses the rapid growth of the Asian region and outlines the 
fundamental weaknesses that caused the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Subsequently, I 
examine the sustainability of the economic recoveries in Asia.
Chapter Two considers the effects of the Asian financial crisis on the Russian 
economy, highlighting Russia’s vulnerability to crisis and the indirect causes of these 
fundamental weaknesses. Russia’s current economic trends are investigated.
Chapter Three outlines China’s similar weaknesses to the crisis-hit economies. But 
the Chinese currency was not forced to abandon its exchange rate peg. I will, therefore, 
analyse China’s avoidance of the Asian financial contagion, and the obstacles which may 
jeopardise China’s long-term economic growth.
I then discuss the controversies that have arisen from the experiences of East Asia, 
Russia and China. This primarily concerns reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to 
financial crises. Chapter Four considers the dangers that global financial integration presents 
for emerging markets. I appraise initiatives that attempt to maximise the benefits of capital 
account liberalisation while minimising the costs.
Chapter Five seeks to examine the exchange rate dilemma, outlining the costs and 
benefits of the various regimes available, and the suitability of each arrangement for 
emerging market economies.
Chapter Six examines the current role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I 
analyse the Fund’s push for free capital mobility and its financial assistance programmes 
prescribed to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. A discussion on the future role and 
proposed reforms of the IMF follows.
Introduction
Following Thailand’s devaluation of the baht on July 2nd 1997, investors began to re­
evaluate their exposures to Thailand’s regional neighbours. Foreign creditors became 
greatly concerned with the Asian region’s microeconomic risks, which included the 
quantity of short-term dollar debt and the significant debt/equity ratios of the corporate 
sector. It was clearly evident that other Asian economies would find repayment of dollar 
debts extremely difficult if the nominal exchange rates were to fall. This realisation 
prompted both foreign investors and domestic residents to sell local currency and buy 
U.S. dollars to hedge their exposures. The Asian financial virus soon affected other areas 
of the world economy, including the commodity producing countries of Australia, 
Canada, Chile and Mexico. Moreover in 1998, Russia was forced to devalue the rouble 
and default on its debt. This shocked the world’s financial centres, prompting the U.S. 
Federal Reserve to cut interest rates on three occasions between September 29th and 
November 17th 1998, in an effort to stave off a global slowdown. Brazil received 
financial assistance from the IMF totalling $41.5 billion, but later devalued the real in 
January 1999. Yu Yongding laments that the: “The Asian financial crisis ... developed 
into the most severe global financial crisis since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
agreement.”1
Prior to Asia’s regional meltdown it was evident that there were four crucial 
preconditions which made the Asian countries particularly vulnerable to a financial 
panic. 1. Extremely high levels of domestic savings, Asia is the highest saving region 
of the world. Household savings were inter-mediated by banks to enterprises. This 
resulted in a deep structure of domestic debt. 2. The fallacy of the pegged exchange rate 
regimes seemingly removed the potential for exchange rate losses, for both borrowers 
and creditors. 3. Asian capital accounts were liberalised and domestic financial systems 
were de-regulated allowing inexperienced domestic banks to borrow through foreign 
markets while regulatory mechanisms remained weak. 4. Excess liquidity, primarily in 
Japan and Europe, sought greater investment returns in newly opening ‘emerging
1 Yongding, Y. Economics blue book o f  the Peoples Republic o f  China. 1999. p.482.
2 Identified by Wade, see p. 1541. The Asian debt and development crisis o f 1997-?: causes and 
consequences. World Development, Vol 26, No.8.
markets’. Asian financial intermediaries could borrow internationally at approximately 
half the cost of the domestic interest rate and re-lend at home, converting dollars into 
local currency, thereby allowing them to reap the interest rate differential.
Nonetheless, there has been widespread debate regarding the exact cause of the 
Asian financial crisis. There are primarily two main explanations. First, the 
fundamentalist or death throes of Asian state capitalism viewpoint, which concerns 
internal, real economy causes. The second belief contends that the crisis was a largely 
gratuitous financial panic that triggered a debt deflation in a basically sound but under- 
regulated system. This account essentially focuses on the short-comings of the 
international financial system and externally related causes.
According to the death throes or fundamentalist story, the Asian crisis was the 
result of rampant corruption at the local level and excessive government intervention in 
financial markets, which caused a dramatic mis-allocation of resources. Indeed, the 
currency strategist Callum Henderson argues that: “The argument that ‘globalisation’ is 
to blame for Asia’s woes is clearly flawed ... Is it any coincidence that the likes of 
Mexico, Thailand, Brazil and Russia all had significant black market economies and that 
they all saw financial and economic crises? No, it is no coincidence at all. The very 
existence of a large and flourishing black market economy is testimony to the fact that 
the real economy is not working efficiently and fairly”3. Furthermore the IMF’s Stanley 
Fischer listed as causes of the Asian crisis, 7“failure to dampen overheating, maintenance 
of pegged exchange rates for too long, lax financial regulation, and insufficient political 
commitment”4.
The fundamentalist view also asserts that the Asian debacle shows the definitive 
failure of the Asian model of state-directed capitalism and a world wide acceptance of the 
Western model of free market capitalism.
The most prominent advocate of the second view is Harvard University’s Jeffrey 
Sachs who claimed that: “Asia is reeling not from a crisis of fundamentals but a self- 
fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans, one that is fuelled by each investor’s
3 Henderson, C. Asian Dawn, p.xxiii.
4The Lex Column. Financial Times. March 3, 1998. p.3.
recognition that all other investors are withdrawing their claims. Since short-term debts 
exceed foreign exchange reserves it is ‘rational’ for each investor to join in the panic.”5
Following the Asian crisis the IMF quickly declared that deep structural reforms 
were necessary before recoveries could begin. Yet these reforms soon stalled and, in 
1999, the Asian economies enjoyed spectacular recoveries (the most impressive of 
which was South Korea which grew some 10% in 1999 after contracting by almost 6% in 
19986). The MIT economist Paul Krugman, has concluded that the IMF’s claim that 
massive and immediate reform was required was in fact the wrong response to Asia’s 
crisis. “If you believed ... that the crisis was a punishment for Asia’s sins, that it 
reflected the deep flaws of the afflicted nations’ economic systems, recovery should have 
been only possible after fundamental change. The fact that it came without such change 
demonstrates that the crisis was simply a panic after all”7.
Accompanying any financial assistance packages from the IMF are certain 
conditions which attracted a great deal of criticism in the aftermath of Asia’s crisis. One 
of the most criticised conditions involved additional liberalisation of the capital account 
prompting Robert Wade to comment. “It seems particularly unwise for the IMF to insist 
that companies receive even more freedom than before to borrow on international capital 
markets on their own account, without government co-ordination, when it was their
Q
uncoordinated borrowing that set up the crisis in the first place” .
However, the IMF request for further capital account liberalisation should hardly 
come as a surprise. Throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s economic policy in the 
majority of OECD countries adhered to a process involving market liberalisation and 
privatisation. According to Robert Wade this combined “a belief in fiscal conservatism, 
in demand management entirely by the finance ministry or central bank, in capital 
markets as efficient suppliers of capital, in de-regulated labour markets as the cure to 
unemployment, and in the private sector as inherently more efficient, more effective in
5 Sachs, J. The IMF and the Asian Flu. The American Prospect. March-April 1998. p. 17.
6 Henderson, C. Asian Dawn. p.99.
7 Krugman, P. The Return o f depression economics, p.x.
8 Wade, R. The Asian debt and development crisis o f 1997-?: causes and consequences. World 
Development, Vol 26, No.8. p. 1544.
supplying most goods and services than the public sector. The recipe came to be known 
as the Washington consensus”9.
But drawing on the experiences of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 
1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994, Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998, illustrates that the 
Washington Consensus has had the unanticipated effect of causing financial instability. 
Such instability has been avoided by India and China who are yet to adhere to the 
Washington consensus, and the Chinese economy has continued to enjoy very high rates 
of growth despite the absence of reforms.
The case of China is of particular interest to this study. The Chinese economy 
exhibits a nominal exchange rate peg, widespread corruption, nepotism and an inefficient 
and bankrupt financial sector -  weaknesses that contributed to the onset of the crisis in 
the Asian region. But despite these weaknesses the Chinese economy enjoyed GDP 
growth in the region of 7.8% in 1998, at the same time, many of China’s regional 
neighbours were experiencing devastating contractions in GDP growth.
In my opinion, all of the recent developing country crises have been borne of a 
growing vulnerability to a financial panic. As I see it, financial vulnerability stems from, 
what I will refer to as ‘fundamental weaknesses’. I have identified six weaknesses that 
have contributed to the financial crises in the developing countries of Mexico, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia and Brazil. They are as follows:
1. A fixed exchange rate, which has tended to lead to an underestimation of 
exchange rate exposures and a reluctance to begin the transition to a more 
flexible regime, even in the face of deteriorating fundamentals.
2. An over-reliance on short-term foreign currency-denominated debt. The short 
maturity of debt means that servicing this debt when investors suddenly 
become risk averse can prove extremely problematic.
3. Inadequate foreign exchange reserves in relation to short-term debt. In the 
crisis-hit countries short-term debt exceeded foreign reserves by over 100%. 
Therefore, once the financial panic began it became impossible to stop 
because each creditor knew that there was insufficient liquidity to pay back 
each and every loan on demand.
9 Wade, R. How to stop New Zealand from becoming the second Argentina. 2001. p. 1.
4. Extensively liberalised capital account. An open capital account and a fixed 
exchange rate have tended to lead to an over-reliance on foreign capital by the 
private sector in Asia and the public sector in both Latin America and Russia.
5. Imprudent macroeconomic objectives. Poor monetary policy in Asia was 
reflected in large current account deficits and the Russian economy possessed 
an unsustainable fiscal deficit prior to the 1998 crisis.
6. The absence of a strong and impartial financial sector has resulted in an 
inefficient and often corrupt allocation of resources in many developing 
countries.
It is my intention with this study to illustrate how each of the above vulnerabilities 
contributed to the onset of the financial crises in the respective countries of Asia and 
Russia. I will then consider the case of the Chinese economy, which was crucially yet to 
liberalise its capital account.
Indeed, the Chinese currency controls and the ample pool of foreign reserves that 
the country possesses enabled China to weather the Asian storm admirably. I feel that 
other developing countries should follow China’s cautious approach to capital account 
liberalisation and I examine other issues related to deterring de-stabilising speculative 
transactions to promote global financial stability in Chapter Four.
The failure of the nominally pegged exchange rates in the Asian region, Russia, 
and Brazil has reopened the debate regarding the most appropriate exchange rate for 
developing countries and at what stage of their development. To avoid vulnerability to 
real exchange rate appreciation and an over-reliance on foreign currency-denominated 
debt I favour a more flexible exchange rate regime. Yet there is no perfect regime and 
each country must closely analyse their country’s characteristics and choose a regime that 
compliments them the best.
Chapter Six seeks to examine the role of the IMF prior to the Asian and Russian 
crises and the austere conditions imposed by the Fund as a precondition for financial 
assistance, which aggravated Asia’s economic difficulties. It is clear that the IMF has 
been trying to do too much and to become more effective must streamline its objectives.
Before we begin, it seems clear to me that the sequence in which these 
devastating economic crashes took place across the Asian region provides a clear insight
into which theory best explains Asia’s financial crisis. So if you believe that Asia’s crisis 
was a punishment for the sins of these corrupt economies it seems far too great a 
coincidence that so many dissimilar economies suffered crises within the period of a few 
months. For example, South Korea in 1997, as the world’s eleventh largest nation, had 
almost achieved developed nation status, while Indonesia remained a desperately poor 
nation. Yet the clearest similarity between each of the crisis-hit economies was a 
vulnerability to a self-fulfilling financial panic.
CHAPTER ONE: THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS1
Introduction
According to Paul Krugman, “anyone who claims to fully understand the economic disaster 
that has overtaken Asia proves, by that very certainty, that he doesn’t know what he is talking 
about”2. Whilst this does illustrate the complexity of the debate, I intend to examine the main 
factors that I believe explain the Asian debacle and which have received general backing.
I will primarily consider the case of Thailand because it seems to me that Thailand 
provides the best example of the dangers of operating an open capital account together with a 
deficient regulatory regime and a fixed exchange rate. In addition, it was Thailand’s 
devaluation that triggered the withdrawal of foreign funds from its Asian neighbours and 
raised the cost of borrowing in emerging markets throughout the world.
However, the precise mechanisms that initiated financial crisis varied from country to 
country and it would be short sighted to consider the region as one when explaining the crisis. 
The effects of the crisis on each country were dissimilar, making it “difficult to ascribe the 
[Asian] crisis to a single root cause”3.
l.i. The remarkable story of Asian growth in context 
Economic growth in Asia began with the pre-war Japanese economy, but later spread to the 
newly industrialised economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. Each of 
these economies benefited from foreign guardianship in opposition to hostility from 
communist or nationalist elements that were evident in much of the rest of East Asia. In the 
wake of the Vietnam War (which ended in 1975), economic development and globalisation 
began to benefit Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, four members of the 
Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN-4). China also began to benefit from 
foreign capital and international markets when they embarked on their gradualist transition to 
a market economy in 1978. (See Table 1, which illustrates East Asia’s annual GDP growth 
from 1970-1996, p.30.)
Britain took approximately sixty years after 1780 to double its national output. The 
United States achieved a doubling of output from 1840 to 1890. After 1880 it took Japan
1 Under the pre-1914 gold standard, a financial crisis occurred when a shortage of liquidity afflicted the 
monetary or fiscal authorities. The problem could arise because o f a deficit in the balance of payments, and be 
complicated by a domestic banking panic. This meant that the fixed exchange rate of the national currency was 
endangered.
Definition taken from Bordo & Schwartz. 1998. p.5.
2Krugman, P. 1998a.
3Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p.7.
i ne /\sian rmaiiciai crisis.
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thirty-three years. But Indonesia accomplished the same feat in seventeen years after 1965, 
South Korea in eleven years after 1970 and China, just ten years after they began their 
reforms in 1978.4
Asia’s rapid growth is even more striking when compared to sub-Saharan Africa. In 
the 1950’s “several African countries had more or less the same income level as Asian 
countries like South Korea and ... [were often] far richer than East Asia in natural resources. 
Before its 1997 troubles South Korea had a per capita income almost seventy times the $150 
of the Congo”5.
The governments in the high performing Asian economies have concentrated 
expenditures in sectors essential to enhancing economic performance. Education levels have 
risen dramatically, for example, and many industries have received government support.
Asian values?
To explain Asia’s rapid growth many analysts identified ‘Asian values’ as one of the main 
reasons for this growth. Indeed, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, asked 
Malaysians “not to accept Westem-style democracy as it could result in negative effects. The 
Prime-Minister said such an extreme principle had caused moral decay ... single parents and 
economic slowdown because of poor work ethics”6. One Asian commentator claimed that 
Asian growth had been achieved through the “interlocking co-operation of free enterprise, 
government financial intervention, and a guidance-minded technocratic bureaucracy ... It is a 
trick that the managers of developed Western economies have yet to learn”7.
East Asia’s route to rapid growth 
The ASEAN-4 began their economic growth by focusing on producing exports for much of 
the Western world. Foreign companies built large factories geared to exports and the native 
businessmen built small businesses in the Asian cities. Before the 1990s the majority of the 
smaller scale investment within these economies was financed by the Asians’ high rate of 
savings. Apartment and office blocks began to emerge in the larger cities predominantly 
financed by bank deposits belonging to Asian households. This encouraged urbanisation as 
agricultural workers met the new demand for labour in these cities. The success of the initial 
wave of foreign investors encouraged others to follow and Asia was soon enjoying rapid rates 
of GDP growth.
“Patten, C. 1999. p. 127.
5Ibid. pp. 126-7.
6Ibid. p.150.
7P. Krugman. 2000a. pp.36-7.
3As a result of the government’s export-orientated industrialisation policy, East Asia’s 
exports rose rapidly. In the 1960s, on average, they grew at 11.6% a year, followed by 24.6% 
in the 1970’s, 9.5% in the 1980s, and 11.8% from 1990-’95. Exports from East Asia to the 
rest of the world rose from $143 billion in 1980 to approximately $855 billion in 1995.8
From 1990 onwards, globalisation and financial liberalisation began to alter the 
composition of foreign funds entering developing countries. Long-term foreign investment 
abated as speculative short-term capital inflows replaced its longer-term counterpart. The 
South-east Asian economies accumulated huge inflows of foreign capital, which fuelled the 
expansion of their bubble economies. There was no shortage of foreign loans for a number of 
reasons. First, the central banks of many advanced economies were attempting to stimulate 
demand as a result of the global recession experienced in 1990. The consequent low rate of 
interest encouraged investors to seek higher returns in new markets and these financiers 
began calling developing countries ‘emerging markets’. Second, the Latin debt crisis that 
occurred in 1982 was finally resolved in the late 1980s, which improved the novelty and 
conceivable potential that these markets possessed. Third, the collapse of communism in 
1989 improved the world as a market place by reducing the probability of communist 
invasions. Fourth, the developing countries that had chosen to operate fixed exchange rate 
regimes became particularly attractive to short-term investors, given that much of the risk of 
exchange rate volatility losses had seemingly been removed. Finally, the IMF encouraged 
the Asian countries to extend their financial liberalisation, thus integrating their economies 
within the global financial system.
Initially, most capital flows to emerging markets were destined for Latin America 
and, in particular, Mexico. However, the ‘Tequila crisis’ in 1994-95 encouraged funds to 
flow eastwards to South-east Asia. The net private capital flows of $190 billion in 1996 were 
four times larger than in 1990.9 The emerging markets had little or no experience in the 
regulation of capital inflows. This fact became increasingly evident as the quality of 
investment that these inflows financed steadily deteriorated. Yet the regional crisis was 
predicted by very few analysts.
8Patten, C. 1999. p.126.
9Lopez-Mejia, A. 1999. p.29.
i  ne /\sian  rinanciai crisis.
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l.ii. Factors contributing to financial vulnerability in Asia: poor financial regulation 
and an absence of corporate transparency
Much has been said about certain negative features of the countries that suffered from the 
crisis. ‘Crony capitalism’ and a general lack of transparency within corporate governance 
were essentially the consequences of state-managed, fast track capitalism. Whilst these 
factors justify acknowledgement they were not a new element of these economies that would 
jeopardise growth or even initiate such a crisis. Indeed, they had been evident for many years 
and were manifested within the economies long before foreign investors arrived on Asian 
shores. The investors in Asia were aware of the deficiencies of these economies: “It was a 
faustian bargain: ignore the shortcomings to get a piece of the Asian miracle”10.
Following the crisis in Thailand international creditors were highly critical of the lack 
of information that they actually possessed on their investments. The lack of transparency 
resulted in a mis-allocation of resources and was therefore cited as an indirect cause of the 
crisis; yet few investors protested when profits were soaring. The lack of corporate 
transparency meant that investors were unable to access information on companies’ foreign 
currency denominated debts.
According to Timothy Lane of the IMF, the Asian economies became particularly 
vulnerable to a financial panic as a result of “ineffective financial supervision and regulation 
in the context of countries’ financial sector liberalisations. Capital account liberalisation was 
poorly sequenced, encouraging short-term borrowing, while limited exchange rate flexibility 
led borrowers to underestimate exchange rate risk. Monetary policies allowed domestic 
credit to expand at a breakneck pace. But if banks and corporations in these countries 
borrowed imprudently, foreign lenders also lent imprudently, possibly reflecting sloppy risk 
management, perceptions of implicit government guarantees, and the incomplete information 
available”11.
A key lesson for the Asian economies is that capital must be efficiently allocated. 
When developing countries open their capital accounts and receive large inflows of foreign 
capital they should already possess d sound) financial infrastructure. Callum Henderson 
argues that: “[Emerging markets] need deep and liquid domestic bond markets in order to 
provide an efficient funding market with which equities must compete - thus making the
10Asia Review Book 1998. p.7.
"Lane, T. 1999. p.44.
5domestic equity market more efficient - to channel inward investment appropriately and to 
tap the domestic savings base.”12
The inexperience of the Asian economies in dealing with vast amounts of capital 
inflows resulted in financial fragility, which was personified by excessive borrowing 
throughout the microeconomy and the absence of sufficient hedging to protect against 
currency depreciation. Additionally, a large portion of the short-term flows were invested in 
long-term projects, increasing the potential for a liquidity attack.
When currencies depreciated corporations endured exchange rate losses, culminating 
in the insolvency of many companies and increasing the potential for a default on debt. This, 
in turn, exacerbated the financial panic, increasing capital flight and depreciating the 
currency further.
The region’s excessive over-reliance on short-term foreign financing dramatically 
increased Asia’s vulnerability to financial panic. Once the panic began it became difficult to 
stop given the countries’ meagre foreign exchange reserves relative to short-term foreign 
currency-denominated debt. The panic was accelerated by the absence of corporate 
transparency. However, in normal times loans would simply have been re-newed and 
business would have continued as usual. But Asia had been facing an increasingly hostile 
external environment since 1995.
Factors precipitating the Asian financial crisis 
The Asian economies had become heavily dependent on exports to the United States and the 
countries of the European Union. (Exports to the U.S. contribute between 10 and 25% of 
Asian economies’ GDP13.) Thus, the deterioration of the external environment from 1995 
onwards slowed exports and worsened the region’s current account balances. Thailand’s 
exporting sectors grew by just 0.1% in 1996 as opposed to 24.7% in 1995 and Korea’s 
exports grew by just 4.1% from 31.5% in 1996.14
The Asian economies were operating fixed exchange rates, pegging their currencies 
predominantly to the U.S. dollar. Between 1995 and 1997 the Japanese yen and many 
European currencies depreciated vis-a-vis the dollar. Inevitably, this made East Asian 
exports more expensive both in the Japanese and European markets and also in competition 
with Japanese and European exports in world markets. The consequence of the U.S. dollar’s
12Henderson, C. 1999. p. 177.
13The Economist. 31 March 2001. p. 15.
uHenderson, C. 1999. p.3.
i ne Asian financial crisis.
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appreciation was clearly detrimental to the export industries within East Asia. (Table 2 
shows Asia’s real effective exchange rate15 appreciations, p.30.)
Furthermore, 65% of East Asian exports were semi-conductors and related capital 
goods.16 Thus when the demand for electronics and particularly semi-conductors fell 
dramatically it damaged the region’s trade accounts. In accordance with the fall in demand 
for semi-conductors, the market was heavily saturated. Over-supply resulted in a substantial 
fall in the price of semi-conductors, by as much as 95% in a year.
Some analysts have argued that China’s currency was in fact the first Asian one to fall 
when, in 1994, the renminbi was devalued. This devaluation is argued to have greatly 
improved the country’s export competitiveness, which was detrimental to South-east Asian 
exporting sectors given that China’s exports were said to be similar to those of its ASEAN 
neighbours. China’s devaluation was therefore believed to have contributed to Asia’s 
deteriorating economic fundamentals, including a worsening of current account balances. 
However, as noted by Prakash Lougani (an economist at the IMF), a closer examination of 
China’s export bundles in relation to the East Asian region reveals that “the composition of 
China’s exports ... is quite different from that of the other East Asian economies”17. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that China’s cheap labour encouraged greater quantities of 
foreign direct investment (EDI) to enter China rather than the rest of East Asia.
Despite these untimely exogenous shocks, Asia had experienced similar disturbances 
before, such as the developed world’s recession in 1990, which reduced demand for Asian 
exports. Yet their economies continued to grow. But the fundamental difference between 
1990 and 1997 was that the Asian economies had become freer, allowing capital to flow in 
and out of their countries at will, making these over-extended countries vulnerable to a high- 
tech, high-speed financial panic.
Thailand’s prelude to crisis
In 1993 Thailand established the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF). The BIBF 
was possibly the most significant measure taken by the Thais in the path of financial 
liberalisation, enabling local and foreign banks to engage in both onshore and offshore 
lending activities. Thai investors could then borrow cheaply in offshore markets and foreign 
investors could also access loans from this facility. BEBF licensees were permitted to accept
15The real effective exchange rate is the trade weighted exchange rate adjusted for inflation. The real exchange 
rate is only adjusted for inflation. The nominal exchange rate simply gives the price of a currency in regard to 
another.
16Loungani, P. 2000. p.36.
"ibid. p.35.
7deposits in foreign currencies, from both residents and non-residents, for domestic and 
foreign investments. Financial intermediaries demanded ever more loans and creditors and 
borrowers did not concern themselves with the possibility of exchange rate losses.
By 1996 Thailand’s foreign debt had increased to 50.14% of GDP.18 External debt 
above 40% of GDP is generally considered to be highly vulnerable. As greater sums of 
capital flowed into the country the number of profitable places to invest in diminished. 
Returns on equity of non-financial shares which were traded on Thailand’s stock exchange 
declined from 26.6% to 7.7% in 1996.19
Thailand’s rapid liberalisation of the capital account was poorly sequenced, occurring 
at a time when the regulatory regime remained weak and underdeveloped. This mistake lay 
at the very heart of Thailand’s financial crash. The good times led to bad policy, increasing 
Thailand’s vulnerability to panic.
Failure to introduce flexibility in the exchange rate regime 
Since 1984 the Thai baht had been pegged to the U.S. dollar. Despite the dollar’s dramatic 
appreciation from 1995 onwards, the Thai authorities insisted on maintaining the value of the 
exchange rate. In March 1997, an IMF official concluded that: “[The] introduction of a more 
flexible exchange rate arrangement is a policy priority, both to increase monetary policy 
autonomy and to improve the composition of the capital account by reducing incentives for 
short-term inflows ... In addition, the present system can hinder adjustment to external 
shocks; in particular the heavy weight of the U.S. dollar in the basket has been unhelpful in 
present circumstances”20. Yet the Thai authorities chose to ignore this and other warnings. 
Thailand could largely have avoided such a crisis if the Thai authorities had chosen to 
devalue the baht moderately and adjusted to an exchange rate with greater flexibility. 
Unfortunately, the Bank of Thailand was reluctant to do so fearing that political 
repercussions would follow any such move.
Short-term capital flows.
Thailand and its Asian counterparts had a number of key characteristics, which encouraged 
the flow of destabilising short-term inflows, rather than the more desirable (and more stable) 
long-term FDI:
1. The most obvious characteristic included the exchange rate peg, which allowed 
Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines to allow only limited exchange rate
l8Laird, J. 2000. p.90.
19In Biers, D. 1998. p.37.
20Laird, J. 2000. p.93.
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volatility. Indonesia operated a ‘crawling peg’, an exchange rate that would gradually 
depreciate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and was therefore highly predictable. For investors, the 
potential for exchange rate losses was minimised by these rigid regimes, encouraging short­
term speculative investments.
2. The regions’ liberalisation of capital accounts allowed domestic banks to access 
offshore markets in order to borrow cheaply in foreign currencies. The offshore markets 
charged a rate of interest of 6-7% as opposed to the higher domestic borrowing rate of 13- 
14%.21 Domestic banks seized this opportunity to borrow cheaply in foreign currencies, 
converting it into local currencies, which were then available for domestic loans. Hence the 
banks would reap the rewards of the interest rate differentials. The initial wave of investment 
that was required as the country developed proved immensely profitable. This encouraged 
further investment that was, however, subject to declining returns as ever more money was 
available. Financial intermediaries were lulled into a false sense of security by the exchange 
rate peg.
3. The liberalisation of the capital account was not complemented by an adequate 
regulatory regime to supervise the vast quantities of capital inflows. The absence of such 
regulation produced an environment that abetted excessive risk-taking.
4. Excessive optimism regarding the Asian region encouraged ever more capital 
inflows. Until the crisis struck, Thailand had “enjoyed a decade of world-wide acclaim as the 
world’s fastest-growing economy”22. Nayan Chanda of the Far Eastern Economic Review 
stated that: “Foreign banks frequently lent blindly, with little or no due diligence ... If the 
market is attractive you go with the herd. Even if you have doubts you don’t stop lending.”23
5. Incentives were offered by governments to borrow in foreign currencies, despite 
concerns about ‘hot money’ flows. For example, banks that borrowed and loaned foreign 
currencies through the BIBF “received special tax breaks”24.
6. Finally, an empirical study by Shang-Jin Wei of Harvard University found that 
Asian corruption has greatly discouraged FDI inflows, equivalent to a tax on multinational 
firms of 20% or more.25 (Table 3 shows that a number of East Asian economies perform 
poorly in a number of aspects of their economies and civil institutions, p.30.) This
21Laird, J. 2000. p.95.
22Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p. 14.
23In Biers, D. 1998. p. 10.
24Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.15.
25Wei, S. 1997.
9‘corruption tax’ meant that short-term flows were therefore the cheaper and less risky 
alternative.
Asian moral hazard
‘The Asian miracle was particularly attacked for its reliance on ‘statist’ industrial policy and 
cronyism (incestuous relationships between big businesses and the government), both of 
which contributed to moral hazards in the inefficient financial sector and the resultant over- 
investment in a classic asset bubble” .
These implicit government guarantees were conducive to financial intermediaries 
becoming excessively over-extended through external borrowing. This was evident in South 
Korean Chaebol-controlled banks, Thai finance companies and members of Indonesia’s ex- 
President Suharto’s family. Coupled with the lack of financial supervision and inexperience 
in dealing with capital flows, these factors fostered an environment that endorsed excessive 
domestic lending and over-investment within the Asian economies. For example, the 
intermediaries would lend capital to speculative real estate ventures that could be either 
highly profitable or unequivocal failures. If the venture was unsuccessful and large losses 
were incurred, Krugman argues that the government would step in to salvage their friends at 
the bank or finance company. “Heads the [finance company] wins: tails the taxpayer 
loses”27.
Following the years of high economic growth, Asian governments were insistent that 
their economies should continue to maintain such economic growth. Together with ‘old boy’ 
cronyism, this belief instituted an environment that was unwilling to see private projects fail. 
As a result, such projects enjoyed a safety net of public guarantees. Corsetti et al. argue that: 
“With financial and industrial policy enmeshed within a widespread business network of 
personal and political favouritism, and with the governments that appeared willing to 
intervene in favour of troubled firms, markets operated under the impression that the return 
on investment was somewhat ‘insured’ against adverse shocks. Such pressures and beliefs 
represented the underpinnings of a sustained process of capital accumulation, resulting in 
persistent and large current account deficits.”28
Indeed, the consensus among foreign creditors was that their investments within the 
financial intermediaries, with which they were depositing their capital, were implicitly 
insured against insolvency by the Asian governments. As Asian investment quality
26Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p.24.
27Krugman, P. 2000a. p.89.
28Corsetti et al. 1998a. pp.2-3.
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deteriorated, the domestic creditors did not reduce their exposures to speculative ventures or 
consolidate their losses. On the contrary, when a business is already experiencing adverse 
circumstances, the anticipation of a future bail-out will actually provide a stronger incentive 
to take on even greater risks.
Devaluation
The exchange rate pegs operated within the Asian economies were established in order to 
achieve monetary stability, which was largely achieved. As confidence in the system grew, 
capital flows to the Asian region also began to grow and Asian banks and finance companies 
increasingly borrowed in offshore markets, converting dollars or yen into local currency, 
which was then made available for loans to the private sector.
The rates of return in Asia were far greater than those that were available in the 
developed economies. The higher premium demanded by investors reflected the market’s 
belief that emerging Asian markets represented a greater risk than their Western counterparts. 
Thus the Asian economies offered highly profitable opportunities, allowing easy foreign 
access to the markets on a short-term basis. The currencies were stable, but, if the 
environment began to deteriorate, investors could soon get their money out.
Foreign short-term loans to Thailand between 1994 and 1996 amounted to, on 
average, 7%-10% of GDP, while foreign direct investment remained ludicrously small at 1% 
of GDP. The country’s total external debt (public and private) increased to 50.9% of GDP in 
1996 from 38.3% in 1990.29 “One of the few economic laws ... necessitates that significant 
capital account surpluses lead to significant current account deficits. The larger the inflows, 
usually the larger the current account deficit. By 1996, Thailand was running a current 
account deficit of some of 8% of GDP”30.
Another result of large capital inflows was the appreciation of real exchange rates. In 
order to maintain the stable value of the exchange rate the Thai central bank (the Bank of 
Thailand) attempted to offset any increase in the demand for the Thai currency by sterilising 
the capital inflows. For example, if a European bank lent a Thai bank U.S. dollars the Thai 
bank would need to convert the foreign currency into local currency in order to finance 
investment in Thailand. This raised the demand for baht, so the Bank of Thailand would 
increase the supply of the domestic currency and buy dollars or yen in the foreign exchange 
market. Therefore, the initial dollar loan’s indirect consequence was to increase the Bank of 
Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves and the domestic money supply.
29In: Biers, D. 1998. p.31.
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With the increase in the domestic money supply aggregate demand began to rise. 
These inflows of foreign capital were used to finance building and infrastructure projects, 
which, in turn, increased Asian demand for foreign goods and services. The increased 
consumption then intensified inflationary pressures and induced a further appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. This led to a deterioration in the trade account thanks to the higher prices 
of the country’s exports.
Although a current account deficit can suggest that an economy is overheating, on its 
own it is by no means an evil that should require amelioration by means of a devaluation. 
Indeed, the United States currently possesses the largest current account deficit the world has 
ever seen and the volume and composition of foreign capital inflows enables the U.S. deficit
q 1
to grow. Today, trade is dwarfed by the size of international capital flows, so many of the 
Asian current account deficits could have been sustained if the capital flows to the region had 
not abruptly stopped and, indeed, gone into reverse.
l.iii. Trigger mechanisms 
What initiated the reversal of flows was the identification of Thailand’s weakening export 
sectors (Table 4 outlines Asia’s slowing export sectors from 1995-96, p.31.) and the 
subsequent belief that the country was unable to sustain such a large current account deficit. 
(See Tables 5 and 6 on p.31.) Additionally, in late 1996, Thailand had recorded its first fiscal 
deficit for many years. The financial markets then recognised the twin fiscal and current 
account deficits that were important characteristics of the Mexican ‘Tequila’ crisis.
Additional trigger mechanisms for the reversal of foreign funds included the Thai 
government’s failed rescue attempt of a prominent finance company, Finance One, which 
subsequently announced that both foreign and domestic investors would incur losses. This 
corporate failure together with the collapse of some of Korea’s famed conglomerates (or 
chaebols) encouraged a renewed risk appraisal of the Asian markets and Thai interest rates 
began to rise in an effort to attract new capital. Thailand’s housing glut was also exposed, 
which had resulted in $20 billion worth of property being unsold at the end of 1996. Thus, 
when loans began to be called in from the foreign creditors Thailand was drastically short of 
liquidity. By May of 1997, the net capital account was negative, showing that more capital 
was flowing out of the country than into it. This news, coupled with the fiscal and current 
account deficits, strengthened the belief that devaluation was imminent.
30Henderson, C. 2000. p.5.
31See Mann, C. 2000. p.43.
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Fearing a devaluation, the Thai companies which were at risk from exchange rate 
losses began converting baht into dollars, thus further contributing to the weakness of the 
currency in the foreign exchange market. Currency speculators joined in, advocating a 
devaluation of the baht. The Bank of Thailand responded by buying baht with its foreign 
exchange reserves. However, the Bank finally gave up its defence of the beleaguered baht, 
precipitating the collapse of the exchange rate peg on July 2nd 1997. By this time, the Bank 
of Thailand’s had spent $23.4 billion of its foreign exchange reserves in an unsuccessful 
attempt to defend the value of the baht, which plunged from 25 baht to the U.S. dollar to 56.
Had the banks’ and the finance companies’ debts been denominated in a local 
currency the Bank of Thailand could have stepped in and fulfilled its role as ‘lender of last 
resort’. But, these loans were denominated in foreign currencies, which left the government 
and the Bank of Thailand helpless. The Asian region endured a severe credit crunch as 
foreign capital went into reverse. The withdrawal of foreign bank loans from the Asian 
region between 1996 and the second half of 1997 was an astonishing 9.5% of Asian GDP. “It 
is very difficult to attribute a reversal of this magnitude in such a short period of time to 
changes in underlying economic fundamentals”32.
Thailand’s economy has for many years exhibited certain defects. These 
shortcomings were eventually highlighted by the rapid liberalisation of Thai capital markets. 
The dependency on foreign loans to stimulate growth made the Thai economy vulnerable to 
an adverse change in investor sentiment. Thus, when the economic climate became less 
favourable, investors became reluctant to renew their loans believing that Thailand was about 
to endure a financial crisis.
This prophecy soon became self-fulfilling as Thailand suffered a financial panic 
comparable to a bank run. When investors began to believe a crisis was ensuing they called 
in their loans. In turn, this initiated a further withdrawal of capital as remaining investors 
realised that they must also get their money out to avoid losses when the crisis hits. The 
upshot is that creditors caused the very crisis they were predicting, proving themselves 
correct in the process. As a result of the inadequate level of foreign exchange reserves in 
relation to short-term debt and the poor quality of investment projects, Thailand was unable 
to raise sufficient liquidity to pay back the loans that were being called in and the crisis 
ensued.
32Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p. 10.
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One source stated that: “The Asian financial crisis erupted as globalisation and 
financial liberalisation accelerated and unrest on financial markets intensified. It was 
triggered by international speculation. The fundamental and deep-rooted causes were, 
however, the pervasive defects in the economic foundations and financial systems of the East 
Asian countries.”33
l.iv. Asian contagion
The hostile environment following the Asian financial crisis intensified the contagion as 
investors began to analyse the weaknesses they had previously considered to be manageable 
given time. But the markets had become less forgiving.
In the aftermath of Thailand’s devaluation on July 2nd 1997, there followed a series 
of depreciations throughout the Asian region. The Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit, the 
Indonesian rupiah, the South Korean won, the Taiwanese dollar and the Singaporean dollar 
all endured depreciations. Even the Hong Kong dollar was targeted by speculators in 
October, forcing the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) to raise overnight interest 
rates to 300% to defend the fixed exchange rate.
Although the worst-hit crisis countries were those of Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea, Indonesia’s rupiah lost 106% of its value relative to the U.S. dollar between July 4th 
and December the 19th 1997!34
The depreciations of the currencies throughout the region was due to the sudden 
withdrawal of external financing, a repercussion of Thailand’s devaluation. The consequence 
was a severe liquidity crunch in the worst hit economies. Foreign investors appeared to treat 
the region as one or, at the very least, a homogeneous group of countries in close proximity to 
one another, with both similar growth rates and moral values.
The dramatic withdrawal of foreign capital was a result of herd psychology. 
According to Kim and Wei: “Herding is the tendency that investors of a particular group 
mimic each other’s trading. Portfolio investors may herd rationally or irrationally. 
Informational asymmetry may cause uninformed but rational speculators to chose to trade in 
the same way as informed traders. Since informational problems may be more serious when 
it comes to investing in a foreign market than a domestic one, herding may be more severe 
correspondingly.”35 Those investors who do not follow the ‘herd’ are liable to bear 
significant losses, thus encouraging investors to follow the herd.
33Transition. June 1998.
34Kloker, D. 1998.
35Kim & Wei. 1999. p.9.
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In addition to herding, there are a number of other means by which contagion can 
adversely affect the fundamentals of neighbouring nations or countries who share comparable 
fundamental weaknesses with the crisis-hit country. Alejandro Lopez-Mejia of the IMF has 
identified five reasons for the transmission of contagion: “First, trade arrangements and 
exchange rate pressures contribute to volatility and contagion. Second, there is the ‘wake-up 
call’ phenomenon, whereby the collapse of one country’s currency alters investors’ 
perceptions about other countries’ economic fundamentals. Third, institutional investors’ 
herding behaviour induces common outcomes in countries with very heterogeneous 
fundamentals. Fourth, there are financial links between countries. For example, the pattern 
of financial holdings can lead to shocks spilling over into other countries, regardless of those 
countries’ fundamentals. Fifth, liquidity-management practices of open-end mutual funds* 
can create contagion effects as leveraged investors facing margin calls** need to sell their 
asset holdings, which, because of information asymmetries, they may do at below-market
• >)36pnces
The Asian region was highly integrated financially, although this was not through 
inter-regional investment flows; it was through externally financed ‘emerging market funds’. 
These funds acted as conduits for foreign capital, which were then distributed throughout the 
region. Consequently, when the troubles in Thailand began to emerge, investors began to call 
in their loans, which effectively withdrew capital from several Asian economies.
Trade linkages also posed problems because intra-regional trade amounted to a half of 
Asia’s total trade. “It seemed inevitable that if one of the economies collapsed in South-east 
Asia, the rest would follow”37.
In the aftermath of Thailand’s devaluation, each exchange rate peg in the region 
looked vulnerable and those possessing the fundamental weaknesses that were inherent 
characteristics of Thailand were worst struck.
South Korea
The plunge in the value of the Korean won from 800 to the dollar to a low of 1,985 meant 
that the amount of won needed to repay dollar-denominated debt had more than doubled. 
(Table 7 shows cumulative depreciation rates following the crisis, p.31.) Furthermore, in 
March 1998, U.S. $30 billion in short-term debt was due meaning that Korea was facing
36Lopez-Mejia, A. 1999. p.30. *An open-end mutual fund is where the fund managers may alter the 
investments held without notifying the unit holders. These funds are used in the USA. **Margin calls are calls 
to a client from his commodity or stock broker to increase his margin and usually occurs when the client has an 
open position in a market that is moving adversely for this position.
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potential bankruptcy without foreign aid. The foreign currency-denominated debt of the top 
thirty chaebols and their numerous affiliates totalled approximately U.S. $60 billion.38
Many of the factors that contributed to Thailand’s debacle were evident in the world’s 
11th largest economy, that of South Korea. Korea suffered from weak banking standards and 
deficient regulation, resulting in over-investment in many sectors. Nevertheless, Korea’s 
crisis had certain elements that differentiated it from that of the rest of the region.
South Korean growth had been helped by conglomerate mergers, the chaebols 
enjoying deep-rooted affiliations with the government. Since the 1960s the government had 
administered loans, through the banking system, to priority industries. After the initial 
success of this procedure, it later gave rise to a growing problem of bad loans. This bred 
corruption and retarded the banks’ ability to make profitable loans. This policy therefore 
stymied microeconomic growth because the vast majority of banks’ resources were directed 
largely to the chaebols. Nayan Chanda commented that: “Bureaucrats chose to finance giant 
petrochemical plants and build millions of cars, even when markets clearly couldn’t absorb 
the additional production. By the end of 1997, this orgy of expansion without any concern 
for the bottomline or shareholder interest had created a staggering amount of debt - 135% to 
140% of nominal GNP ... About $153 billion came from offshore borrowing and two-thirds 
of that was short-term.”39 Moreover, in late 1997 Korea’s usable foreign exchange reserves, 
which are essential for repaying short-term debt as it becomes due, dwindled to just $10 
billion.40
Korea had experienced deteriorating trade accounts with two of the country’s main 
trading partners since the 1990s. The first was Japan. Korea had failed to undertake 
significant investment in research and development. The chaebols, therefore, had to rely 
upon Japan for much of their machinery, which generated a large trade deficit with Japan, 
amounting to $15 billion in 1996. The second was the trade offensive launched on Korea by 
the United States. The U.S. wished to raise the value of Korea’s currency in order to reduce 
demand for Korean exports in the U.S. market, threatening sanctions if Korea did not 
comply. Consequently, Korea’s trade account with the U.S. fell from $6 billion in 1988 to a 
deficit of $11 billion in 1996.41 Additionally, Korea’s East Asian neighbours had a far 
cheaper labour force, thus intensifying pressure on Korea’s exporting industries.
38Henderson, C. 2000. p.46.
39In: Biers, D. 1998. pp.12-13.
40The Economist. 13 December 1997. p.67.
41Kloker, D. 1998.
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Finally, the accession of Korea into the developed nations club, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), had forced Korea to adopt a more liberal 
stance towards foreign capital and finance. This enabled Korean banks to borrow cheaply in 
offshore markets, thus contributing to over-investment and financial vulnerability.
Korea’s top twenty listed companies were earning only 3% on assets by 1996. At the 
same time, the average cost of borrowing had increased to 8.2%.42 When the country applied 
to the IMF for assistance it received the largest aid package in IMF history, totalling more 
than $57 billion.
Indonesia
Of the three countries that suffered acute financial crisis Indonesia has been worst hit, 
“battered by economic and political crises which have become mutually reinforcing, 
producing a downward spiral of instability, rising poverty and unrest, and government 
inaction with no end in sight. The social impact of the crisis in Indonesia has been immediate 
and dramatic, bringing to light underlying social tensions, which had previously been 
obscured by relative economic stability”43. The Indonesian currency, the rupiah, fell from 
2,300 to 17,000 to the U.S. dollar and the economy contracted by 13.2% in 1998. The 
breakdown of the domestic economy resulted in a collapse in imports and consequently a 
rapid improvement in the trade account.
Indonesia suffered from ailments similar to those which contributed to Thailand’s 
collapse. Banks initially prospered from the opportunity to borrow cheap credit in offshore 
markets, converting dollars into rupiah. However, lax financial supervision and regulatory 
measures were unable to manage the vast inflows of capital to ensure they were put to 
productive use.
Following the Thai devaluation, analysts believed that Thailand had the weakest 
fundamentals in the region. No one could foresee the devastating human and financial crisis 
that swept through Indonesia. “Indonesia’s strong economic fundamentals, a more liberal 
exchange rate policy and the extremely attractive interest rate yields offered by rupiah 
deposits made many Indonesian companies assume the currency was a safe-haven amid the 
regional currency storm”44. As a result, many Indonesian companies continued to borrow in 
U.S. dollars and convert them into rupiah, despite the fact that neighbouring countries were 
experiencing destabilising pressures on their currencies. Consequently, less than 20% of
42Bullard et al. 1998. p.14.
43Ibid. p.23.
44Asia Review Book 1998. p.26.
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Indonesian corporations were hedged against foreign exchange exposures when the rupiah 
began to slide in late July 1997. When the rupiah depreciated the unhedged borrowers rushed 
to convert rupiah into dollars, applying further pressure to the downward spiral of the rupiah 
as it achieved one record low after another. The IMF was then called in to provide financial 
assistance but actually worsened the situation by contributing to the meltdown of the 
Indonesian banking system. (The response of the IMF to the Asian crisis will be analysed in 
Chapter 6.)
Indonesia’s economic and political catastrophe resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of people living below the poverty line. From a pre-crisis level of 11.2%, those 
living on less than a dollar a day increased to 60.6%.45
Malaysia
The Malaysian ringgit plunged 33% from July to October 1997 and the Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange lost approximately half of its value from its March 1997 peak, with the majority of 
that decline occurring throughout the summer of 1997.
Malaysia’s economic difficulties were aggravated by Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad’s intemperance. Nayan Chanda commented that: “Having chalked up rapid 
growth for nearly a decade, Mahathir was reluctant to accept that some of his policies could 
be faulty. He blasted foreign speculators and termed currency trading ‘immoral.’”46 
Mahathir’s behaviour supported the belief among foreign creditors that the Malaysian Prime 
Minister was unwilling to address the country’s fundamental difficulties.
In September 1998, Malaysia imposed currency controls and fixed the ringgit at 3.8 to 
the U.S. dollar. Interest rates were lowered and this reduced the debt-service burden that 
Malaysian banks and companies were facing, which was significant given that Malaysia’s 
debt to GDP was about 160% at the time.
Taiwan
In contrast to other East Asian economies, Taiwanese corporate debt relative to the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves (which amounted to over $100 billion), remained low throughout 
the crisis period. Thus investors knew that demands for their deposits could easily be 
satisfied. However, in mid-October 1997 Taiwan allowed its currency to float. The 
Taiwanese authorities believed that there was little point in defending a currency that had 
appreciated considerably in relation to five of Taiwan’s East Asian export competitors.
45Bello, W. 1998b.
“ in: Biers, D. 1998. p.13.
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Once it was floated, the Taiwan dollar depreciated by just 5% and the economy 
continued to grow throughout 1998 while many of the country’s East Asian counterparts 
were subjected to devastating economic recessions.
Singapore
The Singapore dollar was the least afflicted currency of those that were affected by the Asian 
financial storm. During the crisis, the Singaporean monetary authorities allowed a greater 
degree of flexibility between the Singapore dollar and its basket of trading currencies. The 
currency touched its lowest value against the dollar for three years in October 1997, but even 
at this weakened level it represented a significant appreciation against its Asian neighbours. 
Callum Henderson believes that: “The case of Singapore concerns one of fundamentally 
superior economic management... The Singapore dollar could not help but be swept along to 
an extent by the crisis, but the important point was that investor confidence in the handling of 
the economic and financial fundamentals of the country remained assured.”47
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has been operating a currency board system since 1983. Ever since the adoption 
of this stringent regime the Hong Kong dollar has been fixed at a rate of 7.80 to one U.S. 
dollar. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) also had access to the foreign 
exchange reserves of China, which, when combined with Hong Kong’s reserves, amounted to 
$220 billion.
Hong Kong has a strong financial and regulatory system and “corporate Hong Kong 
wasn’t massively leveraged: Among the territory’s major corporations, debt averages 30% of 
equity - one-tenth the figure for South Korea”48. However, following Taipei’s decision to let 
the Taiwan dollar float, analysts believed that the Hong Kong dollar was exposed and grossly 
overvalued. The depreciation of both the Taiwan and Singapore dollars had led to additional 
pressure on Hong Kong, partly due to the similarity between their export sectors and partly as 
a result of intensifying speculation that Hong Kong would follow the example of its equally 
developed neighbour states and allow a moderate depreciation.
There were additional explanations to recommend a correction of Hong Kong’s 
exchange rate. Firstly, the Hong Kong dollar had appreciated by 30% during the 1990s, a 
result of the increased strength of the U.S. currency. Secondly, the dramatic devaluations of 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia applied additional pressure to the Hong Kong unit, not
47Henderson, C. 2000. pp.50-51.
48In: Biers, D. 1998. p.81.
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through export competition but through a significant change in relative prices. Finally, Hong 
Kong’s return to mainland China in July 1997 had involved a degree of political risk.
On detailed inspection, market commentators believed that Hong Kong shared a 
property bubble equal to many of its regional neighbours, illustrated by the astronomical 
price of real estate. It was also argued that Hong Kong’s smaller banks, despite a stringent 
regulatory regime, were not as healthy as they seemed. The bank’s property loans amounted 
to around 40-50% of domestic bank lending, the highest level in the region.
The currency board regime that Hong Kong operates is supposedly immune to 
straightforward speculative attacks. Yet it was severely tested in October 1997. The 
currency board’s self-correcting nature means that domestic interest rates adjust 
automatically to pressures on the Hong Kong dollar through changes in the money supply. 
Therefore, any selling of Hong Kong dollars causes an equal contraction in the domestic 
money supply, inducing higher interest rates. The theory of the currency board suggests that 
eventually interest rates will reach such a point that investor interest will be restored as a 
result of the high returns available.
In many respects, this is what happened with Hong Kong’s defence of its currency. 
Overnight interest rates reached 300% in a successful attempt to maintain the value of the 
exchange rate and encourage speculators to hold on to their Hong Kong dollars. However, 
the costs were large as the high interest rates had severely adverse affects on real economic 
activity generating a harsh recession in 1998, which saw the economy contract by 10.4%.49 
The HKMA responded in two ways. Firstly, by attempting to stabilise the stock exchange 
through large interventions of stock purchases totalling U.S. $15 billion, which began on 
August 14, 1998.50 Secondly, the monetary authorities attempted to counter-act speculation 
by reaffirming their commitment to an open capital account and the currency board regime. 
But the HKMA’s intervention in the stock market was greeted by much criticism, 
domestically and internationally. The HKMA’s goal was to reduce interest rates and to 
stabilise asset prices, yet this will only happen when investors observe value. Thus the 
intervention by the HKMA in the Hang Seng Index only served to distort equity values. 
Investors searching for value simply waited until the HKMA stepped aside.
On October 23 1997, the Hang Seng stock market lost 1,211.47 points and reached a 
1998 low of 6,544.79 from over 16,000 in 1997.51 The steadfast currency board inflicted
49Henderson, C. 2000. p.53.
S0Ghosh et al. 2000. p.304.
51Henderson, C. 2000. p.53.
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serious economic pain on the territory’s economy. In comparison, Singapore and Taiwan 
moderately depreciated their exchange rates and continued to grow throughout 1998. So the 
question must be asked in relation to the Hong Kong dollar’s stability during the crisis. Was 
it worth it?
Callum Henderson argues that: “[There was] absolutely no benefit to the HKMA in 
letting the peg go, and every reason to maintain i t ... If the currency board system had been 
seen to be defeated, it would have caused disaster, and not just for Hong Kong. All other 
currency boards in the world would instantly have been targeted”52. Indeed, Ghosh et al. 
believe that: “should a currency board arrangement fail eventually, contagion to other 
currency board arrangements could be significant.”53 Additionally, Mr Henderson argues 
that if the currency board had been abandoned “the resulting devaluation of the Hong Kong 
dollar could not have been limited and would have caused a proportional devaluation of the 
banking system’s capital base. It would have caused the one thing it had not done to any 
degree up until that point, a loss of confidence in the domestic supervisory institutions and in 
the domestic banking system ... The banking system would have imploded, domestic interest 
rates would have skyrocketed rather than fallen as demand for Hong Kong dollars collapsed 
and the stock market and the economy would have gone into meltdown”54.
Furthermore, the HKMA was aware of the contagion that would spread to China
should the Hong Kong currency be devalued. A devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar would
have increased the price of Chinese exports to the territory, further reducing China’s 
competitiveness, given that their currency had already appreciated in real terms by 30-50% in 
relation to its regional neighbours. This potential loss of export earnings could easily have 
brought the Chinese current account into deficit. When Hong Kong started to meltdown 
analysts began to focus on potential direct and indirect effects on China.
Following Hong Kong’s considerable losses on the Hang Seng Index, contagion
began to spread to other parts of the world for the first time since the crisis began.
Substantial losses occurred on the leading Latin American bourses and the Russian stock 
market. Russia and Brazil were seen as particularly vulnerable owing to their large budget 
deficits. Their central banks then raised interest rates attempting to ward off currency 
speculation.
52Ibid. pp.56-57.
53Ghosh et al. 2000. p.301.
54Henderson, C. 2000. pp.56-57.
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China
Paul Krugman acknowledges that: “China’s economic growth has been astonishing, but then 
so was the growth of everyone else in the region until the crisis. On every other dimension 
China looks worse not better, than its neighbours: more bad banks (there may well be no truly 
solvent banks in China), more nepotism, more corruption”55. Yet, China’s economy 
continued a remarkable rate of growth throughout the crisis period and the currency, the 
renminbi, even strengthened against the U.S. dollar. China’s apparent immunity to both 
regional and global financial turmoil will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
l.v. Why was the Asian crisis not anticipated?
The economies of South-east Asia were the fastest growing economies in the world before 
they were hit with the “financial equivalent of a nuclear holocaust”56. Few people anticipated 
the financial crisis. The governments had not been profligate and unemployment was not 
particularly high. Above all, the governments’ policies seemed successful, inflation was low, 
most countries enjoyed budget surpluses, saving rates were high and continued growth 
seemed a certainty.
Nobody envisaged such a dramatic nose-dive in investor confidence, despite the 
continued fall in value of many Asian stock markets throughout 1996. The decline in 
Thailand’s and South Korea’s stock markets, which had recently achieved record levels, 
represented one of the few indications of dwindling confidence amongst market participants 
prior to the crisis
There were few other indications of the impending financial crisis. Radelet and Sachs 
argued that: “While current account deficits were large, capital inflows were even larger, so 
foreign exchange reserves were actually growing across the region (except Malaysia) ... 
Thailand’s [fiscal] budget reportedly deteriorated markedly in late 1996 and early 1997, 
partly in response to the crisis itself, rather than an independent cause.”57
Paul Krugman was one of the few who did predict a downturn in Asian economic 
growth. In his article ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ he argued that Asian economic growth 
was the result of resource mobilization rather than efficiency. Krugman compared Asia’s 
growth to that of the Soviet Union: “The newly industrialising countries of Asia, like the 
Soviet Union of the 1950s, have achieved rapid growth in large part through an astonishing 
mobilisation of resources. Once one accounts for the role of rapidly growing inputs in these
55Krugman, P. 2000a. p. 144.
56Kloker, D. 1998.
57Radelet & Sachs. 1998. pp.22-23.
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countries growth, one finds little left to explain. Asian growth like that of the Soviet Union 
in its high growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and 
capital rather than by gains in efficiency. Singapore grew through a mobilization of 
resources that would have done Stalin proud”58. The author then uses empirical evidence on 
the countries’ technical efficiency change. “The rate at which Asian developing countries 
were converging on the productivity of advanced countries [was as follows]: Hong Kong 2.0, 
Taiwan 0.8, Thailand 0.1, Indonesia -1.2, Malaysia -1.8, Singapore -3.5. Therefore, the 
Asian economies were not closing the productivity gap”59 and some were actually falling 
behind! Similarly, the Soviet Union experienced slowing rates of growth. For example, 
output per unit of combined input declined rapidly: in the period 1928-1966 it was 2.0; in the 
period 1950-1960 it was 1.7; in the period 1960-1981 it fell to 0.8; and in the period 1983- 
1987 it was -0.7.60 Indeed, the global competitiveness report indicates that a number of 
Asian manufacturing countries are poorly rated in terms of state funding of scientific research 
and private sector R&D spending. (See Table 3, p.30.)
Although the Asian crisis did not follow Paul Krugman’s initial prediction, it did 
underline certain flaws in Asia’s economic growth, prompting Radelet and Sachs to examine 
the impressive growth record a little closer. They agreed with Krugman’s critique, namely 
that Asia’s growth rate was unlikely to continue at such breakneck pace. But they believe 
that Krugman was “wrong about the solidity of Asia’s economic development, and [that] he 
gave a misleading impression of Asia’s economic prospects for the future”61. Radelet and 
Sachs argue that Asia’s rapid growth had been achieved through both productivity growth 
and capital investments. And more importantly, that investment spending has achieved rates 
of return that exceed the cost of capital. Thus the authors believe that Asian resources were 
allocated according to market forces and that rates of return had only fallen gradually over 
time. In contrast, Soviet resources were allocated via bureaucratic fiat and rates of return 
were low and began to fall as early as the late 1950s.
l.vi. East Asia in the new millennium 
Following their recessions of 1998, the crisis-hit East Asian economies enjoyed a spectacular 
economic recovery. In 1999 and 2000 these countries experienced average GDP growth of
58Krugman, P. 1994. p.70.
59Krugman, P. 2000a. pp.30-33.
60Gregory & Stuart. 1994. pp.238-9.
61Radelet & Sachs. 1997. p.48.
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7%.62 South Korea grew by 10% in 1999 after contracting by nearly 6% in 1998, an
/’«3
economic rebound of almost 16%. (See Table 8, p.32.) However, good times often make 
for bad policy and the reforms that these countries began, in the aftermath of the regional 
crisis, have been jeopardised by Asia’s fast recovery. “If 100 reforms are necessary, at most 
five are being introduced. Once cyclical rebound set in, reform slowed and in some cases 
stopped”64.
Ajai Chopra of the IMF’s Asia and Pacific department outlined failures on Korea’s 
restructuring front: ‘“The need for concrete restructuring progress and tangible results - 
principally the exit of non-viable firms and asset sales - has now become imperative to ensure 
that the remaining problems do not jeopardise what has already been achieved’. [John 
Thornhill subsequently argues that:] The same could be said of Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia.”65 It has been widely agreed by the IMF and the World Bank that the greatest 
obstacle to progress has been the legal systems that cannot cope with corporate debt 
resolution. By value almost 60% of Malaysia’s debt cases had been resolved in July (2000). 
The figure was 43% in Thailand while in Indonesia 50% of distressed corporate debt was 
estimated “to be subject to some form of resolution”66.
The East Asian economies were fortunate when in 1997 they slumped but the United
fklStates boomed. During 1997-98 the United States grew at 4% annually. Morgan Stanley 
believes that around two-fifths of Asia’s total GDP growth in 2000 was fuelled by I.T exports 
to America.68 To its credit, the U.S. did not make a political issue over the reduced cost of 
Asia’s exports. But now that the U.S. economy is slowing, American firms have been 
slashing their investment and consequently their imports from Asia. Merrill Lynch expect 
Asian exports to increase by only 7% in 2001, following 20% growth in 2000.69 Asia’s 
slowing exports are compounded by the Japanese yen’s continued weakness (on average,
70exports account for approximately 50% of GDP in the smaller East Asian economies).
But Asia’s macroeconomies are far less vulnerable to a financial crisis than they were 
in 1997. All of the countries, with the exception of Malaysia, have abandoned their pegged
62The Economist. 31 March 2001. p. 15.
63Henderson, C. 2000. p.xvi.
64Chan, R. 2001.
65Thomhill et al. 5 December 2000.
66Fidler, S. 2000b.
67The Economist. 31 March 2001. p. 101.
68The Economist. 7 July 2001. p. 12.
69The Economist. 16 December 2000. p.l 11.
70The Economist. 7 July 2001. p. 12.
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exchange rates, current accounts are presently in surplus rather than deficit as in 1997, 
foreign exchange reserves are healthy and foreign currency-denominated short-term debt has 
been reduced. However, to become more resilient to global slumps, East Asia must diversify 
its export destinations and increase regional trade.
Asia’s reformers appear to have learnt an important lesson from the financial crisis of 
1997 - that of improved monetary policy. Central bankers now stress price stability, and are 
no longer trying to simultaneously target the exchange rate and inflation. Therefore, East 
Asian countries have allowed their exchange rates to depreciate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, e.g. 
The Korean won depreciated by 15% from April 2000 to March 2001.71 This will help the 
Asian economies to maintain export competitiveness. Although Asia’s external debt is 
primarily denominated in dollars, this is far less a problem than for other developing 
countries. According to J.P. Morgan, this is because Asia’s trade quantities are 
proportionally so high, hence, the strong dollar will enable them to obtain more in new trade 
than it will cost them in higher debt-service costs. “As a share of exports, for example, Latin 
America’s external debt is more than twice as high as Asia’s. To most central bankers in 
Asia, therefore, rising debt-service costs have not been a major concern”72.
America last experienced a recession in 1990-91, which Asia weathered admirably, 
but, at that time, domestic demand was strong. Presently, domestic demand is weak and 
governments have little ability to improve it through additional expenditures, for Asian 
economies, excluding China, possessed an average budget deficit of nearly 4% in 2000.73 
Monetary policy will not be particularly effective because the region’s financial sectors 
remain weak. Banks still harbour many NPLs and are reluctant to lend.
The Economist estimates that if America’s economy slows sharply, East Asia’s 
growth will be reduced from 7% in 2000 to 5% 2001. But if America has zero GDP growth 
in 2001, Asian growth would slow to only 3.9%. Goldman Sachs predicts that growth in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan would fall from a combined 8.5% to 2.3%, 
and growth in the less-developed ASEAN economies from 4.8% to 1.3%.74
One of the main causes of Asia’s financial crisis was the region’s external over­
reliance on both foreign capital and exports to the West. Asia’s recovery, thus far, has been 
overly dependent on exports to America. This strategy has delayed reform of banks and
71The Economist. 31 March 2001. p. 101.
72The Economist. 16 December 2000. p.111.
73The Economist. 31 March 2001. p. 101.
74Ibid.
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companies, and some insolvent enterprises have been provided with imprudent subsidies 
enabling them to keep operating. These structural defects should have been addressed over 
the course of the last two years while external demand was strong. The economies would 
then have been in a healthier condition to cope with America’s downturn because monetary 
policies would have been more effective. The Economist has pointed out that as Japan’s 
experience shows, low interest rates will not drive domestic demand when banks are 
harbouring large quantities of bad loans, and remain unwilling to lend, while companies 
saddled with debts are reluctant to borrow.
Additionally, there are demographic threats to Asia’s future growth. Firstly, Asia 
possesses an ageing workforce. According to Chris Patten, one of the main reasons for 
Asia’s high savings and investments from the 1970s onwards was due to the high proportion 
of economically active residents who were bom in the 1950s or 60s. Hence, there will be just 
as fast a rise in the number of the retired in the early years of this century, e.g. the share of 
the population over 60 in Singapore will double in just seventeen years.75 Care of the elderly 
will place great pressure on families and the state. But most importantly, the financial impact 
of paying pensions and health care for an increasing number of retired Asians will be 
significant. The second demographic concern is Asia’s rapid urbanisation. This urbanisation 
occurs because of the huge disparity between urban and rural incomes. At present 
agricultural productivity is improving, in turn reducing the need for mral workers who then 
migrate to the cities where industries demand more labour. The Asian Development Bank 
estimates that by 2025 55% of Asia’s population will live in cities, compared with just 35% 
in 1995. In 2000, twelve of the world’s twenty-five largest cities were Asian. Asia’s rapid 
urbanisation will require large investment on urban infrastructure, such as transportation, 
sewage treatment and clean water supplies. The World Bank has calculated that Asian urban 
infrastructure investment will amount to $1.5 trillion until 2008, and $10 trillion until 2030. 
“Managing investment on this scale will test government competence”77.
At the time of the Asian crisis the Asian economies were fortunate that the region’s 
stability was not additionally jeopardised by an economic crisis in China. China with over 
$40 billion currently receives four-fifths of all FDI to the Asian region, excluding Japan, 
while the ASEAN countries share the remainder78. This foreign investment has contributed
75Patten, C. 1999. p.137.
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
78The Economist. 17 March 2001. p. 103.
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to making China an enormous exporter, and this trend is set to continue due to China’s near- 
limitless pool of exceptionally cheap labour, including a growing supply of well-educated 
graduates. However, China’s ability to attract such large volumes of FDI, deprives South­
east Asia’s economies of desperately-needed foreign skills and technology inputs. Moreover, 
the Economist believes that: “Without China’s cost structures - that is, its economies of scale 
and its low standard of living - other exporters in the region, from Indonesia to South Korea, 
will have trouble staying in business: China can just about out export them all. This 
realisation comes as a profound shock to China’s neighbours, most of whom have built a 
development strategy over the past few decades around export-led growth.”79
But China’s rise and predicted accession to the WTO should bring some benefits to 
the South-east Asian economies. In particular, China’s imports grew by $55 billion in 2000 
suggesting that the country may become a regional source of growth.80 Moreover, according 
to the Economist, China will not suffer from a slowing world economy because it is not yet 
deeply integrated into the world trading system. Instead, China relies on domestic trade, 
which will increase as railway and road networks become more extensive. South-east Asia’s 
markets must improve if the economies are to enjoy sustainable development. The 
Economist has identified three key areas for urgent reform: ‘The first is far greater emphasis 
on clean governance, transparency and legal predictability ... Second, the region must resume 
its earlier efforts to lower trade barriers ... [Third,] China’s growth also highlights the need to 
upgrade Southeast Asia’s domestic capital markets ... Better regulation and financial 
reporting would also help investment capital to find the best opportunities, boosting 
productivity growth.”81
However, DBS Bank in Singapore believe that: “South-east Asia squandered its 
‘golden decade’, which began in the mid-1980s, by failing to invest in better skills and 
sturdier capital markets. Every investor, businessman and columnist in Asia has his list of 
things that the region should have done sooner. Since it patently failed to do any of them, the 
implication seems that South-east Asia is headed for the scrap-heap.”82 But Radelet and 
Sachs disagree: “The Southeast Asian currency crises of 1997 are not a sign of the end of 
Asian growth but rather a recurring - if difficult to predict - pattern of financial instability that 
often accompanies rapid economic growth ... In the long-term, growth will continue because
79The Economist. 10 March 2001. p.26.
80Ibid. p.28.
81The Economist. 17 March 2001. pp. 103-4.
82Ibid. p. 103.
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most of Asia has adopted capitalism as the organizing basis of economic life and become 
deeply integrated into the global economy.”83 Presently the West enjoys a disproportionate 
share of world income, but, according to Radelet and Sachs, this share will decline as Asian 
incomes increase. They estimate that Asia will account for between 55 and 60% of world 
income by 2025, while the share of income in the West will fall from 45% in 1997 (despite 
only having 13% of the world’s population) to between 20 and 30%. (Table 9 shows East 
Asia’s GDP per capita relative to the U.S. from 1965 to projected estimates in 2025, p.32.) 
But living standards in the West will remain higher.84 Moreover, the former prime-minister 
of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew believes that the world’s economic centre of gravity will move 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, arguing that: “East Asia will dominate the world economy 
within 40 years provided conflicts can be avoided ... By 2040 China and Japan’s combined 
GDP would exceed that of the United States ... China’s entry into the WTO [will] make it a 
‘driving force’ of regional growth ... [But] ASEAN countries have to overcome the crux of 
the problem, that is to restore international interest and confidence in ASEAN’s potential.”85
l.vii. Conclusion
The Asian financial debacle of 1997 was a result of Asia’s growing vulnerability to a 
financial panic. The panic was contrived by the region’s excessive dependence on short-term 
capital inflows to stimulate economic growth. The flow of short-term capital was encouraged 
by a number of policy steps including the pegging of exchange rates and a dramatic 
liberalisation of the capital account that was not accompanied by an improvement in 
regulatory procedures. Authorities were, therefore, unable to effectively supervise the 
composition of funds in the capital account and Asia received capital inflows in excess of the 
countries ability to absorb them productively.
A further characteristic of the countries that were worst hit by the crisis, and a general 
indication of vulnerability to a financial panic was that short-term debt exceeded foreign 
exchange reserves by well over 100% in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. Therefore, as 
noted by Radelet and Sachs: “Once a crisis starts, each creditor knows that there are not 
enough liquid foreign exchange reserves for each short-term creditor to be fully paid, so each
Off
rushes to be the first in line to demand full repayment.” Callum Henderson believes that:
83Radelet & Sachs. 1997. p.45.
'“ ibid. pp.46-58.
85Bangkok Post. 17 August 2000.
86Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.30.
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“The most obvious lesson from the Asian crisis is - yet again - that sizeable current account 
deficits if left unchecked will inevitably come home to roost.”87
‘Crony capitalism’, outright corruption and nepotism undoubtedly played a significant 
role in the build up of NPLs. This was because they provided incentives for excessive risk 
taking throughout Asia. “Banks had little incentive for ensuring that their loans were 
creditworthy, while corporations had little incentive to ensure that their loans were needed in 
the first place since they would get them anyway”88.
Following the crisis, the Asian ‘miracle’ economies were heavily castigated for their 
reliance on statist industrial policies and for pervasive cronyism, which contributed to the rise 
of moral hazard-induced lending. However, Asia’s crisis did not reflect the success of the 
Western school or the failure of the Eastern one. Linda Lim considered ten Asian nations and 
divided them into two groups - those who were largely unaffected by the crisis and those who 
were. The former included several countries whose governments belonged to the Asian 
values group and were staunchly undemocratic. While the latter included some countries that 
had already begun to democratise.89
At the centre of Asia’s crisis lay an inefficient and imprudent micro-economy. 
Thailand subsequently closed fifty-six finance companies, Korea closed over half of the 
country’s merchant banks (not to mention the failure of many chaebols) and Indonesia 
endured many bank runs. Moreover, the region’s currency crisis became a debt crisis. “It 
had become a credit crunch where the level of nominal interest rates was no longer so 
important and where perceived credit risk ruled supreme, the benchmark of whether a 
company or a finance house would get a loan or not. In this world, both the sick and the 
healthy found getting credit extremely difficult if not impossible”90.
No other region of the world has been rewarded by the globalisation of trade and 
capital markets as East Asia. But although the global economy is quick to reward open 
markets, it is just as quick to punish those who are ill-prepared. Poorly sequenced 
liberalisation and inadequate supervision, which is the legacy of imprudent political 
leadership lie at the heart of Asia’s crisis.
In the short-term Asia is clearly at risk to America’s downturn. But Radelet and 
Sachs anticipate a more prosperous future for the Asian region as a whole: ‘The system of
87Henderson, C. 1999. p.3.
88Henderson, C. 2000. p.59.
89Lim, L. 1998.
90Henderson, C. 1999. p.8.
market capitalism, which first appeared in Western Europe, has finally become a global - and, 
in particular, Asian - instrument of economic development. Asia has demonstrated that it can 
mould capitalist institutions into a vehicle for rapid economic catch-up.”91
91Radelet & Sachs. 1997. p.59.
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Table 1. GDP growth annual average % 1970-1996
1970-79 1980-89 1990-96
Hong Kong 9.2 7.5 5
Singapore 9.4 7.2 8.3
Taiwan 10.2 8.1 6.3
South Korea 9.3 8 7.7
Malaysia 8 5.7 8.8
Thailand 7.3 7.2 8.6
Indonesia 7.8 5.7 7.2
China 7.5 9.3 10.1
Philippines 6.1 1.8 2.8
Rich industrial 
countries
3.4 2.6 2
Source: Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p. 17.
Table 2. Real effective foreign exchange rates. 1990-1997,1990=100.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
‘90 97.4 96.1 97.1 92.4 102.2
‘91 99.6 91.5 96.9 103.1 99
‘92 100.8 87.7 109.7 107.1 99.7
‘93 103.8 85.2 111 97.4 101.9
‘94 101 84.7 107.1 111.7 98.3 ?
‘95 100.5 87.7 106.9 109.5 101.7
‘96 105.4 87.1 112.1 116.3 107.6
‘97 62.3 59.2 84.8 90.8 72.3
Source: Chang & Velasco. 1998c. p.56.
Table 3.
Several Asian manufacturing nations are rated poorly in key aspects of their 
economies and civil institutions.
Ranking out of fifty-three industrialised and major developing nations worldwide
State Funding 
of Scientific 
Research
Private-sector
R&D
Expenditure
Judicial
Independence Corruption
China 22 47 29 45
Indonesia 53 53 51 52
Malaysia 42 31 30 28
Philippines 52 48 47 51
S. Korea 25 44 15 33
Taiwan 24 38 16 23
Thailand 48 36 43 41
Source: Sachs, J. 1999c. p. 12.
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Table 4. Exports % change over the previous year 1995-96
‘95 ‘96
Thailand 22 -1
China 21.5 3
Taiwan 20 4
Singapore 13 4
South Korea 30 4.5
Hong Kong 15 5
Malaysia 20 6
Indonesia 13 11
Philippines 29 17
Source: Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p.20.
Table 5. Current account $ billion 1993-2000
‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00
Korea 1 -5 -9 -23.5 -14 15 31.6* 7**
Thail -6.5 -8 -13.5 -14.8 -4 7 12.5 9.9#
Malay -3 -4.8 -7.2 -5 -5.5 -2 12.6 13.6#
Indon 2.5 -3.6 -6.8 -7.8 -7 4.5 5.8 11.1#
Phili -3 -3.2 -3.6 -4 -5 -2 7.8 13.6#
Taiw 7.2 6.4 5.2 11 7 5.5 5.1 Q1 9.6 Q4
Singap 4.4 12 14 13.8 13.4 7.8 18.8 Q1 21.8 Q4
H.K 8 2.3 -5.5 -2.3 -3 -2.3 7.2 5.9#
*June 1999. **b ovember2000. if Figures for 2000 are OECD projections.
Sources: Far Eastern Economic Review. ‘Rebuilding Asia’. N. Chanda. 12 February 1998. 
The Economist. Emerging market indicators. 4 April 1998. p. 148, 28 August 1999. p.90 and 
17 March 2001. p.154. OECD Economic Outlook. December 2000. p.126.
Table 6. Current accounts, % GDP 1992-1996.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
‘92 -2.2 -1.5 -3.4 -1.9 -5.9
‘93 -1.2 0.1 -4.2 -5.5 -5.3
‘94 -1.4 -1.2 -5.7 -4.8 -8.1
‘95 -3.2 -2 -7.7 -2.6 -7.6
‘96 -3.3 -4.8 -6.5 -3.5 -7.5
Source: Chang & Velasco. 1998c. p.55.
Table 7. Cumulative depreciation rates (July 1998).
Indo Malay Thail Korea Phili H.K Singap Taiwan
81%* 39%* 36%* 34%** 37%* 0%* 12%*** 13%**
*From July 1997. **From October 1997- May 1998. ***From August 1997- May 1998. 
Sources: Radelet & Sachs. 1998. Malleret et al. 1999. p.114.
The depreciations of the crisis-hit economies were quite different to the depreciations of 
Singapore and Taiwan.
i ne /\sian rinanciai crisis.
32
Table 8. Annual GDP growth % 1998-2002
‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01* ‘02*
China 7.8 7.1 8 7.6 7.8
Hong Kong -5.1 3.1 9 7.1 5.5
Indonesia -13.2 0 3.7 5 6.1
Korea -5.8 10.5 8.9 6.2 -
Malaysia -7.5 5.4 8.5 7 6.5
Philippines -0.5 3.2 3.5 3 3.5
Singapore 0.3 5.2 6 5.6 -
Taiwan 4.7 5.3 6.2 5.8 -
Thailand -9.4 4.2 5.6 5.8 7
*2001 and 2002 are OECD estimates.
Sources: Henderson, C. 2000. p.200. OECD Economic Outlook. 68. December 2000. p. 126.
Table 9. GDP per capita relative to the U.S. 1965-2025
Projected per capita
_______________ _______________  Projected GDP Growth Rate
‘65 ‘95 ‘25 1996-2025
Four Tigers 17.3% 72.2% 98.5% 2.8%
Hong Kong 30.1 98.4 116.5 2.1
Singapore 15.9 85.2 107 2.5
South Korea 9 48.8 82.6 3.5
Taiwan 14.2 56.2 88 3.1
China 3.2 10.8 38.2 6
Southeast Asia 10 21.2 45.7 4.5
Indonesia 5.2 13.1 35.8 5
Malaysia 14.3 36.8 71.2 3.9
Philippines 10.7 9.4 28.5 5.3
Thailand 9.7 25.6 47.4 3.8
Source: Radelet and Sachs. 1997. p.5
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1998
Introduction
Since 1991 Russia has attempted to transform a command economy into a market-orientated 
system, but from 1991 to 1999 GDP contracted by almost 50%. (See Table 1, p.65.) Boris 
Yeltsin (then president) aptly described the situation in a speech given on 30 March 1999: 
“We are bogged down halfway between a planned, command economy and a workable 
market one. We have created a freakish model, a hybrid of the two systems.”1 Looking at 
many socio-economic indicators, such as health care, life expectancy and levels of 
investment within the economy, Russia has deteriorated significantly since 1990. Russia is a 
democracy, but also a kleptocracy. Corruption and crime is pandemic. Political connections 
are the most important ‘currency’ in the market place. Many of the economic reforms Russia 
has undertaken have failed. In turn, this has led to financial vulnerability. I will examine the 
effects of these partial reforms and how they caused such instability within Russia and then 
consider the untimely exogenous shocks that were also at the heart of the Russian financial 
crisis.
2A. Failures in Russian economic reforms
According to the consultancy firm McKinsey, “one of the highest priority problems in the 
world today is the failure of the reforms undertaken in Russia in the early 1990’s to improve 
the well being of its population ... The drive towards establishing a market economy based on 
equal opportunities for all competitors has essentially stopped in Russia since 1995”2.
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union became more receptive 
to reform and consulted various Western economic agencies. Attention then began to focus 
on the experiences of economic transition in Central European countries such as Poland and 
Hungary. Economic liberalisation was becoming increasingly radical and Russia had severe 
economic troubles that required attention. The primary concerns were over-industrialisation 
and inefficiencies within the economy, shortages of goods, large federal budget deficits and 
high levels of inflation.
Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in late 1989. In 1991, the Soviet Union 
disintegrated. The Russian Federation became an independent state and President Boris 
Yeltsin’s government attempted a ‘shock therapy’ stabilisation programme together with a 
swift adjustment to a market-orientated economy. This recovery strategy was chosen by 
Russian neo-liberal economists (encouraged by Western advisers such as Jeffrey Sachs and
'CDSP. 1999, Vol. 51, no.13, p.14.
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Anders Aslund) who believed a market-orientated system with clearly defined property rights
and low inflation was essential to the establishment of an economy driven by entrepreneurial 
activity. Moreover, it was perceived that if reforms were implemented quickly the 
cumulative output loss would be far smaller and that the greatest opportunity to implement 
reforms was at the beginning of the transition process. The reformers not only sought advice 
on how to establish a thriving market economy but also requested grants and loans from 
international organisations such as the IMF.
It has often been argued that Russia has performed poorly because its ‘shock therapy’
approach to transition was too fast and radical. However, Anders Aslund believes that the
Russian economy is not very liberalised and that the financial crisis in 1998 was the 
consequence of reforms that were too slow and partial. “Virtually all the problems in Russia 
today - excessive state intervention, corruption, high tax rates, lingering inflation, and limited 
rule of law - are indications of insufficient reform efforts”.3 Corrupt practices have profited
from the excessive regulations that were imposed by a vast and pervasive state. Aslund
argues that reformers have never had enough power to overcome tenacious vested interests. 
There only real chance was in 1992, when the West, and particularly the U.S., enjoyed much 
popularity and influence in Russia. Western countries should have used this influence and its 
aid to push for the measures required for the complete economic reform of Russia. Since the 
West’s initial lack of action, Western support has primarily been directed through the IMF. 
But this support has been received by less reformist governments and the results have been 
mixed.4
Background to the financial crisis: the stabilisation of the rouble
One of the key stabilisation programmes carried out by the reformers was monetary stability. 
In 1992 the large federal budget deficit was financed entirely by money creation. The 
economic liberal Andrei Illarionov, stated that the money supply was increased by 130% in 
1991, 640% in 1992, and 380% in 1993.5 The hyperinflation of 1992 was a direct result of 
the monetization of the large budget deficit.
As part of the attempt to conquer hyperinflation Russia introduced the rouble corridor 
in 1995. The rouble acted as an anchor of stability for the economy. It helped to increase
2McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
3Aslund, A. 2001. p.21.
4See: Aslund, A. 1999b. p.71.
5CDSP, 1994.
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confidence amongst investors who were then prepared to lend to Russian banks, companies 
and the Russian government. By 1995, the lower (but still sizeable) federal budget deficit was 
financed entirely by borrowing on the international and domestic markets. Thus the 
government, with support from Western advisers, introduced a new anti-inflationary method 
of financing the budget deficit. The Russian government’s borrowing involved private sector 
loans, which usually took the form of government short-term (less than one year) rouble- 
denominated Treasury bills (GKOs). Initially, GKOs were sold only to Russian investors, 
but, under Western pressure to liberalise financially, the GKOs were soon purchased by 
Western banks.
The tightening of monetary emissions brought the annual rate of inflation down to 
around 15% in 1997. This contractionary decision taken by the finance ministry led to a 
shortage of cash in circulation, and accordingly, to an increase in the non-payment of wages 
to public sector workers. Given the exceptionally high returns on the short-term GKO 
investments (which often exceeded 100% per annum), there was little point in financiers 
exposing themselves to even greater risks by investing over a longer period of time. The 
substantial rate of return offered on the GKOs attracted the majority of investors in the 
Russian market. This largely stifled private real investment throughout the rest of the 
economy, further tightening domestic liquidity.
Initially, the procedure of borrowing to finance the deficit was successful because 
domestic and foreign investors believed that the Russian government could finance their debt. 
The investors would then ‘roll-over’ these loans to the government. If investor confidence 
began to dwindle, higher rates of interest would be offered in order to maintain the rouble’s 
semi-fixed exchange rate. However, the non-payment of wages led to a vicious circle of 
decline; diminished purchasing power due to non-payment of wages caused a deteriorating 
internal market this, in turn, led to capital flight owing to the lack of investment opportunities 
within the Russian market. According to Dooley and Kletzer, “capital flight arises when 
residents avoid anticipated taxation of domestic deposits (for example, through inflation) and 
of the gross earnings on reported foreign assets ... The types of policies that can lead to 
capital flight include a large variety of taxes on and subsidies to domestic asset earnings, 
including outright confiscation, that vary by residence of the investor in practice”6.
The Russian experience from 1995 to 1998 shows that inflation can be controlled 
through widespread non-payments, but as noted by Transition, “the economic costs of such a
Cooley & Kletzer. 1994. pp.8-10.
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policy are staggering in terms of misallocation of resources and postponed enterprise 
restructuring, facilitation of corruption, bad investment climate, and stifled growth prospects. 
Furthermore, under these circumstances, low inflation, which places public debt on an 
unsustainable course, is not likely to last, so it indicates neither success nor credibility”7.
Nevertheless, this budget deficit financing strategy bought the government time to 
improve its tax collection and at the time, it was believed, that the lower level of inflation 
would encourage investment. In an attempt to reduce the deficit, the government cut 
expenditures and raised taxes, thus further contracting entrepreneurial activity.
The rise of the oligarchic state 
The partial liberalisation of the Russian economy has resulted in the rise of oligarchic 
capitalists (‘oligarchs’) who exercise considerable economic and political control in Russia. 
Their wealth is largely based on, in effect, ‘stealing’ from the Russian state. The group of 
oligarchs, according to Graeme Herd of the University of Aberdeen, share five fundamental 
characteristics, the most obvious being their deep-rooted economic power base. They 
monopolise Russia’s print and broadcast media, which provides them with ‘information 
power’. The oligarchs’ have strong influence at both the highest levels of government and of 
Russian power structures, illustrated by their capability of organising strategic partnerships 
with multinational corporations. Finally, all of the oligarchs enjoy close relationships with 
regional governors and influence policy decisions concerning the strategic development of 
former Soviet economic assets.8
The oligarchs govern the cash-generating sectors of the economy and are influential 
in federal and local government conduct. McKinsey Global Institute argues that: ‘The 
combination of arcane laws ... low salaries of state employees and weak enforcement and 
control mechanisms provides the means and incentives for corrupt practices.”9 In 1996, the 
oligarchs and their media power played a crucial role in Boris Yeltsin’s re-election campaign. 
Having formed strong contacts with the government elite, the oligarchs plundered the state 
and helped Yeltsin win the 1996 election, in return for guarantees that government handouts 
would persist. Russia’s economic reforms have been stalled by powerful vested interests 
who have the most to gain if reforms continue to stagnate.
It was these oligarchs, together with the State Duma (Russia’s lower house of 
parliament), that rejected the anti-crisis package in 1998 that the Russian administration, the
7Pinto et al. 1999. pp.2-3.
8Herd, G. 1998a. p.93.
9McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
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West and the IMF were striving for. They were aware of the consequences for the Russian 
Federation and its people, but having made the vast proportion of their wealth from stealing 
from the state this was not a concern. Moreover, following the huge inflow of foreign money 
into Russia in 1997, the oligarchs seemed to conclude that they should take the money while 
it was still available to them.
The oligarchs have emerged due to various methods of rent-seeking behaviour. These 
rent-seeking opportunities have offered exceptional profits in comparison with opting for the 
uncertainty that genuine wealth-creating activity provides. As a result of Gorbachev’s partial 
liberalisation and encouragement to promote foreign trade, commodities such as oil and 
various metals could be exported by state enterprise managers. These managers obtained 
licences allowing them to export commodities at much higher world market prices. Oil and 
metal prices within Russia were constrained by state-controlled prices. As late as 1992, the
Russian price of oil was 1% of the world level! Anders Aslund argues that the reformers
attempted to end this embezzlement by releasing Russia’s commodity prices and exports. 
But, the state energy lobby, led by Viktor Chernomyrdin opposed this notion, arguing that 
Russian industries would fold if they were exposed to world market prices. Chernomyrdin 
and his allies won, enabling a few state enterprise managers, government officials, 
commodity traders and politicians to accumulate, according to Aslund, 30% of Russia’s GDP
in 1992.10 It was only after the extraction of billions of dollars from the state enterprises did 
the reformers finally achieve the deregulation of commodity prices.
The Russian Central Bank played a pivotal role in the financial crisis and the rise of 
crony capitalists. Boris Kagarlitsky believes that: “The leaders of the Russian central Bank ... 
are personally responsible for the financial catastrophe in today’s Russia.”11 During the early 
years of transition, reformists failed to establish a prominent position within the central bank. 
Consequently, cheap credits were readily available to influential businessmen. Despite an 
annual inflation level of 2,500%, the bank was willing to provide loans at an interest rate of 
10-25% per annum. In 1992, net credits issued by the Central Bank of Russia amounted to 
32% of GDP.12 The Chairman of the Bank was elected by his allies for the third time in 
September 1998.
10 Aslund, A. 1999b. p.66.
11 Kagarlitsky, B. 1998a.
12 Aslund, A. 1999b. p.66.
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Food import subsidies, which represented 17.5% of Russia’s 1992 GDP, also 
provided abundant opportunities for personal enrichment. In 1992 food importers paid only 
1% of the prevailing exchange rate when they purchased essential foods from abroad, but 
they could re-sell them on the domestic market and hoard the subsidy. The imports were 
actually paid for with Western ‘humanitarian’ export credits, which were added to Russia’s 
state debt13. The potential fear of famine in the winter of 1991-1992 ensured that reformers 
could not oppose these subsidies.
The bounty that was gathered from these three rent-seeking business enterprises was
acquired by just a small number of robber barons who, according to Aslund, accumulated
79% of GDP in 1992.14 These enormous incomes were obtained via direct government 
subsidies or indirectly through government regulations.
By 1995 oligarchs controlled many Russian banks. Tight monetary policy was 
implemented at this time to maintain the rouble exchange rate and stabilise the level of 
inflation. The oligarchs favoured this stabilisation, given that their bank loans to the Russian 
government proved increasingly profitable due to the high level of interest rates.
The oligarchs were also beneficiaries of the country’s privatisation reforms. 
According to Paul Krugman: “[They] high-jacked the economy’s ‘privatisation’ programme 
to their own-enrichment. One might at least have hoped that, having stolen the country, the 
oligarchs would then try to run it as a paying business; but instead they have acted as short­
term looters, extracting whatever they could and shipping the money out of the country ... 
The oligarchs - the only Russians who really could pay considerably more in taxes - have 
chosen not to, leaving the government in a permanent fiscal crisis.”15
Privatisation
The IMF emphasised the importance of privatisation to the Russian reformers, claiming that 
it would both improve managerial expertise and reduce government expenditure.
The rapid, first stage of privatisation between 1992 and 1994 was a huge undertaking 
given that almost all of the industrial sector had been state-owned during the Soviet era. 
Many of these heavily industrialised and inefficient enterprises ended up in the hands of 
‘insiders’ (existing managers and workers). As a consequence of this ‘insider’ method of 
privatisation, managers were seldom replaced by market-orientated entrepreneurs and 
managerial quality either stagnated or frequently deteriorated. Little cash was actually
13Ibid. p.67.
14Ibid. p.68.
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obtained because of the use of vouchers and the needed restructuring of many enterprises did 
not take place to any great extent because the new owners typically did not have the capital, 
skills or incentives. No larger company showed any significant improvement in production.16 
Meanwhile, the government lost revenues from profitable state companies, which had 
previously been its primary source of income. The old Soviet bureaucracy remained in 
charge of many companies, but, at the same time, the former Soviet system of external 
control expired. Yegor Gaidar believes that the ‘insider’ method of privatisation ensured that 
enterprise managers remained “part of the social infrastructure of the totalitarian society; they 
were in no way different from other officials in the state administration. They had gone to 
university together, they worked together, they socialised with one another. They could also 
collude together”17. The privatisation process was supposed to transform Russian industrial 
enterprises into internationally competitive institutions. With the benefit of hindsight, it was 
recognised that privatisation would not prosper in an environment that lacked a strong 
judicial system and non-state corporate governance mechanisms, based either on banks or 
equity markets. Russia had neither. Consequently, the investment environment remained 
poor and little headway was made in industrial restructuring. During Soviet times, 
companies’ efficiency at producing goods was low in comparison with the rest of the world, 
but, according to McKinsey, it has further deteriorated since the reform process started assets 
put in place since 1992 employ less than 10% of Russia’s workforce and, surprisingly, 
produce an average of only 30% of the U.S. productivity level.18
A consortium of commercial banks proposed that they lend the Russian government 
capital and, in return, obtain a large block of shares in Russia’s big companies as collateral. 
In August 1995, in an effort to increase revenues from privatisation, President Yeltsin 
accepted a version of the plan, which later became known as the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, 
where twenty-nine blue-chip companies were to be auctioned separately to banks. The 
auctions were supposed to be open to all bidders, including foreigners, and the bank that put 
forward the biggest loan to the government would obtain each block of shares. The banks 
were not allowed to sell the shares until September 1996. However, the loans-for-shares 
scheme had numerous problems and damaged the reputation of large-scale privatisation. The 
number of companies participating was continually reduced due to political opposition and
15Krugman, P. 2000a. p. 130.
16McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
17Gaidar, Y. 1998. pp.7-8.
18McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
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lawsuits by managers of influential companies who resisted the sale of their shares to 
outsiders or banks. Eventually, only twelve companies were auctioned in auctions that only a 
few of Russia’s strongest banks controlled. The banks that conducted the auctions excluded 
foreigners, colluded, frequently disqualified their competitors and won the bids themselves at 
very low levels. The government eventually obtained just over $1 billion.19 But the new 
majority owners simply continued the management theft, generally by selling products at 
below market prices to their own enterprises, allowing the former state companies to 
deteriorate.
Privatisation has often been cited as a primary cause of Russia’s decline. This is 
largely due to the fact that it was largely the only open transfer of wealth that was evident 
within Russia. It was, therefore, easy to blame. Furthermore, people believed that the state- 
owned industries were of far more value than they actually were. This caused 
disappointment and anger at the cheap sales of factories.
Whilst privatisation has not been an unqualified success it has realised significant 
achievements given that 80% of Russian enterprises are now privately owned and, since 
1997, Russia’s private sector has created at least 70% of the country’s GDP.20 However, the 
main problem of the Russian reforms was the abundant opportunities it provided for the 
oligarchs to become incredibly rich and maintain such extensive control over government 
conduct.
Summary: a comparison.
The market reforms undertaken in Russia failed to stimulate economic growth and worse, 
instituted decline as businesses languished. The economies of Hungary and Poland were far 
more resilient to global financial turmoil in 1997 and 1998. According to Nicholas Stem, 
Russia did not “balance privatisation and liberalisation with deep institutional reforms” and 
were therefore far less resilient to global financial turmoil. “The striking contrasts in the 
region show that stability and growth require markets with competition and financial 
discipline private ownership with effective corporate governance and the rule of law”21.
19Blasi et al. 1997. p.75.
20 Aslund, A. 2001. p.21.
21N. Stem. Financial Times. 24 November, 1998. p.3.
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2.ii. Internal causes of the Russian crisis 
The federal budget deficit
One of Russia’s key fundamental weaknesses was the size of the federal budget deficit, 
which was 6 .8% of GDP in 1997. This was a primary reason for the country’s 
macroeconomic instability. Yegor Gaidar argued that: “During 1995-1998 the problem of 
tax collection was not a problem of tax administration in the usual sense. It was more a 
political struggle about what constituted the essence of the emerging economic system, 
whether it was to be a system in which the relationship between the state and the enterprises 
was to be regulated by law or whether it would be business as usual, based on political 
influence and personal contacts. The result of this struggle was ... A semi-equilibrium in 
which the budget deficit was stabilised at around 6-7% of GDP, but there was not enough 
political support to reduce this figure ... Deficits of this magnitude are unsustainable in the 
long run.”22 The reason for the budget deficit is not due to irrational or excessive state 
expenditure. On the contrary, public services have been cut. The problem simply results 
from an inability to obtain taxes. Tax revenues for the federal government in 1997 were 
equivalent to roughly 8% of GDP, a third or less of revenues collected in most Western 
countries and desperately inadequate to finance the government’s expenditures.23 
The virtual economy
Public sector workers, including soldiers and taxmen, have often gone months without 
receiving wages. Many workers in the private sector receive payment in kind. The problem 
of payment arrears is essentially due to companies failing to pay their suppliers, employees 
and taxes. Payment in kind formed just over 50% of industrial employees wages, and this 
figure was greater amongst large companies that would administer 73% of their organisation 
in non-monetary ways. These same large companies would actually pay 80% of the taxes 
owed to the federal government, although only 8% of the 80% of the taxes paid would be in 
the form of cash. Rather than writing-off these debts and receiving nothing at all, the 
government began accepting payment in kind. The non-monetary payment of wages implies 
virtual earnings, which then become virtual fiscal commitments to the government. An 
economy based on virtual earnings, virtual commitments and virtual prices is essentially a 
virtual economy.24 Since the years of market reform the virtual economy has increased in 
size due to its popularity and resilience. This has had the effect of changing the dynamics of
22Y. Gaidar. 1999. pp.7-8.
23The Economist. 22 November 1997. p.28.
24 See: Gaddy & Ickes. 1998. pp.53-56.
m e  ivu sb iu n  F in a n c ia l c r i s i s  u i  i yyo .
42
the federal budget. With little revenue being obtained in the form of cash, the options of 
public expenditure have been severely restricted and taxing payment in kind is very difficult.
According to McKinsey Global Institute, barter transactions are commonplace in 
approximately a half of Russia’s economy.25 Tax evasion, energy subsidies and government 
procurements are generally carried out via complicated barter deals. Both the government 
and government-related enterprises disguise these subsidies under generous barter deals that 
provides further personal enrichment opportunities. Large companies with good political 
connections would often hand over goods and services to the government and other budget- 
financed organisations in an attempt to be excused from paying cash. This represented a 
weak control over spending commitments by the government, which often tried to clear these 
mutual debts only to see yet more tax and spending arrears appear.
Many Russian citizens, who would usually be prepared to pay taxes, had doubts that 
their hard-earned cash would be used appropriately to benefit the country or the economy. 
They believed their taxes would be far more likely to benefit corrupt officials, who would 
‘skim-off the top of taxes received.
Within the Russian economy there is a large reliance on the oil and gas producing 
sectors. Some 40% of government federal revenues depend on the volatility of the relative 
prices of oil and gas.26 
Inadequate tax enforcement
Russia’s weak tax system has as many as 200 different levies, the majority of which derive 
little, if any, revenue. Anders Aslund argued that: “Russia needs a new tax system with
lower, not higher, rates which should defend the rights of honest tax payers so that it is 
meaningful to pay taxes. The present system is so arbitrary that you are more likely to be 
forced to pay a penalty if you pay your taxes than if you ignore them altogether. Moreover, 
excessive rates make it impossible to collect taxes”27. In addition, the profit tax system, 
which if paid, would almost eradicate all profits, has forced firms to hide their profits in the 
shadow economy. The former Finance Minister, Boris Fyodorov, stated that: “The 
authorities have not made it clear to people that they have to pay [taxes].”28 The Russian 
judicial and law enforcement system is ineffectual and penalties are rarely dealt out to 
managers who ignore their tax obligations.
25McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
26Ibid.
27 Aslund, A. 1998b. pp. 185.
43
Fundamental reform of the tax system has often been blocked by politically 
influential businessmen. For example, the former Prime Minister and ex-head of Gazprom, 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, teamed up with Boris Berezovsky, a crony capitalist and media 
tycoon. This partnership helped stall reforms during the autumn of 1997.29 Leyla Boulton of 
the Financial Times stated that: “Rarely have solutions to a problem been so clearly 
recognised yet so tough to apply successfully in practice.”30
Soft budget constraints 
In a market economy a manager’s performance is judged largely on the profits that the 
company makes. To achieve profits he or she must conduct business efficiently or pay the 
price. In the command planning system the manager was usually responsible for producing 
quantities. Consequently, profits were of little or no concern, given that the state would 
ensure the market survival of insolvent companies. These ‘soft budget constraints’ have 
persisted after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By way of contrast, Poland had enterprise 
budget constraints hardened early on in its transition process, which made bankruptcy a real 
threat to inefficient enterprises. This was an important step in Poland’s far more successful 
transition.
The government’s unwillingness to impose hard budget constraints on companies is 
due to factors such as its fears of unemployment and its consequences. This process has 
restricted restructuring and tax collection, whilst also reducing the level of domestic savings. 
Furthermore, it has distorted the market place and led to unequal competition. During the 
privatisation of state property from 1993 to 1995, over 125,000 companies became privately 
owned. However, sub-national governments have maintained influential affinities with the 
enterprise owners of important companies, irrespective of whether they are publicly or 
privately owned. Regional governments have handed out subsidies and behaved in a 
discriminatory manner, often alleviating tax arrears between the government and firms with 
governmental connections leaving small enterprises with no connections, to make up the 
difference. (McKinsey Global Institute makes much of this point: see below.)
Existing labour regulations in Russia encourage managers to react to changes in 
demand via prices as opposed to quantities. Therefore, the employer will either cut wages or 
pay them sporadically, if at all. Consequently, few are made redundant and workers would
28Treisman, D. 1998. p.58.
29 Aslund, A. 1998a.
30Boulton, L. Financial Times. Russia Survey. 15 April 1998. p.8.
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rather hold on to their job for the hope of one day being paid, than receive the dole, which is 
at a humiliatingly low level.
The continuance of soft budget constraints has ensured a distinct lack of incentives for 
these enterprises to perform efficiently. Moreover, it means that market mechanisms will not 
redistribute resources efficiently, from poorly functioning enterprises to efficient companies 
that deserve to prosper. Soft budget constraints are also incompatible with an impartial and 
efficient tax system. This is because enterprise tax obligations will be determined, not by law 
but by a negotiation between the company and state authorities. This provides ample 
opportunities for corruption. Soft budget constraints and soft administrative control 
facilitates an environment that encourages inefficiency for companies, society, and the whole 
economy.
Unequal competitive conditions
Anders Aslund argued that: “Taxation has become a free negotiation between the ubiquitous
tax inspectors and tax payers, meaning that the strong win and small entrepreneurs are chased 
out of business ... Poland and Hungary ... have six times more enterprises in relation to their 
population than Russia. This means feeble competition, leading to substandard products and 
service, high prices and little economic growth.”31 Unequal rules of competition were cited 
by McKinsey as one of the fundamental causes of the persistent budget deficit. These 
distortions have been implemented by the government to achieve social objectives, most 
notably, to minimise unemployment. However, the distortions impede Russia’s economic 
performance and, therefore, impair the social objectives they were intended to enhance.
McKinsey Global Institute found that: “Despite high competitive intensity, the 
competition is unequal and it causes low productivity. Price decontrol and privatisation did 
successfully stimulate competition. Paradoxically, however, in Russia the more productive 
companies are often the least profitable. Thus, more productive companies are not gaining 
market share and not pushing less productive firms out.”32 Moreover, the regulatory 
environment prevents productive enterprises from crowding out or taking over their less 
productive competitors. As a consequence of the unequal competition, efficient companies 
often struggle financially, while their less productive competitors prosper. The market 
distortions take a variety of forms including; differential effective tax rates; preferential 
access to land and government procurements; differing energy prices paid by different
31 Aslund, A. 1998a.
32McKinsey Global Institute. 1999. Solow et al.
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institutions in the same industry; differing methods of law enforcement; and differing degrees 
of red tape imposed on enterprises. All of these measures put potentially efficient enterprises 
at a cost disadvantage, in turn, reducing their investments and growth. Indeed, a further 
consequence of no real credible threats of bankruptcy is that these insolvent enterprises rarely 
pay their suppliers on time, if at all.
In June 1998, total arrears amounted to approximately $144 billion, almost one-third 
of GDP. Tax arrears to the federal budget totalled $17 billion; at the same time, arrears to the 
consolidated budget (federal and regional) were twice as large. Inter-enterprise arrears 
represent the largest proportion of total arrears at $63 billion in June 1998.33 The result is 
that few suppliers can pay their workers, let alone their taxes. Moreover, in Russia company 
directors often fail to report to outside shareholders so they have ignored requests for 
improved productivity. Many company directors have become very wealthy through various 
corrupt practices, including amassing wage arrears, asset stripping and complicated arbitrage 
schemes leaving their companies to languish. The implicit subsidies that these inefficient 
enterprises enjoy guarantee high levels of government expenditure, whilst ensuring that the 
economy stagnates at a low level. Experience from Poland has shown that bankruptcies must 
be enforced if restructuring is to be successful.
The unequal competitive environment presents extensive obstacles to the growth of 
the Russian market and subsequently creates macroeconomic instability. James Gwartney of 
the Financial Times argues that: “The central problem of the Russian economy is simple. 
The country has a large number of enterprises that are continuing to operate even though they 
are producing obsolete products ... These must be closed and the resources shifted into 
genuinely productive activities ... Russia needs to deregulate business activity ... It is 
impossible to operate a business and comply with existing regulations. The regulatory maze 
strengthens corrupt politicians and criminal elements that use it to extort wealth ... All 
regulations that restrain business entry and operation should be abolished.”34
Increasing risk premiums 
In late 1997 and throughout 1998 there was a dramatic increase in the price of borrowing. 
This was partly due to the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent fear and uncertainty felt 
towards emerging markets. However, foreign and domestic investors became increasingly 
concerned with Russia’s federal deficit. Tax revenues were not increasing and the precarious
33Malleret et al. 1999. p.118.
34Gwartney, J. 2000. p.27.
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situation was becoming untenable as investors perceived the Russian state was unable to 
finance its increasing amount of short-term debt.
Further doubt spread when Boris Yeltsin decided to sack the government in March
1998. Anders Aslund subsequently wrote: “There are many in the West who think that Boris
Yeltsin has gone mad. First, he fired several top ministers, including his Prime Minister ... 
Then he pressured the parliament to accept Sergei Kiriyenko, a young official largely 
unknown abroad, as his replacement.”35
An excessive build-up of short-term debt 
“The seeds of the ... crisis were laid three years ago [1995] with the creation of a market for 
domestic government debt. Theoretically, this would allow the government to finance its 
deficits in a non-inflationary way, that is, without printing money. But ... the government 
rapidly began accumulating an unsustainable pyramid of debt”36. Russia, in a similar vein to 
the Asian crisis-hit economies, had become overly dependent on short-term foreign capital 
leaving the economy vulnerable to an adverse change in investor sentiment.
Continuous disagreement between a reformist government and the conservative 
parliament stalled reforms and perpetuated the budget deficit. Financing this deficit by 
borrowing became increasingly difficult when the cost of borrowing began to rise in October 
1997, reflecting perceptions of growing risk. By mid-1998, the fiscal situation had become 
unsustainable. The servicing of debt was crowding-out other spending plans, and nearly one 
in every three roubles (31% to be exact) of public expenditures were spent on servicing the 
debt. Furthermore, taxes, which represented 80% of total budget revenues, could pay for just 
over a half of Treasury bills that became due each month.37
The loans to the Russian government were largely in the form of short-term bonds 
(GKOs), comprising 70% of the market in early 1998.38 The short-term GKOs have to be 
refinanced frequently, which is rarely a problem for longer-term borrowing. The continual 
refinancing of debt means that lenders must always be found to provide the government with 
further loans. During the first half of 1998 $1 million of Treasury bills had to be rolled over 
each week,39 but throughout the spring and summer of the same year, it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to find new buyers. This meant that the state had to increase interest
35 Aslund, A. 1998a. p. 10.
Financial Times. World Economy & Finance survey. 2 October, 1998. p.26.
37Malleret et al. 1999. p. 129.
38Ibid. p. 116.
39EBRD Transition Report: A 1:1. 1998. pp.12-15.
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rates to continue attracting investors. However, each interest rate rise only served to increase 
the government’s debt service payments. Boris Kagarlitsky argued that: “The government 
was hooked on short term debt. The only way it could meet the payments on its bonds was to 
borrow ever more money ... Inevitably, the point finally came where there was simply no 
money left in the budget to continue servicing the debt.”40 An additional fundamental 
weakness was that Russia’s short-term foreign debt exceeded its foreign exchange reserves 
by over 100%. Foreign exchange reserves totalled a meagre $14 billion and $20 billion of 
GKOs were held by less-than-confident foreign investors. Therefore, the state needed an 
international rescue loan, from the IMF if it was to pay off maturing bonds and avoid a 
devaluation of the rouble. Russia was pledged $22 billion, the majority of which would come 
from the IMF. But investors decided that $22 billion was not sufficient to resolve Russia’s 
fragile fiscal position. The upshot was that capital flight from Russia and other developing 
economies produced a $2-3 trillion reduction in the value of global stock market 
capitalisation 41 The communist-dominated Duma refused to pass procedures essential for 
reform, such as tax increases and the IMF loan fell through. The point where the government 
could no longer ‘roll-over’ its maturing debt led to Russia defaulting on its domestic debt and 
floating the rouble on August 17th 1998.
Warning ignored: collapse of the Moscow stock exchange
During the first eight months of 1997, the Moscow stock exchange was the best-performing 
market in the world. The value of Russian shares doubled during 1996 and 1997. The capital 
inflows led to a vast speculative asset bubble, which saw the stock market rise by 142% in 
1996, and a further 184% in the first eight months of 1997.42 The increased value of the 
Russian capital markets represented expectations of Russia’s potential growth given its 
conceivably large consumer market, its abundant natural resources and Moscow’s location 
between the East and the West. However, the reality soon became apparent. Investors 
became increasingly apprehensive after the Asian collapse, Russia’s tax collection was 
stagnating and crony capitalists continued to stifle economic growth by stealing from the 
state and investing abroad. Russia’s financial collapse first began when the stock market fell 
by 20% in one day in October 1997 43 But this did not provoke sufficient policy reforms 
despite the Russian administration, the IMF, and the West all urging for a package of prudent
'“ Kagarlitsky, B. 1998a.
41Hale, D. 1998. p.9.
42EBRD Transition Report A l:l 1998. p.12.
43 Aslund, A. 1999a. p.72.
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policies, which was submitted to the Duma in 1998. Yet the Duma, with the backing of the 
business elites, rejected it and the financial collapse ensued.
The Russian Trading System (RTS) reached a peak of 571.6 on 6th October 1997. By 
17th September 1998 it had fallen to 51.7.44
An untrustworthy and inadequate banking sector 
A fundamental weakness shared by all of the developing countries that have experienced 
severe financial crises in the 1990s has been a weak financial sector. In 1992 Russia’s 
citizens endured hyperinflation. As a result of this traumatic experience many Russians were 
apprehensive of holding roubles. Furthermore, the banks were generally not trusted by 
Russian citizens and, consequently, held few household deposits and financed little private 
investment. The exception was the proclivity to direct public funds to politically favoured 
firms. The largest contributing factor to the banking system collapse was the stubbornness of 
the Russian government to do away with its economic nationalism. The Financial Times 
stated that: ‘The banking system is a hybrid built from the wreckage of communism with 
neither the capital nor the credit skills to provide long term investment for the economy.”45 
Various Russian banks have also received large indirect subsidies from the government. 
These indirect subsidies in 1997 took the form of $5.9 billion entered by the Kremlin into 
funds of the largest fifteen banks, in order to increase their liquidity.46
Prior to the financial crisis, the Russian banking sector had little involvement with 
industrial investments. Instead, the banks had become over-burdened with forward contract 
liabilities, and by June 1998, the banking sector was greatly exposed to a rouble devaluation. 
By August 1998, Russian entities possessed $200 billion of foreign contracts, approximately 
twice the total of the banks’ total assets.47
An unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment (FDI)
McKinsey stated that: “The absence of bank lending in Poland did not prevent it from 
achieving a strong economic growth due to FDI and retained earnings ... FDI [has] been the 
secret of Poland’s economic miracle.” In stark contrast, Russia has attracted negligible 
quantities of FDI. In 1997, FDI totalled just 0.5% of GDP. But the former Soviet states of 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan obtained much higher levels of FDI (19.2% and 5.3% of GDP
^International Herald Tribune. 3 June 1998. p.l.
45Financial Times. 15 April 1998. Russia Survey, p.4.
46Financial Times. 9 April 1997. Russia Survey, p.9.
47Malleret et al. 1999. p. 116.
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respectively) and even the dictatorship in Belarus has attracted more gross FDI than half of 
Russia’s regions.48
Unequal competitive conditions are often identified as a major reason for the lack of 
FDI within Russia. Foreign companies know that they will be exposed to an unfavourable 
working climate and soon find themselves subject to disproportionate taxation and intrusive 
inspections by officious inspectors.
Further deterrents against FDI are also evident. For example, companies categorised 
under the United Energy System (UES) were limited to a maximum of 25% foreign 
ownership.49 But crime, corruption and the low quality of infrastructure have also deterred 
potential investors.
Russia demonstrates immense potential for economic growth. Numerous regions 
possess vast quantities of natural resources, together with a relatively cheap and well- 
educated workforce. However, market distortions must be removed, destitute companies 
must be taken over or forced to cease production.
Crime and corruption
According to Paul Krugman, seven men control approximately one half of Russia’s 
marketable wealth. Therefore, the Russian government only needed those seven men, and a 
few smaller scale oligarchs, to have paid their taxes, in order, to have resolved the fiscal 
deficit.50 Yet the business elite not only own marketable wealth, they also own politicians 
and they refuse to pay. The lack of an effective judicial and law enforcement system together 
with deficient public sector salaries and state control of crucial assets has intensified the 
scope for corruption within Russia. Companies without government connections are 
subjected to excessive taxes, officious inspectors, arbitrary fines and farcical regulations. 
This has resulted in an economy which has failed to reward entrepreneurship. When criteria 
was selected by the Russian public as a means of becoming wealthy, 88% chose connections, 
76% dishonesty and just 39% believed that hard work would be rewarded by wealth.51
Commentators have often perceived international loans to Russia as profligate. Many 
within the IMF opposed the July 1998 package believing that these funds would only benefit 
the oligarchs, who would then siphon the money into foreign bank accounts. The World 
Bank once provided $5 billion to assist the restructuring of the coal industry, but the money,
48Brock, G. 1998, p.351.
49 Aslund, A.. 1998b. p.187.
50Krugman, P. 1998b.
51 Yavlinsky, G. 1998. p.71.
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according to Boris Kagarlitsky, simply disappeared.52 Russia’s prevailing economic 
conditions and liberal regulations on international financial transactions have provided ample 
opportunities for both capital flight and the Russian mafia. Russia’s financial markets have 
become an international centre for money laundering. The majority of international banks 
have regulations to detect and report money laundering. But because crime and corruption 
are at the heart of Russia’s society it is almost impossible to determine whether money is 
earned legitimately. In 1999, the Russian Interior Ministry estimated that organised crime 
controlled 40% of the economy, and that approximately half of Russia’s banks were managed 
by criminal organisations.53
The Economist stated that: ‘The unusual thing [within Russia] is not that crime has 
flourished since 1989. It is that there has been at least an attempt to run Russia as a law 
governed state. And the worrying thing, for both Russians and the rest of the world, is that 
this attempt has largely failed.”54
Anders Aslund argues that Russia’s key problem has been the four dominant circles,
which have defended corruption and rent seeking, whilst also opposing equitable tax and 
regulatory reform. The first is the business elite. The second is the state administration, 
which expanded by 1.2 million bureaucrats from 1992 to 1998, nearly 2% of the labour force. 
Most of the new employees were inspectors who impede the work of businesses and 
effectively reduce competition and create monopoly rents for the big companies. The third 
bracket is the regional governments, which thrive on subsidies. Lastly, the conduct of 
deputies of the State Duma preserves the profits of the rent-seekers.55
Lack of political credibility when challenging the oligarchs 
The former Prime Minister, Sergei Kiriyenko (regarded as one of the very few competent and 
honest Russian politicians of the post-communist period), attempted to “sever the incestuous 
link between business and politics ... Kiriyenko went straight for the jugular of the economic 
and political juggemaught, Gazprom, one of the most powerful Russian institutions and a 
bastion of oligarchy ... The Prime Minister had gone too far in challenging the vested 
interests at the core of Russia’s crony capitalism. He might still have been saved by 
presidential support, but this was not forthcoming. Following the collapse of the rouble and
52Kagarlitsky, B. 1998a.
53The Economist. 28 August 1999. p. 18.
54Ibid.
55 Aslund, A. 1999a. p.85.
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the decision to default on August 21st, 1998, Yeltsin sacked the entire cabinet for the second 
time in five months”56.
Russia’s current president Vladimir Putin is generally perceived as a positive impetus 
for Russia’s economic growth, and has promised a ‘dictatorship of the law’. Mr Putin has 
selectively attacked some of the country’s most prominent oligarchs including Boris 
Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky. Mr Gusinsky, and his media company, have 
experienced a barrage of intimidation from the authorities, and in the civil courts he has been 
sued by Gazprom regarding a $300 million loan. Having spent four days in prison he was 
released, in a government-brokered deal, which saw Mr Gusinsky surrender a majority stake 
in his media empire to Gazprom.
An increasing outflow of federal funds to sub-national governments 
In an attempt to reduce the burden on the federal budget and to meet the differing demands of 
Russia’s republics, the federal government allowed the lower regional governments to have 
greater autonomy over expenditure. In 1992 the regional budget revenue was 11.8% of GDP. 
In 1997 this figure was at 13.5% of GDP.57 As the regional budget revenues increased, so 
did the wastefulness of the sub-national governments expenditure. According to Anders
Aslund, about a third of expenditure at regional level goes to communal support and housing.
Unfortunately, the regional governments tend to concentrate this area of expenditure on the 
wealthier members of society, rather than poorer members of the population. Another third 
of expenditure provides subsidies and in effect, soft budget constraints to many companies. 
Enterprises should face a credible threat of bankruptcy to promote efficiency. The final third 
of regional expenditure goes to socially beneficial projects.58
2.iii. Exogenous factors 
Asian contagion
“The Russian default was the third stage of the global financial contagion that began with the 
devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 ... The devaluations contributed to a slide in world 
commodity prices, leading currencies of other commodity producers, such as Australia, 
Canada, Chile and Mexico, to plummet as well. During these two stages, Russia avoided a 
rouble devaluation thanks to previously pledged IMF support”59.
56Malleret et al. 1999. p.120.
57EBRD. Transition report 1998. A l:l. p.15.
58 Aslund, A. 1998b. p.186.
59Hale, D. 1998. p.9.
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Average GDP growth in Asia between 1990 and 1995 was 8% per annum. In stark 
contrast, Russia had experienced its first year of GDP growth since transition began in 1997, 
of just 0.8%. However, Russia did bear certain similarities to its emerging market comrades.
Following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the international financial operators 
began to reassess their exposures to other ‘emerging markets’ bearing similar fundamental 
weaknesses that underlay the Asian debacle. These characteristics included a dependency on 
short-term ‘hot money’ foreign deposits, a fixed exchange rate, inadequate foreign exchange 
reserves, a weak financial sector and governments, which were feeble in the implementation 
of macroeconomic objectives. Furthermore, Malleret et al. believe that: “It was feared that 
the long-term implications for such markets might be secular not cyclical.”60 Russia was 
clearly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling financial panic.
From October 1997 onwards, investor sentiment became increasingly bearish. Loans 
to the Russian government began to be called in as the potential for a financial crisis was 
realised. During January 1998 $600 million of foreign money left the rouble-denominated 
bond market.61 The dramatic outflow of foreign capital meant that the government had to opt 
for one of two unfavourable choices facing it. To devalue its exchange rate or to raise 
interest rates. Initially, they chose the latter and raised interest rates to exceedingly high 
levels (which touched 150%) in order to defend its exchange rate. However, each interest 
rate rise only served to worsen public finances, in turn this further deteriorated investor 
confidence. Arguably, the Asian crisis precipitated a looming Russian financial crisis.
Fear of competitive devaluations 
In late July 1998, the Japanese yen resumed its decline vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. Primary
commodity prices continued falling, further reducing export earnings of mining and 
agricultural sectors within the Asian region. Finally, economic growth within the U.S. was 
forecast to slow. These factors seem to suggest an imminent devaluation of the Chinese 
renminbi, which would then prompt further devaluations within the region. The potential for 
a new round of devaluations throughout many emerging markets led to a renewed ‘flight to 
safety’ as investors continued to head for safer climes.
W eaker commodity prices 
The Asian financial crisis together, with the strong U.S. dollar, depressed the prices of 
primary commodity goods. Primary commodities account for 80% of merchandise exports in
“ Malleret et al. 1999. pp.l 13-114.
6lFinancial Times. 5 February 1998. p.18.
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Russia. This huge reliance upon the relative price of these commodities was partly the result 
of deindustrialization that had taken place since 1992.
Export incomes fell by 11% year-on-year in the first half of 1998. Contracts for 
primary commodities in Russia were largely short-term. This meant that export earnings 
would fluctuate in accordance with the short-term prices. Consequently, the external and 
fiscal balances of the country deteriorated. In the first six months of 1998, Russia’s trade 
balance fell by $7.5 billion in comparison with the same period in 1997; at the same time, the 
country experienced its first post-communist current account deficit (-3% of GDP).63
In 1998 the price of a barrel of oil had fallen, from the previous year, by $10 to just 
$14 a barrel. Although, it was only the export price that declined, the domestic price 
remained at roughly $11 a barrel.64 The decline in commodity prices occurred at a precarious 
time for the Russian economy and only served to exacerbate risk aversion amongst investors.
Moral hazard
In addition to the untimely exogenous shocks Russia was experiencing, moral hazard had 
manifested itself within the international financial community. When a large international 
rescue loan is forthcoming, in an attempt to alleviate financial speculation and restore market 
confidence, it can actually encourage governments and investors to behave recklessly. This 
phenomenon is known as moral hazard.
Many of the investors that remained in the Russian market following the Asian 
debacle and subsequent international rescue loans, believed that the IMF and other such 
organisations would continually intervene and ‘bail them out’. Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard 
University argued that: “U.S. investors wanted to get their money out of Russia ... without 
devaluation losses, [so the IMF stepped in believing it could] outsmart the market.”65 
Moreover, Malleret et al. argue that: “By [July 1998] the U.S. government had clearly thrown 
caution to the winds of the moral hazard issue and decided to go ahead with the bail-out.”66 
Bordo and Schwartz believe that: “The IMF has repeatedly suspended loans to Moscow 
because of its failure to live up to its promises, but has then resumed lending for fear of
fklcontagion.” (Moral hazard will be discussed at length in Chapter 6 .)
United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe, 1998, no.3, p.31.
63Malleret et al. 1999. p. 111.
64 Aslund, A. 1998b. p.186.
“ Sachs, J. 1999a.
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2.iv. The effects of Russia’s financial crash
Domestic effects
The August 17th 1998 devaluation saw the rouble plummet from 6.3 roubles per dollar to 
20.8 per dollar on September 8th 1998.68 Russia’s economy contracted by at least 4.6% in 
1998. In 1998, the Russian central bank spent $10 billion in a failed attempt to maintain the 
rouble’s exchange rate anchor.69 The government was left with even fewer means to fund its 
expenditures. Defaulting on its domestic debt did immense damage to Russia’s already poor 
reputation within the world investor fraternity. The expected reaction to the crisis by the 
weak Russian government was that the money supply would be increased to finance their 
budget deficit, whilst the consequent rise in inflation would reduce wage arrears in real terms. 
But expenditures have only been evident on the most essential of projects.
The devaluation increased the price of imported goods significantly as the purchasing 
power of Russian consumers deteriorated. The consumer price index (CPI) rose to 60% from 
July to September 1998. In 1996 only 18% of Russians lived below the poverty line. This 
figure rose to 30% after the financial crisis.70
The devaluation of the rouble led to a collapse in the volume of imports entering 
Russia, falling by 65% from August to September 1998.71 Conversely, the depreciation of 
the rouble has made domestic producers much more competitive and Russia’s trade account 
achieved a surplus of $2 billion in November 1998.72
The oligarchs have been plundering the state for many years and have been incredibly 
successful in so doing. However, they were adversely affected by the 1998 financial 
collapse. “August’s financial crisis was a logical outcome of the oligarch’s war, as they tried 
to maintain their high and dubious incomes by any means. In the end, the Russian state could 
no longer deliver enough cash to satisfy their ravenous appetites. The crash radically reduced 
the amount of money that could be made on the state - and thus the power of the corrupt 
businessmen”73.
External Effects
The August 1998 financial crisis and its aftermath inevitably harmed the export industries of 
Russia’s trading partners. The balance of payments of the CIS countries was dramatically
68RET. October 1998. p.l.
69Pinera, J. 2000. p.70.
70Intemational Herald Tribune. 17 February 1999. p.l.
7IRET. October 1998. p.l.
72RET. February 1999. p.9.
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weakened by the events in Russia and the Russian crisis reduced output of many of the CIS 
countries by as much as 5%.74
Financial contagion continued to proliferate following Russia’s crisis. The Financial 
Times wrote: “Investors watching Russia stumble to the brink of financial collapse in the past 
few days did what they always do in a crisis - bought German government bonds in search of 
the safest haven for their money.”75 Inevitably, this led to a continued tightening of liquidity 
across other emerging markets, particularly Latin America. The Russian crisis exposed 
Brazil’s twin deficits on the current account and public finances. In January 1999, Brazil 
abandoned its exchange rate peg.
Russia in the new millennium 
In 1999, GDP grew by 3.2%. This represented the first significant growth since the transition 
to a market economy began.76 (See Table 1, p.65.) Economic growth was a record 8.3% in 
200077 and industrial production rose by 10%.78 Inflation has fallen from around 90% in 
1999 to an estimated 20% for the whole of 2000 and the rouble has stabilised, having fallen 
in nominal terms by 75% in 1998 and 31% in 1999. Furthermore, the central bank’s foreign 
exchange reserves have increased to U.S. $25.9 billion in March 2001 and Russia is enjoying 
a large current account surplus, which rose from U.S. $2.4 billion in the fourth quarter of 
1998 to $46.4 billion in the fourth quarter of 2000.79 Moreover, Russia’s federal budget has 
been turned from a chronic and unsustainable deficit to a surplus amounting to 4% of GDP in 
the first half of 2000. The surplus has been achieved through increased tax collection, 
primarily through higher export and excise tax receipts.80 There has also been a significant 
decline in barter transactions because cash has been more available. Hence, the costs of 
conducting barter transactions have grown in relation to using more readily available cash.
Unfortunately, these favourable statistics do not indicate that Russia has left behind 
the years of decline and stagnation to begin a course of sustainable long-term growth. Major 
problems still afflict the Russian economy. A Moscow investment bank, Renaissance 
Capital, estimates that one-third of the recovery in GDP since 1998 is the result of the
73 Aslund, A. 1999b. p.73.
74Raiser & Sanfey. 1998. pp.537-538.
75Financial Times. 1 September 1998. p.2.
76RET. October 2000. p.3.
77The Economist. 12 May 2001. p.52.
78OECD. Economic Outlook. December 2000. pp. 128-129. No. 68.
79The Economist. 12 May 2001. p.146. 28 August 1999. p.90 and 19 May 2001. p.136.
80OECD. Economic Outlook. December 2000. pp. 129. No. 68.
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trebling of world energy prices, and the remainder is due to the 75% devaluation of the 
rouble.81 The U.S. dollar has risen against most currencies, which has enabled Russia to 
obtain more for its exports of raw materials because they are mainly priced in dollars.
But Vladimir Putin’s chief economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, argues that these 
favourable factors should have increased GDP by over 14% in 2000 alone, rather than just 
8.3%. “So the net impact of economic policy, at a time when the government claims to have 
launched serious economic reforms, has been to produce a drag on the economy [worth 
almost six percentage points]”82. Mr Illarionov reckons that almost half of the competitive 
benefits of the devaluation have been eroded by inflation and hence the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. But owing to continued capital flight (which amounted to a conservative 
estimate of $100 billion from 1990-200083) some upward pressure is being removed. Mr 
Illarionov is highly critical of the government’s fiscal policy, “both for failing to control 
spending (non-interest expenditure is up 28%) and for not raising taxes. Only 15% of the 
‘windfall’ has been captured by the state. Much more has gone on imports and in capital 
flight”84.
Gaddy and Ickes argue that the decline in barter transactions is the result of the real 
depreciation of the rouble, which has shifted behaviour towards the greater use of money. 
“This is a behavioural change, but it does not represent restructuring”85. A further mitigating 
factor slowing Russia’s economic growth has been the deterioration in household incomes, 
which in 1999 were approximately 75% of the 1995 level. Inevitably, this has reduced 
domestic consumption and Gaddy and Ickes believe that the rise in company profits has come 
largely at the expense of a decrease in real wages, which fell from an average hourly rate of 
$1.10 in July 1998 to $0.45 in May 2000. Owing to the increased real cost of imported inputs 
in sectors such as machinery manufacturing, Russian producers are actually exporting less 
than they did before the financial crisis, despite their greatly improved trade 
competitiveness.86
Furthermore, some oil importers are already reducing demand due to the high oil 
prices. Inevitably, this puts pressure on the price of oil and a lower price would slow
81The Economist. 25 November 2000. p. 148
82The Economist. 27 January 2001. p. 105.
83The Economist. 9 December 2000. p. 126.
84The Economist. 27 January 2001. p. 105.
85Gaddy and Ickes. 2001. p. 16.
86Gaddy and Ickes. 2001. pp. 15/19.
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Russia’s current growth. Thus to achieve sustainable growth economic reforms must be 
undertaken in earnest.
The need for essential reforms
Russia’s prerequisite for sustainable growth is the implementation of structural reforms, the 
most influential of which will be microeconomic. These are the toughest reforms to 
implement, but they would reap the greatest rewards. The fortuitous current environment 
should be taken advantage of to install crucial reforms. Hard budget constraints should be 
enforced, insolvent companies must be shut down and the government must continue to 
reduce arrears. These additional resources can then be employed more efficiently in other 
areas of the economy. However, given the absence of an adequate social safety net the 
consequent unemployment could possibly increase poverty. New jobs must therefore be 
created. According to Andrei Nesterenko of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
unemployment as a result of bankruptcies may not necessarily lead to substantial reductions 
in living standards for lower income groups if the available social capital is spent in a more 
intelligent manner. Mr Nesterenko believes that competitive private companies and 
governments should become involved in the provision of social and public services.87 To 
enable this to happen the following vital reforms must be undertaken:
1. The deregulation of business activity.
Enterprises in Russia are subjected to problematic laws, weak legal enforcement, high 
taxes and corruption, all of which inhibit entrepreneurial activity. To encourage the 
involvement of private enterprises the business environment must be improved and business 
activity deregulated. In turn, this would induce entrepreneurial activity and FDI, which is of 
vital importance for Russia because Mr Nesterenko believes that: “Russia’s economic revival 
must rely almost exclusively on private investment.”88
It is crucial that earnings are retained for reinvestment and restructuring of property 
because both the Russian stock market and the country’s banks are failing to direct sufficient 
capital to producers. Presently, investment opportunities are reduced by Russia’s persistent 
capital flight, which exceeds $20 billion a year. Companies and affluent individuals prefer to 
deposit their money in foreign banks where the legal systems are stronger. But, as noted by
87Nesterenko, A. 2000. p.21.
88Ibid. p.22.
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Anders Aslund, Russia’s capital flight also “reflects the country’s high level of savings ... a
resource for the future89.
FDI is often regarded as the most productive form of external assistance available 
from the international community. FDI would be accompanied with the import of efficient 
foreign machinery and the finest managerial expertise essential for efficient production and 
much needed restructuring of Russian assets. Poland has attracted considerable amounts of 
FDI, which have been a vital part of the country’s success. Poland’s experience with FDI 
shows that foreign companies will, with the correct incentives, retain profits and invest 
elsewhere in the economy. Russia should do all it can to attract foreign capital and strive to 
become a member of the World Trade Organisation. FDI might also help to further weaken 
the position of vested interests, namely the oligarchs.90
2. The establishment of clearly defined property rights.
If private investment is to stimulate a revival within Russia, clearly defined property 
rights and a system of land entitlement must be introduced. This will provide an incentive for 
entrepreneurs to develop their land and allow them, where possible, to use it to mortgage 
further investments.
3. Reform of the tax system.
According to Mr Nesterenko, “what hampers business in Russia most of all are taxes. 
If entrepreneurs paid all the taxes they owed, they would pay more than they earned”91. The 
tax system must be simplified and reduced. Presently, it forces entrepreneurs to conceal their 
profits in the shadow economy and punishes honesty. Those who can afford to pay taxes, 
namely the business elite, must be forced to do so. Little has been achieved in making the tax 
system more transparent. Despite many proposals only one significant change has taken 
place - a flat-rate 13% income tax, and a simplified fiscal regime for businesses, which took 
effect in January 2001. Following the introduction of the 13% flat rate tax income tax 
revenues increased by 70% because people abandoned expensive tax-avoidance schemes.92
Encouragingly, there are now even proposals, which advocate the eradication of tax 
preferences. The government must insist on cash tax payment and enforce hard budget 
constraints, whilst discontinuing hidden subsidies to languishing enterprises. Pinto et al.
89 Aslund, A. 2001. p.23.
90Havrylyshyn & Odling-Smee. 2000a. p.10.
91Nesterenko, A. 2000. p.22.
92 Aslund, A. 2001. p.22.
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argue that: “Once net creditors realise that the government will no longer provide hidden 
subsidies through tax breaks and other concessions, the practice of non-payments will end 
spontaneously”93. In addition, law enforcement and an effective judicial system must be 
established to confirm that the era of non-compliance is over and taxes must be paid.
Further developments and recommendations 
A further impediment to Russian economic growth is the country’s level of foreign 
indebtedness. Currently, Russia’s foreign debt is equal to about $160 billion and annual 
repayments are expected to be between $12 billion and $17 billion, during 2001-05. This 
amounts to over half of the federal budget.94 This is a considerable burden on the economic 
development of Russia, given that money continues to leave the country and so ensures a 
weak domestic economic environment with few investment opportunities. (Table 2, p.65, 
shows Russia’s expected debt repayments 2001-05.) Andrei Nestemeko believes that: 
“Major debt repayments must be re-scheduled beyond 2005, giving the economy several 
years to restructure and take off.”95 However, Andrei Illarionov argues that Russia should be 
taking advantage of the current favourable economic environment and repay the country’s 
debt. He reckons that in doing so Russia would improve the country’s image abroad, and 
also absorb the inflationary effects of the country’s extra cash from the $60 billion trade 
surplus.96 But Gorban et al. believe that: “Despite a significant trade surplus, factors such as 
capital flight, low tax collection rates and weak government control, over expenditure patterns 
severely limit the amount of funds that could be paid to the external creditors.”97
In 2000, only ten of Russia’s eighty-nine regions provide more funds to the federal 
government budget than they received from it and they provided the government with over 
half of the total tax revenues it obtains 98 President Putin has responded by issuing a decree 
to have Russia’s eighty-nine regions overseen by seven federal administrators. It is hoped 
that this will help to alleviate the excessive expenditures that result from the misuse of 
resources in various regions.
93Pinto et al. 1999. p.4.
94Nesterenko, A. 2000. p.21.
95Ibid.
96The Economist. 27 January 2001. p. 105.
97Gorban et al. 1999. p.l.
98Nesterenko, A. 2000. p.22.
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Controls may be implemented to discourage destabilising short-term capital flows or to rectify a balance of 
payments deficit.
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The Russian government has used currency controls*. For example, Russian 
exporters were forced to sell 50% of repatriated export revenues in October 1998; this was 
increased to 75% in mid-January 1999. In March 2000, amendments were made which 
allowed exporters who were using 25% of revenues to service foreign debts to repatriate just 
50%, while other exporters continued to repatriate 75% ." Additionally, the foreign exchange 
licences of some of Russia’s most prominent banks were suspended. The Russian 
government has submitted two bills to parliament. The first will establish state control over 
foreign exchange transactions, and the second, requires registration of foreign trade 
transactions, which, if implemented, will enable officials to suspend a transaction if there is 
evidence to suggest it is disguising capital flight or money laundering.
Russia’s banks urgently require restructuring. Jacques Sapir believes that the most 
effective method of restructuring will be the partial nationalisation of Russia’s largest banks. 
According to Mr Sapir, the initial phase of such a strategy “would comprise deposit or 
savings banks and would be partly state-owned. These would concentrate on managing the 
private payments system, in close collaboration with the central bank ... The second part of 
the banking sector would comprise investment banks, mostly private, that would raise money 
through the internal financial or stock markets to finance long-term high risk operations”100. 
Mr Sapir believes that the combination of nationalisation and specialisation could greatly 
enhance the credibility of Russia’s banks and he also points out that this is a similar approach 
as was used by France in 1945 with spectacular results.
Russia should learn from the consequences that were the result of the government’s 
non-payments policy to artificially control inflation. The reduction of inflation must be based 
on fiscal reform and the government must refrain from inducing an additional build-up of 
arrears. Stoneman et al. argue that: ‘The pervasiveness and institutionalisation of non­
payments is one of the most important impediments to the emergence of an operable market 
economy. Payment arrears, barter and offsets are, in essence, a highly effective obstruction 
to the imposition of hard budget constraints”101. However, arrears have fallen markedly. 
(See Table 3, p.65.)
"Westin, P. 2000. p.5.
100Sapir, J. 1999. pp.15-16.
101Stoneman et al. 2000. p.5.
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Another measure that would considerably improve federal budget revenues would be 
the imposition of a 10% tax on exports. Mr Sapir believes that this would provide additional 
receipts of 4.7% of GDP, “enough to manage the current deficit problem”102.
Currently, the fortuitous environment provides little incentive for Russian enterprises 
to restructure and become more efficient. But, as identified by Gaddy and Ickes, there is an 
ironic paradox regarding those enterprises, which invested, in an attempt to improve their 
competitiveness, prior to the August 1998 devaluation. These enterprises may have incurred 
dollar-denominated debt to enable them to purchase foreign machinery. Consequently, these 
enterprises endured significant exchange rate losses following the August 1998 devaluation.
Jose Pinera, who was responsible for the privatisation of the Chilean pension system 
from 1978 to 1980, believes that the privatisation of Russia’s pensions will drive economic 
growth. According to Mr Pinera, if Russia does this properly and runs pension reform in 
parallel with other reforms, “pension reform can stimulate a virtuous cycle in which workers 
invest their savings in capital markets, and markets increasingly invest in Russia as both the 
financial and the corporate sectors develop”103.
Mr Pinera also believes that Russia should replace the rouble with the euro (but this 
does not mean joining the European Union or adhering to E.U. policy standards). He argues 
that the majority of Russian citizens have little faith in either the Russian central bank or the 
rouble and many citizens actually prefer to use the dollar and other foreign currencies 
whenever they can. The euro should be chosen rather than the dollar because Russia appears 
to identify more closely with Europe than America. Moreover, the euro is not associated 
with one particular country and, most importantly, the E.U. is not Russia’s superpower rival. 
This ‘dollarization’ would greatly increase investor confidence in Russia, which would be 
reflected in lower interest rates. (Dollarization is discussed in Chapter 6 .) Adopting the euro 
would also provide greater security for long-term loans, such as mortgages, which, according 
to Mr Pinera, are practically non-existent today. “Use of the euro, a liberalised banking 
sector integrated into the international financial system, and greater domestic competition 
will finally enable Russians to use the world’s and their own savings for productive
,,104purposes
According to Andrei Nesterenko, “[Vladimir Putin’s] economic achievements will 
depend on progress being made in four areas: bringing down foreign debt, creating a market
Sapir, J. 1999. p. 17.
103Pinera, J. 2000. p.68.
104Ibid. p.71.
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friendly environment, restructuring the real sector, and bringing order to economic 
federalism”105.
Stoneman et al. believe that: “[Russia is] going through a revolution as profound as 
1789 in France or the English Civil War.”106 McKinsey found that there are no natural or 
economic obstacles in Russia that would impede high economic growth. Russia has a 
relatively cheap and skilled workforce, substantial energy reserves and considerable spare 
capacity in potentially profitable industrial resources.107 Over the long term, it is conceivable 
that Russia can realise its potential and achieve advanced economy status.
Market distortions must be removed and the industrial sectors with the greatest 
growth potential, such as oil and light manufacturing (consumer goods and food processing), 
could flourish to replace imports that are likely to increase with any appreciation of the 
exchange rate. Pinto et al. estimate that the absence of market distortions would lead to large 
inflows of FDI and that annual growth of 8% would be attainable. If this growth is sustained 
over 15 years Russia could reach the GDP level of Spain or Portugal.108
However, a strong argument can also be made in favour of Russia’s continued 
stagnation. Nobody doubts the country’s potential but, as noted by Stoneman et al., “the task 
of managing Russia’s inherited industrial infrastructure would challenge the most advanced 
economic, political, civil, and management institutions. Unfortunately, all these institutions 
are weak in post-Soviet Russia”109. Furthermore, Russia’s development will be a costly 
process, with experts estimating that $2 trillion will be required to modernise the country’s 
infrastructure, labour force and production facilities.110
2.vi. Conclusion
The Asian financial crisis adversely affected Russia, owing to the country’s large federal 
budget deficit and its means of financing this deficit by relying excessively on short-term 
borrowing. Investors began to demand greater risk premiums, but each interest rate rise only 
increased the government’s debt-service payments. The upshot was, that yet more funds had 
to be borrowed to cover the additional cost of borrowing. However, throughout 1998 
investors became increasingly unwilling to ‘roll-over’ their loans to the Russian government,
105Nesterenko, A. September 2000. p.21.
106Stoneman et al. 2000. p.6 .
107McKinsey Global Institute. Solow et al. 1999.
108Pinto et al. 1999. p.4.
109Stoneman et al. 2000. p.6 .
110Nesterenko, A. 2000. p.20.
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despite interest rates being offered in excess of 150%. The situation was unsustainable, the 
rouble was devalued and the government defaulted on its domestic debt. Russia should have 
devalued its currency in response to the growing pressures from the Asian crisis, and adopted 
a more flexible regime, which would have provided a far smoother adjustment to exogenous 
disturbances. Pegged exchange rates appear inconsistent with international capital mobility 
and massive private capital flows.
The government’s inability to obtain tax revenues was the consequence of various 
market distortions, which, in turn, were the result of too many partial reforms when Russia 
first embarked on transition to a market. From 1992 to 1998 Russia performed far worse than 
was expected. Archie Brown of Oxford University has argued that: “Both Russian 
marketeers and their Western advisers were from the outset of the post-Soviet period far 
more interested in building a market economy than in building a democracy. As a result of 
these misplaced priorities they built neither the one nor the other.”111 The Russian transition 
began with great endeavour; privatisation and monetary stabilisation was essentially achieved
by the mid-1990s. However, economic reform after 1995 was disappointing. Anders Aslund
argued that: “Consecutive Russian parliaments have continuously voted against serious 
market liberalisation; real reformers were in power only from November 1991 to June
1992 ”112
Russia’s experience is in many ways incomparable with any other economy in 
transition. Radical reforms have achieved notable successes elsewhere so why not Russia? 
The fastest reformers have been those countries closest to Western Europe, such as Poland 
and Hungary. These countries were generally more economically developed at the start of 
transition and they had also had less time under socialist rule. Furthermore, these countries 
enjoy the incentive of prospective accession to the European Union, which has encouraged 
radical reform. Stoneman et al. conclude that: “The battle for Russia’s future remains 
undecided. The revolution will only be over when effective reforms take hold and when 
sustained economic recovery is clearly underway. By the same token, continued economic 
stagnation will suggest that the struggles of competing interest groups remain unresolved and 
the revolution has yet to run its course.”113 But a lot will depend on the performance of 
Vladimir Putin. James Gwartney believes that: “If Mr Putin moves slowly and timidly,
" ‘Brown, A, 1999. p.57.
1,2 Aslund, A. 1999. p.75.
" 3Stoneman et al. 1999. p.6 .
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Russia will continue to stagnate. But if he implements the necessary reforms, Russia’s 
economic rebound will be the story of the decade. ,114
1 l4Gwartney, J. 2000. p.27.
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Table 1. Russia’s GDP % change on a year earlier 1990-2002
‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02
-4 -13 -19 -12 -15 -3 -3.5 0.8 -5 3.2 8.3 4 4
Figures for 20 01 and 2002 are OEC]0 estimates.
Sources: Economies in Transition: comparing Asia and Europe. 1997. p. 163. The Economist. 
25 November 1999. p. 148 and 12 May 2001. p.52. OECD Economic Outlook. December 
2000. p. 129.
Table 2. Russia’s expected debt repayments 2001-2005, $ billions.
‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05
IMF 2 3.3 3.1 1.5 1.3
Eurobonds* 3.5 2.7 4.3 3.7 6.1
Official Creditors
2.3 2 1.4 0.7 0.5
Paris 3.2 3.4 1.5 1.5 3.5
Other 2.8 3 8.4 5.1 3.1
Total 13.8 14.4 18.7 12.5 14.5
* includes payments on restructured debt to the London Club. 
Source: The Economist. 13 January 2000. p.94.
Table 3. Total wage arrears 1998-2001, Roubles billion.
Total Wage Arrears, rbs billion.
‘98 77
‘99 43.7
‘00 31.7
‘01* 32.3
*2001 is an estimate.
Source: Russian Economic Trends, monthly update. March 2001. p.7.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CHINA
Background
China is the largest country in the world and home to over a fifth of mankind. “It presently 
has a government struggling to make the transition from impoverishing communist 
economics to market capitalism. That is a formidably difficult task given China’s size an*} 
the former backwardness of its economy. So far, the Chinese leadership has managed the 
transition quite adroitly”1.
In 1978, China began a programme of economic reform to gradually transform the 
country into a market economy. The majority of productive assets were owned by the state, 
so in an effort to ignite economic development the Chinese authorities attempted to 
deregulate the economy, opening up markets and enabling entrepreneurs to establish private 
businesses. Foreign trade and investment were liberalised, enabling China to enjoy huge 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and rapid increases in income, primarily through 
the highly efficient export sectors. Additionally, state controlled prices have been gradually 
relaxed, education standards have improved, and China has achieved remarkable growth 
since commencing their gradualist transition. (See Table 1 and 2, p.92.)
The former Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, argues that: “Chinese communists 
embarked on capitalism because communism had so manifestly failed, and its failures 
threatened to topple the party from power. With their governmental competence questioned 
and their moral authority in tatters, Deng and his supporters argued through the late 1970s 
and 1980s that, in order to retain its control of China, the Communist Party would have to 
show that it could after all make people better off. The only way it could accomplish that 
was by modernising China, introducing capitalism, and throwing the country’s doors and 
windows open to the outside world ... Improvements in the living standards of parts of China, 
and parts of Chinese society, have bought time. To many Chinese ‘shut up and I’ll let you 
get rich’ seemed about as good an offer as the Chinese were likely to get from their 
government. They preferred the freedom to make money to the absence of any freedom 
whatsoever.”2
Some argue that China could become the world’s number one economy in terms of 
total national output in as little twenty years. (See p.88.) But in terms of GDP per capita, it 
will not rank alongside the advanced countries of the world, such as France, Britain, 
Germany, Japan and the U.S., for many decades. Gerald Segal believes that: “[China] is
‘Patten, C. 1999. p.282.
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overrated as a market, a power and a source of ideas. At best, China is a second-rank middle 
power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theatre ... In 1997 China accounted for 3.5% of 
world GNP ... The U.S. was 25.6%. China ranked seventh in the world, ahead of Brazil and 
behind Italy. Its per capita GDP ranking was eighty-first, just ahead of Georgia and behind 
Papua New Guinea,... Using the U.N. Human Development Index, China is one hundred and 
seventh, bracketed by Albania and Namibia - not an impressive story.”3
Yet the Asian financial crisis threw China into the international limelight, and played 
to the country’s ambitions of becoming a world economic power. This is because a 
devaluation of the Chinese renminbi would have triggered a further bout of currency 
depreciations throughout the Asian region and ignited fears of catch-up devaluations in the 
emerging markets of Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Throughout the crisis period the Chinese authorities managed to avoid devaluing the 
renminbi. In so doing, China received lavish praise from the U.S. for not introducing an 
additional deflationary impulse to the world economy.
Introduction
China, like the Asian and Russian economies prior to their crises, operates a nominally 
pegged exchange rate, which allows the renminbi to fluctuate within a strictly defined range. 
In 1997, the renminbi strengthened slightly against the U.S. dollar and appreciated in the 
range of 30-80% in relation to its crisis-hit regional neighbours. In 1998, the Chinese 
economy maintained its impressive rate of growth despite growing by its lowest annual level, 
of 7.8%, since the early 1990s. China’s relentless growth is even more impressive when one 
considers the harsh recessions that Asia’s ‘miracle’ economies were enduring at this time. 
(See Table 3, p.92.) The fiscal austerity measures that were introduced in China in 1994 
succeeded in controlling inflation and foreign exchange reserves have reached record levels. 
Moreover, China has consistently generated substantial current account surpluses, amounting 
to $24 billion in 1997, nearly 3% of GDP.4
However, on a closer inspection it would appear that all is not quite as well as the 
impressive figures above would suggest. Few analysts trust Chinese economic data. Chinese 
statistics have long been exaggerated for numerous reasons, which primarily include local 
officials doctoring their statistics to make them and their regions look good. Additionally, 
China produces some useless goods, which are never sold but are still added to GDP.
2Ibid. p. 142.
3Segal, G. 1999. p.24.
4Femald & Babson. 1999.
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Possibly the most significant difference between China and the crisis-hit Asian 
economies is that China possesses a current account surplus. (See Table 4, p.92.) However, 
China’s seemingly impressive current account surplus of $24 billion in 1997, is actually 
offset by Hong Kong’s current account deficit of $19 billion, “reducing the total to a fairly 
unimpressive $4.6 billion. China’s trade surpluses, in other words, are largely a statistical 
illusion”5.
The primary recipient of China’s bank credits has been the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), 45% of which are insolvent. It is therefore no surprise that even “by conservative 
estimates, at least a quarter of Chinese loans are non-performing - a rate that South-east 
Asians would have found frightening before the crash”6.
Few market participants questioned China’s vulnerability to Asian contagion until 
Hong Kong’s currency and stock market were subjected to fierce speculative attacks, forcing 
a collapse in asset markets, which, in turn, struck the stock exchanges of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Analysts then began to focus on China’s slowing export sectors, which had lost a 
considerable degree of price competitiveness following the East Asian currency devaluations. 
These devaluations prompted concerns that China’s inflows of EDI would subside, given that 
the vast majority of inflows are received from the East Asian region.
Clearly, China had many of the same ailments that were inherent failures within both 
the fallen Asian economies and Russia. In fact, China exhibits pervasive corruption and 
considerable nepotism, but crucially, less vulnerability to a financial panic.
3.ii. Evidence of China’s vulnerability to financial crisis 
A weak banking sector 
The Chinese banking system provides a clear example of the similarities between China and 
the crisis-afflicted economies of East Asia and Russia. China’s banks are weak and suffer 
from deficient regulation and supervision. They provide easy credit to inefficient, over­
leveraged state enterprises and their cronies. Speculative property development is rife within 
many Chinese cities, one of the aspects that were central to the rise in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Shanghai has built more office space in one 
decade than Hong Kong built in four. Moreover, Nicholas Lardy believes that: “At least 20% 
of outstanding loans are bad by Western standards (roughly 18% of GDP), indicating that 
Chinese banks possessed approximately $145 billion in bad loans at the end of 1996. At the 
beginning of 1998, China’s state banks had a declared capital base of $54 billion meaning
5Krugman, P. 1997.
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that the banks are bankrupt three times over. However, Mr Lardy considers that a more 
realistic estimate of the extent of Chinese bad loans is 70% of GDP!”7 Mr Lardy claims that 
an additional “vulnerability China shares with the Asian countries in crisis is an enormous 
build up of NPLs ... The ratio of NPLs in China is substantially higher than it was in South 
Korea, or Thailand before the crisis”8. „
A further Chinese vulnerability to Asian contagion was identified by Femald and 
Babson: “Weak banking systems are a particularly important problem if the banking system 
is large relative to the economy ... The size of China’s banking system is similar to that in the 
rest of Asia. In particular, the median ratio of bank loans relative to GDP was 93% in 
Malaysia, almost identical to the ratio in China.”9 The absence of clear bankruptcy laws 
enables insolvent banks and companies to continue operating, whilst managers lack the 
necessary incentives to ensure that their companies perform efficiently. These insolvent 
enterprises are able to persist with their money-losing activities thanks to government 
subsidies and the absence of market mechanisms that would otherwise enforce bankruptcy.
Chinese banks continue to lend blindly and support money-bleeding state enterprises. 
This is because they are aware that the authorities will guarantee bank deposits, which are 
primarily held in state-owned banks. Therefore, household depositors still have confidence 
in the banking system, and the deposit base remains sound. However, the longer that the 
banks persist in financing the insolvent state-owned enterprises, the greater the likelihood 
depositors will lose confidence in the Chinese banking system, requiring an intervention by 
the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) to act as ‘lender of last resort’. But, this may only 
succeed in exchanging a banking crisis for a fiscal and, in turn, current account crisis.
The competitive threat to China’s export sectors 
China’s trade has been one of the primary ingredients that have promoted economic growth 
since 1978. In 1997, China’s net exports contributed 19.2% to economic growth, 10% higher 
than the average level since the start of the reforms.10 International trade played only a 
limited role in China’s growth at the start of economic reforms in 1978, when the Chinese 
authorities concentrated production on import substitution. However, by 1994 the annual 
value of China’s exports was U.S. $102.6 billion from approximately $7.3 billion in 1978.11
6Segal, G. 1999. p.26.
7The Economist. 14 February 1998. p.69.
8Lardy, N. 1998. pp.82-85.
9Femald & Babson. 1999.
10Economics blue book of the Peoples Republic of China, 1999. p.295.
"Henderson, C. 1999. p .ll .
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Despite the Asian crisis the renminbi remained relatively stable, and the Chinese 
currency consequently appreciated by around 30-80% relative to the ASEAN currencies, 
reducing Chinese export competitiveness in these markets. China’s 1998 current account 
surplus weakened and year-on-year export growth fell from 20.9% throughout 1997 to 8.6% 
for the first five months of 1998.12 This was a result of the collapse in domestic demand and 
increased competitiveness of East Asia. The contagion effects on trade occur as a result of 
the reduced income level of the crisis-hit countries. Hence, China’s exports to East Asia 
slowed markedly given the renminbi’s real appreciation vis-a-vis China’s regional
neighbours. This has illustrated the importance of diversifying export destinations as an aid 
against contagion. Moreover, 20% of China’s exports are destined for the Japanese 
economy, which was (and still is) enduring a prolonged economic recession. This was
compounded by a depreciation of the Japanese yen vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, which worsened
Chinese export weakness in this market. Some 40% of Chinese exports were destined for 
Asian markets (including Hong Kong), where growth slowed markedly and the Asian 
devaluations improved much of East Asia’s wage costs in relation to China. Although China 
was not hit by an adverse turn in investor sentiment, the belief that China was completely 
insulated from the Asian crisis is incorrect. China’s exports contributed approximately 2% to 
the country’s 1997 growth of 8.8%.13 Consequently, the slowdown in export growth 
threatened GDP growth and, more importantly, the slower export growth jeopardised the 
reform programme of SOEs. This was because the Chinese government had been relying 
upon strong export growth to provide employment for the millions of SOE workers that are 
being made redundant each year from SOE reform.
Despite the depreciation of ASEAN currencies, China still possesses a number of 
advantages in producing low-end manufacturing products, which the country specialises in. 
Average monthly wages of $60 are a third of those that would be demanded in Thailand. The 
Economist argued that: “ASEAN’s manufacturers offer little threat to China’s - quite the 
contrary. China has a near bottomless pool of cheap labour, useful economies of scale, and 
growing domestic demand to supplement the market for exports. In almost any 
manufacturing process China gets into ... It soon becomes unbeatable.”14
12Kynge and Ridding. 1998.
13Ibid.
14The Economist. 2 December 2000. p.94.
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However, China experienced deflation after October 1997. This was partly a result of 
domestic oversupply, but deflationary pressures were also being imported thanks to cheap 
foreign imports, which suggests that the renminbi is overvalued. Indeed, the East Asian 
devaluations provided further deflationary impulses to the Chinese economy. This is because 
cheaper East Asian products flowed into the Chinese market, further weakening prices in 
already saturated Chinese goods markets. Overcapacity in the Chinese economy indicates 
that additional inflows of FDI will achieve lower profit margins. Thus, a prolonged 
slowdown of the Chinese economy would result in a decline or even a reversal of FDI. 
Consequently, there were fears that the government would provide an inflationary impulse to 
the Chinese economy by allowing a devaluation of the renminbi, which would have raised the 
real price of imports into the Chinese market.
However, if the Chinese authorities had chosen to devalue the renminbi they would 
have triggered an additional round of ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ currency devaluations 
throughout the Asian region, or at the very least expectations of such depreciations. This in 
turn, would have caused a further rise in the price of emerging market borrowing throughout 
the world as investors re-appraise their exposures to similar economies. Moreover, a Chinese 
devaluation would have widened “China’s trade surplus with the U.S., which is likely to 
exceed $30 billion this year [1997]. American politicians already complain that their 
country’s bilateral trade deficit with China is intolerable, and China’s leaders know that a 
trade war with America would be sure to destroy any economic benefit from devaluation”15.
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
“The state sector sucks in four-fifths of investment clogging the banks with bad debts and 
starving private firms of cash”16. In 1997, over 6,000 SOEs were bankrupted and that 
number continues to rise, increasing unemployment and the need for adequate welfare 
benefits. Many insolvent SOEs, which continue their money losing activities, are unable to 
pay wages to employees, igniting further social tensions. China has approximately 110,000 
medium and large sized SOEs, nearly 50% of which are insolvent. These SOEs employ 
around 120 million workers, of whom approximately 50 million are believed to have no 
useful work to do.17 Chris Patten has stated that: “Lending from the state banks to these 
firms is hollowing out China’s banking system, which it would probably cost about 25-30% 
of China’s GDP to recapitalise ... China’s high savings are in effect, drained away each year
15The Economist. 13 December 1997. p.97.
16The Economist. 14 February 1998. p.20.
17Patten, C. 1999. pp. 143-144.
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to bail out the money losing state enterprises, which swallow three quarters of the country’s 
investment but deliver well under half its industrial production. This is why China is so 
crucially dependent on attracting foreign investment.”18
The growth of the Chinese exporting sectors was supposed to provide employment for 
the millions of workers made redundant through government SOE reform, but the reduction 
in export demand from the East Asian region slowed Chinese export industry growth and 
threatened the reform process. The SOEs operate with inadequate incentives to perform 
efficiently and have little reason to be productive. Callum Henderson believes that: “If the 
SOEs are allowed to any major extent to carry on with the old unproductive practices ... One 
of two things could occur: a Soviet-style collapse of the state sector or a rising and intolerable 
burden on the state budget if the government seeks to avoid the former ... The SOE problem 
has to be dealt with now, however much pain it causes, for the alternative will surely be even 
more painful.”19
China’s outstanding credit has grown from 53% in 1997 to 100% in 1998; a ratio 
reminiscent of South Korea prior to Korea’s financial crisis. The SOEs are the primary 
recipients of bank credit and their balance sheets have deteriorated markedly as the debt they 
owe has increased dramatically. In 1978, when the gradualist economic reforms began 
“[SOE] balance sheets were quite strong, reflected in a debt-to-equity ratio of about 10%- 
about a fourth or a fifth of what one would expect among firms in a market economy. 
Because of a rapid increase in their borrowing, by the end of 1995 the debt-to-equity ratio of 
all state-owned firms ... exceeded a striking 500%. This change implies that many of China’s 
state-owned firms are insolvent- some cannot even cover their operating costs with their 
income. Because of their highly leveraged position, more and more firms will be unable to 
service the debts if the economy slows down, further undermining the weak financial position 
of banks”20.
The reduction of the number of SOEs in the Chinese economy will require a vast 
reallocation of labour and capital. SOE reform will cause widespread redundancies, a 
politically difficult step, which can only be made easier if new jobs are created for the laid- 
off workers. Thus investment within the non-state sector must continue. Any reduction in 
FDI flows to China would make this transition more difficult and jeopardise SOE reform.
18Ibid.
19Henderson, C. 1999. pp.212-213.
20Lardy, N. 1998. pp.80-81.
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Some 80% of China’s FDI is courtesy of ethnic Chinese living in East Asia. Utilised 
(as opposed to contracted) FDI inflows to China have risen at an annual rate of 28% from 
1983 to 1997 and amounted to approximately $45 billion in 1997 and 1998, followed by $41 
billion in 1999. The Chinese mainland now accounts for approximately one third of the total 
stock of FDI destined for emerging markets and China’s stock of FDI ($350 billion) is the 
world’s third largest, behind the U.S. ($1.1 trillion) and Britain ($394 billion).21 However, 
1997 was a “year of record capital flight from China by some reckonings, an outflow of $35 
billion. Much so-called investment from East Asia makes a round-trip from China via some 
places like Hong Kong and then comes back in as FDI to attract tax concessions”22.
China’s current account surplus indicates that the country is a net exporter of capital. 
The Chinese Central Bank often purchases U.S. treasury bonds and other foreign exchange 
assets. However, it is “hard to understand how China can attract so much foreign investment 
without running a large current account deficit. Where does the money go? ... [Russia runs 
the biggest trade surplus of all] ... obviously this isn’t because the Russian economy is super 
competitive. What that trade surplus actually reflects is Russia’s sorry state, in which 
nervous businessmen and corrupt officials siphon off a large fraction of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings, parking it in safe havens abroad rather than making it available to pay for 
imports. China ... suffers from a milder form of the same ailment. The reason those inflows 
of foreign capital don’t finance a trade deficit is that they are offset by outflows of domestic 
capital... In other words, that [trade] surplus is a sign of weakness rather than strength”23.
A further similarity between China and Russia, in 1997, was the running of budget 
deficits, which indicate poor government discipline over the collection and spending of 
public revenues. Indeed, Russia and China’s budget deficits are primarily the result of soft 
budget constraints - government support for insolvent enterprises. Although China’s budget 
deficit was only 0.2% of GDP in 1996, this figure does not include SOE deficits financed by 
the central bank (the PBOC). When these deficits are included, the budget deficit amounts to 
6% of GDP24 similar in size to Russia’s budget deficit in 1997 of 6.5% of GDP.25 This is 
why the Chinese government is attempting to reform the SOEs and therefore greatly reduce 
the burden of supporting them through the PBOC. However, in the short-term this 
restructuring process only aggravates the economic slowdown.
21The Economist. March 10 2001. p.26.
22Segal, G. 1999. pp.27-28.
23 Krug man, P. 1997.
24Henderson, C. 1999. pp.32-33.
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The absence of efficient capital markets
A misallocation of capital contributed to the onset of the Asian crisis. This misallocation was 
essentially due to the absence of efficient and transparent asset markets. Capital inflows were 
consequently directed towards inefficient and often corrupt activities. China’s capital 
markets are currently rampant with speculative activities as a result of ambiguous regulations 
and weak supervision. China’s ‘A’ share market capitalisation amounts to approximately 
50% of China’s GDP, representing Asia’s third largest stock market behind Tokyo and Hong 
Kong. China’s ‘A’ share market was the world’s best performer in 2000, yet this was partly 
achieved by “market-ramping carried out by a handful of powerful insiders ... The managers 
of ten big investment trusts took regular trips to the sauna. There ... they rigged the 
market”26.
Foreign investors are still unable to purchase renminbi-denominated ‘A’ shares. 
Instead, they must purchase independently priced, and foreign currency-denominated, ‘B’ 
shares. However, the majority of foreign investors invest only in the mainland companies 
that have issued ‘H’ shares, which are listed in Hong Kong. This is because these shares 
enjoy the security of Hong Kong’s common law system. But according to the Economist, 
“the fragmentation of China’s equity markets negates much of its purpose. A company with 
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘H’ shares today has three wholly different valuations, none with much 
connection to fundamentals ... [In February 2001] ‘A’ shares traded at four times the price 
earnings ratio of the corresponding ‘B’ shares in Shenzhen, and three times the ratio in 
Shanghai. The gap between ‘A’ and ‘H’ shares is not much smaller. Distortions such as 
these were bound to persist as long as domestic savings remained locked in Chinese currency 
shares, and overseas savings remained locked out of them”27.
3.iii. China’s evasion of the Asian currency meltdown 
Despite China’s apparent similarities to the crisis-hit East Asian economies, the renminbi did 
not endure the sort of speculative attacks that East Asia were subjected to in 1997. This was 
because the Chinese capital account remains essentially closed. Only the current account has 
been liberalised for international transactions. Beijing would claim that this is proof of the 
wisdom of adopting a slow and gradual process of economic reform, as opposed to ‘big bang’ 
liberalisation, which has resulted in only a partially liberalised Russian economy that was
2SRET. March 1998. p i.
26The Economist. 3 March 2001. p. 100.
27Ibid. p99.
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vulnerable to a financial panic. In the Asian economies the sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation was headlong and, consequently, lacked competent regulatory measures.
In addition to China’s inconvertible currency, the country has a vast pool of foreign 
exchange reserves relative to short-term debt. In 1997, China’s foreign exchange reserves 
amounted to $140 billion.28 Such liquidity provides a crucial defence against financial 
market volatility, particularly when reserves are in excess of short-term debt.
China’s guiding principles on capital controls 
Commentators have often stated that China’s favourable external fundamentals, most notably 
a healthy current account surplus and foreign exchange reserves in excess of short-term debt, 
would themselves preclude a self-fulfilling financial panic on the Chinese renminbi. But, 
more importantly, China’s closed capital account prevents domestic residents or foreign 
speculators from exchanging the renminbi for speculative purposes. “The key elements of 
China’s capital controls are a universal requirement for registration, strict criteria of approval, 
tight control over using foreign exchanges and severe penalties for breaching regulations”29. 
The main objectives of China’s capital controls are as follows:
1. Restrictions on levels of borrowing.
The authorities have emphasised the importance of increasing domestic savings rates; 
foreign capital inflows have been considered as supplementary. This has enabled China to 
maintain current account surpluses over the last twenty years, despite being one of the 
world’s largest foreign capital-absorbing nations. At the same time these restrictions have 
inhibited financial intermediaries from borrowing excessively in foreign currency- 
denominated loans, which has prevented an expansion of balance sheets that was seen 
elsewhere in Asia.
2. FDI is the more desirable form of capital inflows, whilst short-term speculative 
flows must be discouraged.
FDI avoids the potentially destabilising effects of short-term foreign capital, which 
must be serviced in good times and bad. Consequently, around 80% of China’s debts are 
long-term.
3. A gradual approach to capital account liberalisation.
The restrictions on capital flows have helped the Chinese authorities to preserve a 
stable exchange rate. Without the capital controls, Chinese banks may have borrowed
28Feldstein, M. 1999a. p. 104.
29Yongding, Y. in ‘Global Finance: new thinking on regulating speculative capital markets’, 
p.294. 2000.
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excessively in foreign currencies. Thus the capital controls insulated the economy from 
exogenous shocks that may otherwise have exposed China’s weaknesses.
Because foreigners are not permitted to buy and sell local currency-denominated ‘A’ 
shares, an adverse turn of foreign investor sentiment has no implications for the value of the 
renminbi. Would-be-sellers are unable to sell their shares until they find a foreign buyer who 
will pay dollars for their shares. Because the Chinese capital account has not been 
liberalised, only residents with a need related to trade, tourism, a repatriation of profits 
derived from a direct investment or the repayment of an approved foreign currency- 
denominated loan can purchase foreign exchange.
Due to the renminbi’s lack of convertibility foreign investors own only a very small 
share of renminbi-denominated financial assets such as bank deposits and corporate stock. 
The difficulty of converting such assets back into dollars means that the type of high speed 
financial panic that occurred in Asia, where foreign investors and local borrowers rushed to 
convert local currency into dollars cannot happen in China.
The Chinese futures market for foreign exchange is also restricted to those who have 
a trade-related need, preventing currency speculators from taking short positions in 
reniminbi. Moreover, domestic enterprises with foreign currency-denominated loans are 
unable to purchase foreign exchange to make payments until these loans come due.
However, capital controls do come at a price since any attempt to restrict the 
movement of capital will involve costs. If the rules are too strict they may discourage the 
good transactions. Conversely, if they are too loose, they will be evaded with ease. 
Additionally, controls provide ample opportunities for corrupt practices because officials are 
in a position to grant or refuse profitable entitlements. However, following the Asian crisis, 
market participants, and the IMF, were thankful that China had not liberalised the country’s 
capital account.
Despite the controls on capital, some capital is illegally converted into foreign 
currencies and deposited in offshore bank accounts. As identified by Paul Krugman, this 
capital flight helps to explain China’s trade surplus. The substantial quantity of capital 
fleeing China reflects problems with the country’s investment environment. It also indicates 
that should the Chinese authorities relax the foreign exchange controls, many other investors 
would flee the Chinese market to seek more profitable opportunities abroad.
In 1998, China’s trade surplus amounted to approximately $43.6 billion and utilised 
FDI to $45 billion. However, foreign exchange reserves rose by only $5.1 billion from 1997 
to year-end 1998. The combination of FDI inflows and the trade surplus should have
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increased foreign exchange reserves by a substantial proportion of the $88.6 billion, which 
should only have been reduced by a number of offsetting factors given that the capital 
account is closed. So what has happened to the rest of the money? Callum Henderson has 
identified two possible explanations. Firstly, there is the 1997 PBOC rule that allows specific 
Chinese trading enterprises to retain up to 15% of their export receivables in foreign 
exchange as opposed to immediately converting the currencies into renminbi. The State 
Development Planning Commission, believes that the slackening foreign reserves are the 
result of exporters amassing dollar revenues up to the limit permitted by the PBOC instead of 
converting them into renminbi. But Mr Henderson disputes this because in 1998 exports 
amounted to around $182 billion. Thus if every exporter in China held 15% of its foreign 
currency receivables (which is against PBOC rules considering only certain exporters are 
allowed to retain these earnings) it would amount to only $27.3 billion. Secondly, the 
existence of the Chinese black market, which enables Chinese residents to convert renminbi 
into U.S. dollars, indicates capital leakage through illegal foreign exchange transactions. Mr 
Henderson argues that: “The very fact that the authorities have cracked down on such 
activities in Guangdong and Xiamen, and that the PBOC governor himself, Dai Xianglong, 
spoke in terms of ‘crushing’ the black market for foreign exchange appears to confirm this ... 
One hears of up to 40% of annual FDI being leaked back out of the country. Given that this 
would amount to $18 billion, using 1998 as a benchmark, this would seem exaggerated. 
There is no question, however, that such leakage is occurring.”30
Yet there are other explanations of the capital leakage. On the Chinese stock markets 
we have seen that only foreign investors were allowed to purchase ‘B’ shares (denominated 
in U.S. and Hong Kong dollars), but in practice approximately 80% of the ‘B’ shares listed 
on the Shanghai exchange and 60% of shares on the Shenzhen exchange are held by Chinese 
residents who have established illegal offshore accounts.31 But since the 26th February 2001 
the PBOC has permitted Chinese residents to buy ‘B’ shares. The ‘B’ share market failed to 
attract many foreign investors because it was too illiquid and the quality of listed companies 
was often poor. Instead, most domestic enterprises seeking hard currencies listed their shares 
on the Hong Kong stock exchange or on foreign markets. Further changes to the stock 
markets are expected later in 2001 or in 2002. Measures include the merging of the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges and the development of a second board, similar to
30Henderson, C. 1999. pp.92-96.
31The Economist. 3 March 2001. p.99.
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the U.S. Nasdaq, that will provide new technology companies with the opportunity of raising 
capital.
But there are additional explanations of the illicit capital leakage. These include 
borrowing without government approval, forging documents to disguise borrowing as export 
earnings to receive a tax rebate, unauthorised investment abroad by Chinese enterprises, 
capital flight under the disguise of payments for patents, commissions and travel expenses. 
While loopholes in the capital controls enable foreign investors to use residents as agents to 
buy shares prohibited to non-residents, and importers often receive invoices that are higher 
than the actual value of goods, the difference is then remitted abroad.32
To counteract this capital leakage China’s Supreme Court, in October 1998, 
demanded a major crackdown on illegal foreign exchange activities. However, foreign 
investors expressed concern and domestic trading enterprises also complained about the 
inconveniences caused by these stringent measures. The Chinese government subsequently 
responded by loosening the controls to ensure economic activity was not discouraged. Such 
action clearly demonstrates the authorities concern and determination to challenge the 
outflow. Addressing the illegal capital leakage without deterring investment and trade flows 
poses a significant problem to the Chinese officials, leading Yu Yongding to conclude that: 
“The greatly weakened effectiveness of capital controls in China is one of the most important 
threats to China’s economic stability.”33
China’s healthy foreign exchange reserves 
At the end of 1998, China’s foreign exchange reserves amounted to a new high of U.S. $150 
billion. At the beginning of 2000 the country’s total debt obligations amounted to U.S. $137 
billion. But only 20% of China’s total debt obligation is short-term.34 Moreover, China’s 
external debt is modest relative to foreign reserves. Short-term international bank lending 
amounted to only 24% of foreign reserves in 1997, in comparison with 249% for Indonesia 
and 145% for Thailand.35 One of the key fundamental weaknesses of the Russian and East 
Asian countries was that the country’s foreign short-term debt exceeded available foreign 
exchange reserves. But with China, the knowledge that there is ample liquidity to pay each 
short-term investor can in itself preclude a financial panic.
32Yongding, Y.
33Yongding, Y. In ‘Global Finance: new thinking on regulating speculative capital markets’. 
2000. p.302.
34Ibid.
35Henderson, C. 1999. p. 104.
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Nevertheless, an Asian style high-speed financial meltdown is unlikely to occur in 
China, irrespective of what level of foreign reserves the PBOC holds. This is due to the 
restrictions on capital mobility. Despite these controls, capital is fleeing China, but whether 
this leakage is sufficient to demand an exchange rate realignment is doubtful.
China’s capital controls have, therefore, insulated China from destabilising 
speculative pressures. China also possesses an extremely strong external position, including 
$150 billion in foreign exchange reserves and a current account surplus. (See Tables 4 and 5, 
pp.92/93.) And while some analysts argue that these strong fundamentals would preclude a 
self-fulfilling attack on the renminbi, these favourable factors are primarily a result of the 
capital controls that the Chinese authorities have employed.
Other crisis prevention measures in China 
Market mechanisms do not operate fully in China and bankruptcies are controlled. Insolvent 
enterprises often receive subsidies enabling them to continue with their money-losing 
activities. Furthermore, many Chinese financial institutions support moral-hazard- related- 
lending, on a scale that is reminiscent of East Asia prior to the 1997 crises. These institutions 
bear little responsibility for bad loans and harbour incompetent, inefficient financial 
regulation and supervision. Consequently, the Chinese authorities can be rewarded for their 
gradual approach to capital account liberalisation, which has restricted Chinese financial 
institutions from borrowing excessively in foreign currencies. The renminbi’s 
inconvertibility has enabled China’s external fundamentals to remain strong, in contrast to its 
East Asian neighbours. Hence, China’s bad loans are denominated in its local currency 
rather than foreign, as was the case in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. 
Therefore, the possibility of a bank run in China is reduced because the PBOC could fulfil its 
role as ‘lender of last resort’.
China’s financial markets are at a very early stage of financial development. 
Therefore, the absence of easily accessible stock futures and foreign exchange forwards, may 
also have contributed to China’s evasion of destabilising speculative attacks. Furthermore, 
China’s capital controls discriminate in favour of long-term foreign investments, rather than 
short-term speculative flows. Moreover, China receives the largest quantity of FDI inflows 
of any emerging market in the world. Long-term investment avoids the problem of debt 
servicing that can prove so difficult with short-term debt, particularly when the economy 
suffers an adverse turn in investor sentiment. FDI has played a significant role in improving 
China’s economy. The indirect consequences of FDI have introduced new technology and
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products, whilst direct investment has also helped to increase the size of the non-state 
(typically profitable) sector.
Walden Bello believes that China is well respected by foreign investors, unlike the 
countries of South-east Asia because “Beijing is tough on foreign investors and enjoys the 
upper hand with the international business community. Yet foreign investors are scrambling 
to get into China, restrictions and all ... Foreign investors will always scream about 
investment controls chasing away foreign capital. But the case of China ... shows that where 
there is money to be made, investors will live with the restrictions. In contrast, foreign 
investors can blackmail other governments to dilute their investment rules. Investors know 
they can ratchet up their demands because weaker government’s will inevitably give in ...
qz:
Respect is what the Chinese government gets from investors” .
China is believed to possess enormous economic potential because it is the largest 
country in the world in terms of population and has an enormous market place, with many 
millions of prospective customers to satisfy. But the respect that both foreign investors and 
governments grant the Chinese regime seems a little perverse. As Chris Patten argues, “the 
Chinese government needs our investment. It needs access to our markets. Without our 
money and our purchases of Chinese goods, the very future of the communist regime would 
be imperilled. We spin the wheels for it”37.
3.iv. Why China would not devalue 
At the time of the Asian crisis China had a number of reasons to maintain the renminbi - 
dollar exchange rate. Even the currency speculator George Soros was adamant that China 
would ‘until its dying breath’ defend both the Hong Kong dollar and the renminbi exchange 
rates: ‘T o devalue the [renminbi] would knock a psychological prop from under the Hong 
Kong dollar, which is pegged via a currency board to the American dollar. Should the peg 
come into question, Hong Kong’s own financial system would suffer horribly, with 
consequences ... for China, which depends heavily upon capital raised in Hong Kong for 
much of its development.” A devaluation of the renminbi would have triggered 
expectations of competitive devaluations throughout the Asian region. Such expectations 
would have become self-fulfilling and would have struck emerging markets throughout the 
world, severely aggravating the Asian crisis. “Asset prices would fall everywhere and 
growth would decline. An already far-too-high dollar would be pushed even higher as Asia
36Bello, W. 1999b.
37Patten, C. 1999. p.202.
38The Economist. 14 February 1998. p.69.
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seeks to fix employment problems with ever-larger trade surpluses. Emerging market 
lending would again get hit”39.
A renminbi devaluation would not necessarily promote China’s exports to Japan and 
East Asia because Japan has been enduring a prolonged economic recession and Asia’s crisis 
has had a profound effect on income levels in these economies. A related point to China’s 
export competitiveness is the high proportion of foreign raw materials that constitutes many 
of China’s exports. Some Chinese products comprise up to 57% in foreign inputs, thus a 
renminbi devaluation would be largely offset by the increase in the price of these 
components.40 From 1990 to 1997 average Chinese export growth was 17% per year. But in 
1998 exports only increased by 0.5% and imports fell by 1.5%.41 However, Henny Sender 
believes that China may actually have found that it is more competitive following the Asian 
crisis. Sender argues that China can increasingly compete on quality as opposed to just lower 
unit costs and its trade-finance arrangements did not fall apart as they did in the rest of Asia. 
China’s oversupply of commodities and 1998 deflation amounted to an effective devaluation. 
China’s export share of Asian countries to the U.S. market has increased dramatically since 
1989, at the expense of its South-east Asian neighbours. (This trend is illustrated in Table 6, 
p.93.) In addition, Sender argues that the tax rebates to exporters effectively devalue the 
exchange rate by 3%. Furthermore, Chinese exporters were offering an exchange rate of over 
9 renminbi to the U.S. dollar, in comparison with the official rate of approximately 8.3.42
Finally, China’s capital controls have insulated the economy from market volatility 
and indirectly contributed to China’s strong external fundamentals. Provided China 
continues to enjoy prolonged inflows of foreign capital, the renminbi will be able to maintain 
its pegged exchange rate. Yu Yongding stated that: “Due to the current account surplus and 
continued capital inflows, there was actually an excess supply of the dollar on China’s 
official foreign exchange market. In other words, if there were not devaluation expectations, 
the renminbi would have to bear revaluation pressure, rather than devaluation pressures. 
Although on the black market the renminbi was traded at a lower than official rate, the 
transaction volume on the black market was small owing to the capital controls;
39Dombusch, R. 1999.
40Yongding, Y.
41Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 February 1999. p.61.
42Sender, H.. Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 February 1999. pp.17-18.
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[consequently] the influence of the black market on the determination of the renminbi’s 
official rate was minimal.”43
Indeed, on the Shanghai foreign exchange market official trading (averaging at 
around $150-200 million a day) dwarfs the black market, which usually amounts to 
approximately $200,000 a day. But Callum Henderson argues that: “A black market is ... a 
symptom of economic failure of some sort, of local scepticism with financial and economic 
policy and with present valuation of the currency and domestic assets, be they property, 
stocks or anything else that has a value to it.”44
3.v. East Asian lessons for China 
The intensity and duration of the Asian financial meltdown took everyone by surprise. China 
was negatively affected in certain areas of its economy, most notably in its slowing exports 
and inflows of FDI, which pose additional problems to the economy. However, the Asian 
crisis has served as an invaluable and free lesson to the Chinese authorities, who must take 
heed of the fundamental weaknesses that were so brutally exposed in the Asian financial 
crisis. The clearest lesson of the Asian crisis was the dangers and vulnerability posed by an 
open capital account, and inadequate regulation and supervision. Easy credit gave rise to a 
growing proportion of NPLs, which were primarily denominated in foreign currencies. Thus, 
the collapse of the exchange rate peg transformed a currency crisis into a financial and 
economic crisis.
The financial effects of the Asian crisis occurred because investors became risk 
averse and wished to avoid economies that possessed similar fundamental weaknesses. The 
belief that a crisis will ensue becomes self-fulfilling and an investor stampede may take 
place, precipitating the crisis. The excessive reliance on short-term external financing was at 
the heart of the Asian and Russian crises.
Since the outset of the Asian crisis, China has adopted a number of policies in order to 
strengthen the country’s insulation from financial market upheaval, whilst also focusing 
attention on the necessary reforms of the economic system, the financial one in particular.
The authorities have been engineering a comprehensive but gradual reform of the 
financial system, which has several notable aspects. Firstly, the process of commercialisation 
must be accelerated and managers increasingly assessed by Western market standards, 
thereby encouraging banks to become more risk-averse and profit-orientated. Nevertheless, 
whether the banks will actually consolidate their loans remains questionable. The Chinese
43Yongding, Y.
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authorities response to the anticipation of slowing growth, following the Asian crisis, was to 
significantly increase, in Keynesian fashion, government expenditure on infrastructure 
projects. State enterprises have also stepped up investment. According to Femald and 
Babson, “nominal state investment in 1998 was 22% higher than a year earlier ... The 
increase in investment by state enterprises appears to have been financed by substantially 
faster third-quarter lending by the four major banks. Hence, the increase in growth appears to 
be at the expense of previously announced enterprise and bank reform”45. This spending 
spree on infrastructure was being made in an effort to attain the 8% GDP growth target that 
Beijing has become so accustomed to meeting and, on occasion, even surpassing. However, 
the haste of the infrastructure expenditure has caused concerns regarding the quality of the 
investments undertaken. This response to slowing growth illustrates that, despite moves to 
make the banks more commercially orientated, the government strongly influences the banks’ 
policy conduct. Femald and Babson acknowledge that: “China faces the very difficult task of 
sequencing, that is, of trying to move from having a non-commercial banking system where 
market mechanisms do not work fully, to have a viable commercial banking system where 
incentives are appropriate. The transitional stage - where controls have been lifted but 
incentives remain inappropriate - holds clear dangers as was evident in the Asian crisis
 • >,46economies.
Currently, banks and state enterprises are bound together by government intervention, 
which only results in soft budget constraints. The lack of incentives results in a high 
proportion of bad loans because enterprises do not have the motivation to ensure that such 
loans are either profitably or efficiently used. The government knows that to counteract this, 
insolvent financial intermediaries must cease operations, meaning that balance sheets are no 
longer allowed to deteriorate and the concept of the market environment must be introduced, 
rather than a business environment based on implicit and explicit guarantees. However, 
China has no formal insurance programme to protect depositors’ money, meaning that the 
closure of banks is a socially (and economically) difficult step.
Second, there is need for an increase in capital adequacy standards. The Ministry of 
Finance injected 270 billion renminbi ($32.5 billion) of special treasury bonds into China’s 
four state-owned commercial banks in August 1998. The PBOC then stated that it would 
provide these banks with enough time for them to improve their management personnel and
^Henderson, C. 1999. p. 102.
45Femald and Babson. 1999.
46Ibid.
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reform their operations. In May 2001, the chairman of China’s central bank said that the 
government would recapitalize three of the country’s four largest commercial banks to help 
them to attain the minimum international standards for capital adequacy (currently 8% of 
assets).47 However, “throwing money at the banks won’t work unless they also start lending 
on the basis of credit analysis, rather than politics”48.
Third, there is need for the development of sound supervision and regulatory 
measures to reduce excessive borrowing and lending by financial institutions, thus fostering 
an environment that rewards risk-averse, profit-orientated lending. The government has been 
attempting to constrain the widespread growth in the number of finance companies, whose 
reckless lending became infamous following Thailand’s crisis.
Finally, there is need for a restructuring of assets. In 1999, China transferred 
approximately 16% of the four largest commercial banks’ bad loans, or 1.4 trillion renminbi 
($169.1 billion), into asset management companies (AMCs)49 In 2000, these same banks 
transferred 400 billion renminbi in bad loans to AMCs. The AMCs’ mandate is essentially to 
recover whatever they can. “[But] the selling of assets through the AMCs is expected to be 
an uphill struggle, meaning that the finance ministry will eventually have to foot most of the 
bin”50 These 5acj loans were purchased by the AMCs for bonds issued to the banks, but 
interest has to be paid on these. The Economist argues that: ‘The cash for this, less what can 
be raised at auction, can only, eventually, come from the taxpayer.”51 Therefore, the 
potential for new bad loans must be reduced by prudent lending criteria and, according to the 
Economist, without SOE restructuring the banks will not be successfully reformed.52
The fact that many of the Asian crisis-hit countries were operating pegged exchange 
rates has served as an additional warning to the Chinese authorities. The fixed exchange 
rates in Asia facilitated the creation of bubble economies where vast amounts of short-term 
capital flowed into, and subsequently out of, these economies. Furthermore, the exchange 
rate pegs were predominantly fixed to the U.S. dollar, which had strengthened considerably 
throughout the late 1990’s. Consequently, Asian exports lost price competitiveness, which in 
turn, resulted in weakened current account balances. Prior to their financial crises Mexico, 
Thailand and Russia all delayed the transition from a pegged exchange rate regime to a more
47Intemational Herald Tribune. 10 May 2001. p. 17.
48Bamathan et al. 1998.
49Intemational Herald Tribune. 10 May 2001. p. 17.
50Financial Times. 14 May 2001. p. 10.
51The Economist. 19 May 2001. p.98.
52Ibid. p.97.
1 he Asian rmancial Crisis and China.
85
flexible arrangement even in the face of deteriorating fundamentals. The government must, 
therefore, have the courage to act when change is needed. Beijing recognises the need for 
greater exchange rate flexibility. This is partly because China’s predicted accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (see below) may result in a surge in imports, a deteriorating 
balance of payments and, consequently, an unsustainable exchange rate peg. A move 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility will probably involve a widening of the renminbi’s 
daily trading band.
The above are important considerations for China’s future policy on exchange rates, 
because as Tom Holland of the Far Eastern Economic Review believes that: “At some point 
during the opening decades of the 21st century the Chinese currency, the renminbi, will 
become fully convertible. Immediately, the renminbi will become the world’s fourth most 
heavily traded currency, behind the U.S. dollar, the euro and the yen.”53
China has recognised the importance of maintaining export competitiveness and 
diversifying export destinations. Moreover, the authorities realise that devaluation will not 
promote sustainable export competitiveness. Consequently in 1998, the Chinese government 
ordered that tax rebates be increased for specific exporters to improve their competitiveness. 
Chinese exporters, which are sensitive to microeconomic management by Chinese officials, 
increased production and exports rose by 1.6% year-on-year in June 1998 and 3.5% year-on- 
year in July 1998, following the above decree.54 The government is also providing increased 
funding for enterprise research and development to maintain (and possibly) improve long­
term competitiveness.
In addition to the increase in tax rebates, the authorities have also been encouraging 
exporters on the more prosperous Eastern coast of China to increase the production of high 
value-added and technology-intensive goods. At the same time the production of labour- 
intensive, low value-added products is being transferred to less-developed and poorer areas 
inland, where wages are far lower. Indirectly, this programme is developing China’s more 
rural and backward areas and hence increasing incomes in these areas. The increasingly 
globalised world economy has intensified competition in the world market and Chinese 
officials realise they must continually adjust the country’s trade structure according to 
changes in comparative advantages.
53Holland, T. 2000a. p.76.
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3.vi. China in the new millennium
China’s SOEs currently lack sufficient incentives to perform efficiently. It is often the case 
that managers do not face hard budget constraints and are thus not encouraged to perform 
profitably. Failing managers stay in their jobs owing to an asymmetry of information, which 
makes it difficult for the government to determine whether external factors or managerial 
failures reflect the enterprises’ performance. The absence of effective SOE supervision 
results in adverse selection and moral hazard. According to Li et al., the performance of 
SOEs will only be improved if three areas are reformed: firstly, the introduction of effective 
governmental supervision of the enterprise; secondly, the enterprise manager is a person of 
high moral principles; and, finally, the Communist Party secretary and the Workers’ Council 
(which presently represents SOE management staff) provide impartial inspections assessing 
the management of SOEs.55
Cautious gradualism has epitomised China’s economic reforms to date. But, the 
Chinese prime minister, Zhu Rongji, promised, in March 2001, more economic pain as SOE 
reforms are doubled and more loss-making companies are shut down and others merged or 
sold. China’s current leaders are showing much determination in challenging some of the 
country’s most difficult problems. Deflation has been checked, but reforms must continue. 
Unemployment must be controlled to prevent a social backlash, yet the Chinese SOEs must 
be made into efficient enterprises (to reduce the burden on the budget deficit) and the banking 
system must lend strictly according to profit-based criteria, while ensuring that the SOEs do 
not fall under en masse due to a lack of financing.
These challenges require a tougher and more drastic approach to reform than is 
offered by China’s gradualist approach. This is because the state-controlled banks are 
currently heavily burdened with NPLs. These NPLs are the consequence of the governments 
continued support for money-bleeding SOEs. Consequently, the banking system does not 
encourage or improve the efficiency of corporate governance and actually results in poor 
corporate discipline. The gradual approach to the reform of the banking system means that, 
as time goes by, the slow progress may be insufficient to offset the deterioration in asset 
quality. In turn, this will reduce the banking system’s overall liquidity, which will cause a 
reduction in lending. The lower level of bank lending will reduce investment to the corporate 
base, thus weakening profits and adversely affecting economic growth. Workers of these 
companies see the reduction in profits and respond to this increased job insecurity by saving
54Henderson, C. 1999. pp. 100-101.
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more and spending less, which further adversely affects bank liquidity and lending. This 
vicious circle was evident in the Asian crisis and has contributed significantly to Japan’s 
economic slump.
Callum Henderson argues that: “As with everything else, China has far too much 
banking capacity, in terms of both branches and workers. The result is a crippling cost base 
under which no bank could realistically be profitable. That cost base has to be substantially 
reduced.”56 The alternative is that the PBOC will print money to maintain economic growth. 
However, this will ignite inflation, whilst placing an additional strain on the maintenance of 
the exchange rate value. Therefore, an increasing number of bank employees must be made 
redundant, but this will only require greater government expenditures to provide subsistence 
benefits. To encourage the reform of the Chinese banking system and to boost consumer 
spending, the authorities in 1999 introduced a 20% tax on interest earned on bank savings, 
which will keep household deposits at an artificially low level. Therefore, the banks should 
make healthy profits by reducing the overall level of interest they pay on money they borrow. 
At the same time, these restrictions should promote the banks to lend by profitability criteria.
The authorities are attempting to sort out the stock markets. China’s socialist market 
has two main objectives for the stock market, according to the Economist. “The first is to 
facilitate a ‘massive debt-equity swap’ for the Chinese economy. China’s domestic saving is 
enormous: it runs at around 40% of GDP. But these funds have traditionally been allocated 
in the least efficient way, through the state banking system. Most loans go to awful SOEs”57. 
If savings are, therefore, directed to the stock market the Chinese authorities hope that it will 
result in a more efficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, the government hopes to mollify 
social tensions by raising money to pay pensions and unemployment benefits to the five 
million people that are made redundant each year from SOE reform. The second goal is to 
expose enterprises to the discipline of the market, which rewards efficiency and punishes 
inefficiency by enforcing bankruptcy. The stock market is, therefore, being used to provide 
incentives for companies to perform efficiently. “By ensuring that SOEs have minority 
shareholders, the government hopes to inspire companies to improve their corporate 
governance, transparency and competitiveness”58. The Chinese authorities must realise that 
enterprise managers should be appointed on the basis of their management talent, rather than
55Li et al. 1999. p.5.
“ Henderson, C. 1999. p.201.
57The Economist. 3 March 2001. p99.
58Ibid.
their connections to the state. The ‘B’ share market has a market capitalisation of just 1% of 
the ‘A’ market. The diverse valuations of China’s various shares will only converge when 
the authorities combine the markets’ various share classes. Allowing Chinese residents to 
purchase foreign currency-denominated ‘B’ shares was therefore perceived as the first step 
towards the integration of the ‘A’ and ‘H’ share markets. If this is achieved China would 
have the world’s fourth biggest stock market. But complete integration will not be possible 
until the renminbi is made convertible for capital account transactions and no one knows 
when this will be.
These are difficult tasks but the authorities determination to tackle these issues is 
illustrated by the measures that are being undertaken to ensure that China joins the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in early 2002, after fifteen years of trying. WTO admission 
would force China to adhere to WTO rules or to make a clear and strict commitment as to 
how it will adhere in a shorter period of time than is usually provided to other developing 
economies. This is due to the fear that China may flout the rules once the country is admitted 
to the WTO.
Accession to the WTO will require that by 2006 China will have reduced tariff and 
non-tariff barriers whilst domestic banking, telecoms, agriculture and distribution is also 
liberalised, enabling foreign companies to compete in these markets. It is estimated that 
WTO membership would increase China’s annual GDP by 2-3%, with each additional 
percentage point of growth providing five million extra jobs. In addition, a more efficient 
allocation of Chinese capital and resources would provide a further 4% to annual GDP 
growth.59 If China becomes a more market-orientated economy by 2005, it is estimated to 
grow annually by 7% until then, by 9% from 2006-2015 as the benefits of restructuring 
emerge before slowing a little thereafter. Thus, by 2020 China’s economy would have grown 
to $10 trillion in 2000 dollars, equalling the size of America’s economy today.60 Javed 
Burki, a former World Bank official, predicts that if present trends continue, China will 
become the world’s largest economy accounting for 26% of global output by 2025. America 
will remain constant at around 21 or 22%, while India will become the world’s third largest 
economy followed by Japan, Germany, Brazil and Mexico in that order.61
China’s entrance to the WTO would increase domestic competition and expose 
inefficient SOEs to market forces given that, under the WTO, they will no longer enjoy
59Transition. April 2000. p. 13.
60The Economist. 10 March 2001. p.26.
61See: Greenway, H. 2001.
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current levels of subsidies or preferential treatment. Recently established consumer durable 
manufacturers will encounter fiercely competitive pressures, which will force them to 
undertake corporate restructuring to improve their efficiency. The liberalisation of the 
domestic market will accelerate technology transfers through the establishment of foreign 
enterprises. But the main efficiency gains from WTO membership will take place in the non­
tradable and in the currently protected sectors, which according to the World Bank, “will feel 
the impact of import competition or the arrival of new foreign backed competitors”62. 
Moreover, admission to the WTO will contribute to reducing the role of the state in the 
Chinese economy, which currently suppresses economic growth through trade barriers and 
local protectionism in many sectors. In June 2001, the United States and China declared that 
they had agreed on several issues, most significantly farm subsidies that had previously 
blocked Beijing’s entry to the WTO. An agreement with the E.U. followed shortly after. 
Only a bilateral agreement with Mexico remains to be concluded. China may be able to join 
the global trade body early in 2002. Pierre-Louis Girard, the chairman of the WTO working 
party drafting China’s accession terms, said that: “We are now very close but we are not there 
yet. I urge governments to make every effort to conclude these negotiations as quickly as 
possible.”63
The Economist believes that: “WTO membership is just the first of the reform 
initiatives. The central government has declared war on most parts of the socialist economy, 
all the time sticking to ‘the socialist road.’”64 The government is now attempting to provide 
better access and communication to the disparate areas of Eastern China by improving 
infrastructure such as roads, railways and fibre optic cables. The U.S.’s development of 
extensive highways and railway systems was the largest contributing factor to the growth of 
the country because this infrastructure enabled a more efficient and widespread use of land.65 
Indeed, development of an infrastructure of itself will not provide sustainable development, 
but a sound infrastructure is conducive to sustainable development by enabling a more 
efficient use of resources e.g. China’s abundance of inland workers and land.
China’s GNP is approximately a sixth the size of Japan’s, but China’s energy 
consumption, as a percentage of GNP, is eight times higher than Japan and is actually the 
world’s highest. Given China’s inefficiencies, which distort the pricing mechanism and thus
62Transition. April 2000. p. 13.
63Financial Times. 5 July 2001. p.7.
64The Economist. 10 March 2001. p.25.
65Henderson, C. 1999. p.226.
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supply and demand, China would need a substantial multiple of Japan’s energy consumption 
if it is to attain an equal level of GNP. Mr Henderson argues that: “What is needed is a 
commercially driven pricing mechanism, with minimum government interference and a 
national power grid. The government aims to develop the latter by 2009. It is an awesome 
task - one of many such - but it is fundamental not only to the development of efficient 
energy pricing but to the further development of the economy as a whole.”66
3.vii. Conclusion
So far, according to the Economist, China’s growth has been primarily achieved through the 
removal of restrictions on labour mobility, enabling former agricultural workers to find jobs 
in cities, where productivity is higher. Globalisation has benefited China’s economy hugely. 
Exports amount to 23% of GDP making the country the world’s ninth largest exporter.67 Yet 
China’s ‘catch-up’ growth has been slowing over recent years indicating that the speed at 
which China is catching up with the West is also slowing.
The Asian financial crisis shattered the economic growth that China’s regional 
neighbours had enjoyed for the last two decades. Yet China maintained its resilient growth, 
despite possessing similar weaknesses that were evident in the Asian and Russian economies 
prior to these countries financial crises. China has a pegged exchange rate and the, country’s 
banks are insolvent three times over by Western standards. Despite China’s capital controls 
vast amounts of capital is fleeing the country. Moreover, the existence of SOEs is placing a 
huge burden on the budget deficit, capital is poorly allocated and many analysts contend that 
China actually possesses more corruption and nepotism than the fallen Asian tigers. 
Additionally, the Asian crisis reduced China’s export competitiveness and threatened future 
inflows of FDI, which, in turn, jeopardised SOE reform and thus the sustainability of the 
budget deficit.
Despite these weaknesses China was largely insulated from the financial upheavals of 
1997 and 1998 for two reasons. Firstly, China’s partially inconvertible currency has 
indirectly strengthened China’s external fundamentals (most notably a current account 
surplus) and minimised short-term debt. Capital controls have prevented weak Chinese 
banks from borrowing in foreign currencies, whilst also restricting speculative behaviour 
towards the renminbi. Secondly, in stark contrast to East Asia and Russia prior to their 
crises, China’s foreign exchange reserves greatly exceed the country’s outstanding short-term
66Ibid. pp.188-189.
67The Economist. 10 March 2001. p.26.
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debt. However, the notion that China was unscathed by the regional crisis is untrue. The 
Asian crisis occurred at a precarious time for the Chinese economy.
Asia’s crisis has provided conclusive evidence of the dangers posed by capital 
account liberalisation, when regulatory and supervisional measures are weak, providing 
China with an invaluable lesson. China must continue to reform the economy, separating 
business from government, thus removing the potential for moral hazard, and developing a 
financial infrastructure that rewards entrepreneurship and efficiency. Successful admission to 
the WTO would certainly help China’s prospects by encouraging reform through a more 
competitive environment. Moreover, accession to the WTO will provide a sure measure of 
economic progress. Nobody doubts China’s potential but the country continues to exhibit 
many fundamental weaknesses, which must be addressed.
China’s current condition has been summed up by Chris Patten: “China has moved 
with praiseworthy speed from North Korean economics to something resembling a capitalist 
economy. It has opened up to the world, and encouraged investment in capitalist 
development ... The next stage of the economic journey is more difficult. It involves 
dismantling, slimming down, privatising, making profitable the SOEs that are the legacy of 
Mao’s China. This is the task that proved so difficult in the constituent parts of what was 
once the Soviet Union and in the countries of its European empire.”68
68C. Patten. East & West. p. 143.
92
Table 1. China’s average GDP % growth 1970-1996 in relation to rich industrial
countries
1970-79 1980-89 1990-96
China 7.5 9.3 10.1
Rich Industrial 
Countries 3.4 2.6 2
Source: Kotler and Kartajaya. 2000. p. 17.
Table 2. China’s annual GDP % growth rate since the gradualist reforms began in
1978.
‘78 ‘79 00 o 00 ‘82 ‘83 ‘84 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87
11.7 7.6 7.8 5.3 9 10.9 15.2 13.5 8.9 11.6
00 00 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96
11.3 4.1 3.8 9.2 14.2 13.5 12.7 10.5 9.6
Source: Economics blue book of the Peoples Republic of China 1998. p.512.
Table 3. China’s GDP growth through the Asian crisis period and beyond.
‘97 e>
.
's© 0
0 ‘99 ‘00
i—( 
©
‘02 1996-2025
9.5 7.8 7.1 8 7.6 7.8 6*
2001 and 2002 are OECD estimates. * Projected per capita GDP growth rate.
Sources: Economics blue book of the Peoples Republic of China 1999 p.509. OECD 
Economic Outlook 68. December 2000. p. 126. Henderson, C. 2000. p.200. Radelet & Sachs. 
1997. p.51.
Table 4. China versus other Asian economies selected indicators 1996 %
1. Change in real 
GDP growth 
98-99 avg 
minus 95-96 
avg
2. Bank 
Loans/GDP
3. Current 
Account/GDP
4. Total 
Debt/Reserves
Indonesia -17.5 55.4 -3.4 707
Malaysia -12.2 93.4 -5.2 147.3
Thailand -11.5 100.5 -8 240.7
Korea -11 61.5 -4.7 307.6
Singapore -7.7 96 15.2 *
Hong Kong -7.2 162.4 -1.7 *
Philippines -4.9 49 -4.3 410.9
China -2.7 92.7 0.9 162
Taiwan -1.2 143.7 4 25.6
Column 1 compares the growth from two years after the 1997 crisis to the growth recordec 
two years prior to the crisis. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show statistics for 1996 and are thus
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unaffected by the Asian crisis. Debt figures for the banking sectors of Hong Kong and 
Singapore are not comparable with data from other countries due to the large size of external 
claims and liabilities.
Source: Femald and Babson. 1999.
However, only 20% of China’s external debt is short-term:
Table 5. Chinese external debt and reserves 1994-1998 U.S.$ billions
‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98#
External
Debt*
138 150 175 180 181
Total
Reserves**
59 80 110 143 145
Short-term 
commercial 
bank debt
19 25 30 36 34
* External debt figures include bank claims on China, from BIS, which exceeded China’s 
reported external bank debt by about $50 billion at end-June 1997. # June 1998 estimate.
** excluding gold.
Source: Femald and Babson. 1999.
Table 6. Export share of selected Asian countries in the U.S. market, 1989-1996
‘89 ‘93 ‘96
G reater China 24% 33% 34%
China 13 25 29
Hong Kong 11 8 5
NIEs 59 44 41
South Korea 22 14 13
Singapore 10 10 11
Taiwan 27 20 17
ASEAN-4 17 23 25
Indonesia 4 4 5
Malaysia 5 8 10
Philippines 3 4 4
Thailand 5 7 6
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Henderson, C. 1999. p. 16.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES ARISING FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF EAST ASIA,
RUSSIA AND CHINA 
4.i. The globalisation of finance
The process of economic ‘globalisation’ is not a new phenomenon; although the term is new 
the process (which has greatly speeded up of late) has taken place over the course of the last 
five centuries. Entrepreneurs in the more economically advanced countries have increased 
trade and production activities in territories and countries throughout the world. Since the 
1950s there has been a vast expansion of international capital markets. Initially, this was 
driven by international investment flows associated with the post-war economic recoveries 
but it was later influenced by the establishment of offshore currency markets where financial 
transactions were subject to only limited regulation. The increased prominence of short-term 
capital flows between major trading currencies eventually overwhelmed the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate system in 1972-73. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
there has been a greater frequency of financial crises that have hit economies throughout the 
world, such as the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s, the ERM crisis in the early 
1990s, the ‘Tequila’ crisis of 1994-95, the Asian crisis in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 
1999.
The end of the fixed exchange rate era reflected the belief that free international 
capital mobility is essential if the benefits arising from global trade and investment are to be 
maximised. Indeed, from the mid-1970s onwards capital controls were increasingly freed, 
exchange rates were increasingly floated and private capital flows increased dramatically. 
The quantities traded in the world’s foreign exchange market rose from a daily average of 
$15 billion in 1973 to over $1,000 billion in 1999, larger than all of the world’s stock markets 
put together.1 More recently, the increase in capital flows has been driven by Western 
governments and multilateral institutions (such as the IMF) introducing and advocating 
policies of extensive economic liberalisation. The size and volatility of this market has meant 
that central banks are no longer able to adequately protect the value of their currency in 
international markets.
The integration of developing (and more recently transitional) economies into the 
global financial system has been accompanied by a sharp rise in external financing. Indeed, 
net capital inflows to emerging markets in 1987-89 amounted to approximately $50 billion a
'Khor, M. 2000.
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year. But in 1995-97 these flows increased threefold to just over $150 billion, although they 
decreased substantially following the Asian financial crisis.2
Destabilising short-term capital inflows were at the heart of the Russian and East 
Asian financial crises. These economies, which had become dependent on short-term capital, 
found that their creditors would ‘roll-over’ the loans when times were good, but when the 
market became more pessimistic, creditors were increasingly reluctant to roll-over their 
loans. China’s capital controls, in contrast, have minimised inflows of short-term debt and 
promoted the role of long-term foreign direct investment (EDI). China’s capital controls 
have also contributed to the strength of the country’s external fundamentals, resulting in a 
typical current account surplus and $145 billion of foreign exchange reserves at the end of 
1998.3 Consequently China, despite some similar weaknesses, was insulated from the 
financial panic that swept through Asia in mid-1997 and Russia in August 1998.
In light of these findings, the potential role of capital controls in developing 
economies will be analysed and attempts made to identify the optimal method of sequencing 
for capital account liberalisation. The capital account liberalisation of the Asian economies 
was poorly sequenced, which ultimately contributed to the region’s vulnerability to a 
financial panic.
Capital inflows
There are essentially three types of capital flows. Firstly, long-term investment flows such as 
FDI. Secondly, portfolio investment, that includes transactions via debt and equity securities. 
Finally, aid or assistance capital flows, which may include short or long-term trade credits or 
bilateral and multilateral loans. Barbara Peitsch states that: “An investment is considered 
direct foreign investment when a lasting relationship is established between a legal person or 
entity resident in one country (the foreign investor) and an entity resident in another country 
(the foreign investment enterprise) in which the foreign investor obtains a controlling interest. 
This type of investment can be contrasted with (foreign) portfolio investment, in which the 
investor is not interested in exerting significance over management decisions.”4
To recall, net capital inflows to emerging markets in 1987-89 amounted to 
approximately $50 billion a year. But in 1995-97 these flows increased threefold to just over 
$150 billion. The volume of short-term capital flows to Asia were maximised by a policy 
mix, which stored up trouble for the future, including the promotion of short-term rather than
2Eichengreen and Mussa. 1998. p. 17.
3Femald and Babson. 1999.
4Peitsch, B. The OECD Observer. April-May 1995. p.32.
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long-term investments. (Table 1, p.l 18, shows capital flows to Asia and the Pacific before 
and after the crisis.) The most prominent aspects of this policy mix included a pegged 
exchange rate, extensive capital account liberalisation and an inadequate regulatory regime to 
supervise the capital inflows. Consequently, some Asian countries became over-reliant on 
external capital to finance economic growth and received capital inflows in excess of the 
economies ability to absorb them effectively and efficiently.
4.ii. Capital account liberalisation 
Capital account liberalisation is defined as the “freedom from prohibitions on transactions in 
the capital and financial accounts of the balance of payments”5. Each of the advanced 
economies in the world has liberalised its capital account and, in so doing, allowed their 
currencies to be fully convertible for capital account transactions. In theory capital controls 
cannot be maintained if domestic politics have been fully liberalised simply because capital 
controls enforce restrictions on peoples’ economic freedoms.
There are numerous reasons to conclude that capital account liberalisation is a 
positive undertaking for an economy. Studies, including those by Jeffrey Sachs and even the 
World Bank, have repeatedly shown that economies, which liberalise and welcome foreign 
capital are those that experience the most rapid increases in GDP growth. For example, the 
East Asian region had, until 1997, grown rapidly and reduced poverty substantially. In 
contrast, the closed, statist economies of sub-Saharan Africa have made little economic 
progress.
Nevertheless, the integration of a country into the international financial system poses 
enormous economic challenges. With capital account liberalisation comes inherent dangers 
that will, with an adverse turn in investor sentiment, scourge countries that exhibit 
fundamental weaknesses. Moreover, the Asian and Russian financial crises indicate that 
international financial markets do not work perfectly. Worse, the international financial 
system has inflicted enormous economic losses and caused social dislocation in such 
developing countries. Nonetheless, markets and the ‘invisible hand’ certainly appear to be 
the most efficient way of allocating resources in comparison to a centrally planned system. 
But capital account liberalisation should reflect the development of a deep, sophisticated and 
efficient domestic financial system.
5Eichengreen and Mussa. 1998. p. 19.
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Global perceptions on capital account convertibility
The recent financial crises in East Asia, Russia and Brazil have prompted debates regarding 
the liberalisation of developing economies’ capital accounts. The discussions have primarily 
focused on three areas. Firstly, the optimal speed and sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation. Secondly, whether restrictions should be placed upon international capital 
flows, such as a Tobin tax (which will be discussed later in this chapter). And finally, 
whether there is an optimal exchange rate regime compatible with the free movement of 
capital, or alternatively, an exchange rate that is suitable with restrictions on capital mobility.
The ongoing debate on capital account liberalisation has seen broad disagreement 
between the United States and the IMF on one hand, and Europe and Asia on the other. The 
U.S. and the IMF essentially believe that the Asian and Russian crises were punishment for 
the sins of these economies. These misgivings, according to the U.S. and IMF, were the 
causes of the countries financial meltdowns because ‘crony capitalism’ resulted in a 
misallocation of resources. Furthermore, the IMF does not consider that the extensive 
liberalisation of the Asian region’s capital accounts was a central cause of the crises. This is 
apparent because the IMF demanded additional capital account liberalisation as a 
precondition for the provision of the ‘bail-out’ loans to South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia!
The countries of the European Union and the Asian region oppose this notion. 
Essentially, they believe that the seeds for these crises lay in the comprehensive liberalisation 
of the region’s capital accounts throughout the 1990s. Foreign capital inflows to Asia surged, 
causing an immense speculative bubble to form in the property market, the stock market and 
industrial investment. The result was staggering levels of private debt to foreign lenders, 
who shouldered little or no responsibility for the havoc that ensued on their departure. Thus, 
Asia and Europe believe that capital account liberalisation precipitated Asia’s regional crisis 
and both responded by proposing restrictions on international financial transactions. The 
Japanese government has considered implementing capital controls and endorsed the use of 
such restrictions throughout the Asian region. Indeed, Malaysia, in response to continued 
speculative attacks on the ringgit, introduced capital controls on the 1st of September 1998. 
The restrictions on capital mobility allowed the Malaysian government to reduce interest 
rates, with no adverse affect on the currency. Yet the imposition of such controls in Malaysia 
received a great deal of criticism from the IMF and U.S.
Many Russian economists have felt aggrieved by policy recommendations made to 
them by the IMF and, in particular, the creation of a market to enable purchases of short-term 
government debt to take place. The high returns offered on this short-term debt stifled
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investment throughout the rest of the economy and the borrowing was not accompanied by a 
significant improvement in tax revenues. Hence the government’s ability to service its debt 
did not improve and the debt became unsustainable. Boris Kagarlitsky argued that: “Foreign 
credits did not save Russia. They did not prevent the crisis. On the contrary, they provoked 
it. At the same time, the conditions imposed on Russia by the IMF and other international 
financial institutions prevented Russian decision-makers from seeking realistic solutions to 
the country’s problems using domestic resources, which even now are impressive.”6 
Furthermore, the liberalisation of financial transactions in Russia has accelerated capital 
flight and assisted the Russian mafia and international drug dealers by creating an 
international centre for money laundering.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in Asia and Russia, the U.S. responded with the 
proposal of a ‘new global financial architecture’. This new architecture was to be constructed 
on the principals of increased transparency and accountability, the continuation of free capital 
movements and a reduction in the scope for moral hazard. Alexander Swoboda stated that: 
“The goals of the system remain the same: to foster efficiency in trade in goods and assets; to 
ensure the stability of the system; and to allow for an equitable, socially acceptable 
distribution of income and wealth.”7
In response to Asia’s financial meltdown, Japan’s finance minister proposed an 
‘Asian Monetary Fund’ (AMF). In a similar vein to the IMF, the AMF would have the 
capability to provide liquidity to a member country suffering from potentially destabilising 
speculative attacks. The IMF responded unfavourably to such a proposal, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. But instead the countries of the European Union 
cautiously advocated a new international financial architecture, which would divide the world 
into monetary zones. Each zone would maintain a degree of control on capital mobility and it 
is a concept, which is widely supported in the Asian region.
However, as noted by Robert Wade, the United States has a strong interest in the 
preservation and diversification of free global capital mobility. The United States’ persistent 
current account deficit indicates that the country spends more than it earns. To finance this 
deficit the U.S. borrows heavily in international markets, although, unlike the Asian and 
Russian economies, approximately 90% of the capital borrowed by the U.S. is denominated 
in U.S. dollars, which makes the U.S. economy far less vulnerable to a financial crisis than an
6Kagarlitsky, B. 1998a.
7Swoboda, A. 1999. p.2.
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economy which has borrowed heavily in foreign currency-denominated debt.8 Moreover, the 
U.S. has the lowest level of household savings in the world (see below). The U.S. economy 
must therefore supplement these savings with foreign capital inflows to maintain the 
economy’s high level of consumption.
Analysts, particularly in Asia, have also accused the U.S. of forcing their free trade 
beliefs upon developing countries through IMF recommendations (which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6). Proponents of this view believe that the U.S. wants everyone to play by 
American rules, whether it involves multinational companies or global finance. Finally, over 
one half of the banks in continental Europe are owned by governments or receive subsidies 
from their governments. This delicate financial system highlights a further reason for 
contention between the U.S. and E.U. concerning the free movement of capital. This is 
because American and European banks obtain the majority of their profits conducting 
different operations. For instance, American banks obtain a greater proportion of their profits 
from trading incomes, e.g. trading in swaps and derivatives. In contrast, European banks 
receive profits largely from interest payments. Therefore, a liberalisation of these financial 
systems to free capital mobility would result in intense competition in Europe. This would 
reduce interest rate spreads and, of course, profits in banks that are already thought to be 
suffering from an increase in non-performing loans (NPLs).9
Advantages and disadvantages of capital account liberalisation 
We have seen that large inflows (and outflows) of foreign capital pose significant challenges 
to developing economies. The volume and volatility of capital flows contributes to an erratic 
international financial system. However, capital flows, which are regulated and managed 
effectively, can be of enormous benefit to both investors and borrowers:
1. Foreign capital flows can transfer resources from high-saving to low-saving 
countries and stimulate growth by increasing investment and technology transfers. 
Moreover, governments may borrow from international savings to finance additional public 
expenditures. Foreign capital flows increase a country’s available capital stock. This capital 
can then be used to supplement domestic resources in order to increase investment (which 
poses the question why Asia required so much foreign capital when the Asian region saves 
approximately 35% of GDP compared with the United States’ 15%.)10
8Mann, C. 2000. p.43.
9Wade, R. 1998/1999. p.51.
l0Ibid. p.49.
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2. Capital account convertibility will also allow enterprises and domestic and 
international investors to diversify their investment portfolio. This allows investors to reduce 
their vulnerability to income and wealth effects via domestic shocks, thereby reducing their 
overall investment risk.
3. Capital flows to developing countries will increase liquidity in these economies. 
In turn, this will enhance competition between financial intermediaries, thereby reducing 
margins and improving the quality of financial assets, which contributes to stronger, deeper 
economies.
However, capital account convertibility has obvious disadvantages, which represent 
significant challenges to developing economies:
1. The dramatic surge in capital flows has been stimulated by revolutionary changes 
in communications technology, which has helped to integrate the world’s financial services 
industry. Investors can now access information on asset prices throughout the world, 
effectively, efficiently and at a modest price. However, such rapid advances in technology 
have made it even more difficult for governments or authorities to curb either inward or 
outward investment flows and financial markets can be inherently unstable.
2. Unfortunately, the efficiency of resource allocation in international financial 
markets is hampered by asymmetric information (where one party to a financial transaction 
has more information than the other). The degree of asymmetric information is believed to 
increase when it comes to international transactions, largely as a result of geographical and 
cultural factors. Thus resource allocation may be distorted.
3. Interest rates tend to be lower in developed Western economies than those in 
poorer developing countries. Therefore, under free capital mobility, capital will flow into the 
developing economy with the highest interest rate. In theory, as capital flows in, the 
developing countries interest rate should fall to the level of the advanced countries. “[But], 
the only way this can occur in the short-run is if there is a massive rise in the country’s asset 
prices. Thus free capital flows are likely to lead to stock market and property bubbles”11. 
East Asia and Russia’s dramatic build-up of debt was not complemented by an increase in the 
ability to service this debt.
The sequencing of capital account liberalisation 
Current account liberalisation should be undertaken before the liberalisation of the capital 
account. Otherwise, the liberalisation of the capital account would attract large volumes of
nThe Economist. 14 March 1998. p. 116.
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capital inflows, which would lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency and a 
deterioration in export competitiveness. The Asian economies, as we have seen, liberalised 
their current accounts before introducing capital account convertibility and China is 
following a similar but far more gradual approach (and is, as we have seen, yet to liberalise 
the capital account).
The freeing of the capital account is likely to lead to a sudden and dramatic inflow of 
foreign capital, particularly when the exchange rate is fixed or nominally pegged. This was 
evident in East Asia and Russia prior to these countries’ financial crises. A pegged exchange 
rate seemingly removes the risk of exchange rate losses via exchange rate fluctuations. This 
belief has resulted in an underestimation of exchange rate risks, contributing to excessive 
borrowing and lending. If a pegged exchange rate is in operation, the authorities will attempt 
to offset an appreciation of the domestic currency (a result of the capital inflows) by adopting 
a policy of sterilisation (which was discussed in Chapter 1). However, the increased 
domestic money supply ensures that policy makers maintain high nominal interest rates, 
which only serves to attract further capital inflows.
If the exchange rate is a floating regime, a dramatic inflow of capital will result in an 
appreciation of the exchange rate. The appreciation will increase the price of exports and 
reduce the price of imports. This will lead to a deterioration in the trade balance, which can 
adversely affect investor sentiment and cause a reversal of capital inflows. Thus, the 
liberalisation of the capital account should only be undertaken when a country’s trade is 
sufficiently developed; otherwise the current account balance may weaken.
In East Asia, the volume of speculative investments that saw little or no returns left 
the economies with an absence of liquidity when investors began to call in their loans. I 
believe that capital account convertibility should, therefore, follow a gradual process, similar 
to the procedure underway in China. This can progressively eliminate weaknesses and risks 
while improving regulatory mechanisms. The optimal sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation should attempt to maximise the benefits of convertibility, whilst reducing 
potential hazards identified in the liberalisation of Asia’s capital accounts.
The radical liberalisation of the Asian economies’ capital accounts, which was 
recommended by both mainstream literature and the IMF, was not accompanied by the 
introduction of regulatory and supervisory standards that could influence the enormous 
inflows of foreign currency-denominated short-term capital inflows. In the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis analysts and market participants demanded the adoption of Western standards of
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transparency and disclosure. Hence, financial transparency would also appear to be an 
important prerequisite prior to capital account liberalisation.
In Thailand and Korea banks were the primary financial intermediaries receiving and 
distributing capital inflows. The expansion of the banks’ balance sheets contributed 
significantly to their vulnerability that was exposed following the outbreak of the crisis, 
which precipitated a banking crises. Therefore, fundamental improvements must be made in 
the developing countries’ banking sectors, prior to the liberalisation of the capital account. 
Primarily this would include increasing capital-adequacy ratios, introducing more stringent 
loan criteria and improving liquidity requirements. Restrictions to limit the amount of 
foreign borrowing that banks can engage in may also be advisable.
The build-up of NPLs, in Asia, was accelerated by moral hazard, where implicit and 
explicit government guarantees promoted excessive borrowing and risk-taking by financial 
intermediaries. (The IMF was also criticised in regard to moral hazard and this will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.) These or similar ‘guarantees’ in other developing economies must 
be addressed prior to liberalisation of the capital account, otherwise a similar expansion of 
credit together with a rise in NPLs is likely to ensue. To counteract the potential of moral- 
hazard-induced lending and to maintain financial efficiency and stability, the financial 
institutions that pose least risk to promoting moral-hazard-related lending and those that 
exercise the most developed regulatory regimes evident in the economy should be granted 
liberalisation privileges before their domestic competitors. Support for the most prominent 
inefficient financial intermediaries in newly liberalised economies should be removed.
The conventional belief regarding capital account liberalisation remains that it should 
take place only after the macroeconomy is stabilised, indeed. Indeed, Barry Eichengreen 
believes that: “For emerging markets, an open capital account should be the exception not the 
rule.”12 Inflation should be low, imbalances in the balance of payments must be rectified and 
financial intermediaries should be robust and transparent. An alternative view on the 
sequencing of capital account liberalisation states that cogent reforms will not be 
implemented until the country is subjected to external pressures demanding such reforms. In 
turn, this may enable the economy to overcome vested interests’ opposition to reforms. This 
approach advocates an early opening of the capital account in the economic reform process. 
While this may seem hasty it can be offset by the introduction of a temporary yet frugal and 
authoritarian institution to monitor the inflows of capital. This institution would provide time
12Eichengreen, B. 1998.
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to enable the development of proficient financial intermediaries, markets and instruments, 
which would otherwise appear to be a prerequisite for capital account convertibility.
To summarise, there are clearly costs and benefits to each approach of capital account 
liberalisation, which will vary between countries, depending on both their economic 
objectives and the economic conditions prior to the removal of capital restrictions. 
Fundamental weaknesses must be rectified by an economy if capital account liberalisation is 
to provide a sustained access to foreign private capital. If these vulnerabilities are not 
addressed prior to the liberalisation of the capital account, the economy may be subjected to a 
financial panic and ensuing economic crisis.
Corsetti et al. argue that: “As long as financial systems are weak, poorly regulated 
and subject to political distortions, a hasty rush to capital account liberalisation may be 
unwise and produce destabilising effects. The benefits of free capital flows are numerous and 
provided that financial systems are strong, the arguments in favour of free capital mobility 
are compelling. In the transition to a system with desirable characteristics, however, capital 
account liberalisation will have to be cautious, gradual and carefully managed.”13
Thus, in my opinion, limited capital controls should be employed until the country i 
sufficiently developed to liberalise entirely.
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was established to examine financial market 
performance in conditions of repression in the domestic economy in order to develop an 
analysis of the theoretical advantages of liberalisation of domestic capital markets and was 
later extended to the explanation of the performance of international financial markets. The 
EMH states that, left to themselves “capital markets generate asset prices that, given available 
information, are best estimates of the present value of future income streams from capital 
assets. Errors in asset pricing, that get generated as a result of incomplete information, get 
removed by signals from excess demand and the correction squeezes out ‘noisy traders’ who 
can push prices away from equilibrium by speculating on price movements instead of 
evaluating assets on the basis of fundamentals”14. But Dani Rodrik of Harvard University 
argues that: “In reality, financial markets are inherently unstable, subject to bubbles (rational 
or otherwise), panics, short-sightedness, and self-fulfilling prophecies.”15
4.iii. Capital controls
13Corsetti et al. 1998c. p.26.
14Damodaran, S. 1999. p. 16.
15Rodrik, D. 2001. p.60.
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The instability of international capital markets and the recent crises has resulted in an 
increasing majority of market commentators endorsing an increased role for capital controls 
to restrict the movement of destabilising short-term capital flows. Indeed, Sumangala 
Damodaran of Delhi University concludes that: “The inability of financial markets to lead to 
optimum solutions left by themselves renders capital controls as the obvious second best 
solution.”16 However, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, opposes 
capital controls stating that: “The relative stability of China and India, countries whose 
restrictions on international financial flows have insulated them to some extent from the 
current maelstrom, has led some to conclude that the relatively free flow of capital is 
detrimental to economic growth and standards of living. Such conclusions, in my judgement, 
are decidedly mistaken.”17
The case for capital controls has concentrated on two main areas: restrictions on 
short-term destabilising capital inflows and restrictions on capital outflows in the event of a 
crisis. (Although there are also proponents of restrictions on FDI, this topic is far less 
contentious and less relevant to this thesis than the former.)
Controls on short-term destabilising capital flows 
Restrictions on short-term ‘hot money’ capital inflows enable the domestic authorities to 
regulate the composition of funds in the economy’s capital account. Thus controls on capital 
inflows usually encourage flows of long-term FDI and restrict potential surges of short-term 
capital and portfolio investment. The capital controls which have been employed by China 
have contributed to the strengthening of the economy’s external balances, while in East Asia 
and Russia the absence of such controls resulted in an over-reliance on short-term foreign 
capital and relatively small inflows of long-term FDI.
Capital account liberalisation was poorly sequenced in the Russian and East Asian 
economies. This posed significant dangers due to the fundamental economic weaknesses that 
were clearly apparent in these countries. These weaknesses should have been insulated by 
the imposition of limited capital controls, which would have prevented excessive borrowing 
and the resulting vulnerability to a financial panic. In Asia, capital controls would have 
provided time for the financial institutions to enhance their risk-management practices and 
improve the authorities’ ability to regulate and supervise the composition of capital inflows. 
But capital controls must be impartially implemented so that financial intermediaries who 
enjoy a close relationship with government officials are unable to dramatically expand their
16Damodaran, S. 1999. p.23.
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balance sheets in the belief that they enjoy government guarantees, while ‘unconnected’ 
institutions, which are financially superior are prevented from accessing foreign funds.
Currently, the Basel Capital Accord gives a lower risk weight to short-term rather 
than long-term loans to banks outside the OECD. Thus, Western financial institutions are 
encouraged to make short-term rather than longer-term loans. The recent bout of financial 
crises has shown “that the standards of the Basel Capital Accord are increasingly divorced 
from the credit risks actually faced by many banks, and are distorting incentives for banks
1 o
regarding the capital maintained for a given level of risk” . Following the financial crises, 
there have been calls to alter the Basel Accord so that the incentives for short-term loans are 
removed and long-term loans are encouraged. Moreover, it is widely believed that controls 
on inter bank lending could improve global financial stability. Controls on short-term capital 
inflows can restrict all short-term inflows of foreign capital or simply curb the domestic 
banks’ ability to lend and borrow in offshore markets. Of these two methods of controlling 
capital flows, the restriction of cross-border inter bank flows has received most support. 
Primarily, this is a result of the dramatic expansion of bank balance sheets in East Asia. The 
credit that had driven this expansion proved destabilising when foreign banks suddenly 
refused to roll-over their loans. Therefore, the imposition of controls on the domestic banks’ 
ability to borrow in foreign currency denominated short-term debts could enhance banking 
standards in the developing economy. Capital controls can be effectively implemented on 
either the foreign lender or the domestic borrower conducting the financial transaction. But 
other analysts contend that controls, which are only implemented on inter bank loans will be 
unable to insulate a country from destabilising flows of foreign capital. Therefore, they 
believe that the only alternative is restrictions on all short-term capital inflows, including 
equities and portfolio investments.
However, it is widely agreed that any growth in foreign currency-denominated loans 
should be met by an increase in the banks’ reserve requirement ratios. This would help to 
ensure that there is available liquidity to meet the demands of creditors should the loans be 
called in and may also help to avoid the liquidity crisis seen in the Asian banks, where short­
term loans were financing long-term investments and reserve ratios were low.
Capital controls were in operation in Chile from 1991-1998. These controls 
encouraged long-term and FDI capital inflows, and reduced inflows of destabilising short­
17In: Wade. R. 1998-1999. p.49.
lsAkyuz & Comford. 1999. p.27.
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term capital. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the composition of funds in Chile’s 
capital account was influenced in favour of FDI and long-term loans. Chile has used three 
main types of controls. Firstly, 30% of all non-equity capital inflows into Chile have to be 
deposited in the central bank for one year where they will receive no interest income. The 
loss of income on this money effectively works as a tax on the inflow of capital. Therefore, 
if the capital inflow remains in Chile for only a short period, this effective tax will be 
proportionally greater than if the capital remained in the country for a longer period of time. 
Secondly, Chilean financial institutions can only access foreign funds if at least two bond 
rating agencies rate their risk at the same level or lower than Chile’s own government bonds. 
Finally, any capital that enters Chile must remain in the country for a period of at least a year. 
This capital control has discouraged many hedge and pension funds from investing in Chile 
at all.
Since the imposition of capital controls, Chile has maintained stable growth and 
avoided financial crises. However, whether Chile’s stability and resilient growth has been 
the result of the restrictions on capital mobility is debatable. Joseph Stiglitz believes that 
Chile’s capital controls have had the desired effect, arguing that “you want to look for 
policies that discourage hot money but facilitate the flow of long-term loans, and there is 
evidence that the Chilean approach or some version of it, does this”19. Dani Rodrik (1998) 
conducted a study of many countries, including those that have imposed capital controls and 
those that have not. He found that: “the data provides no evidence that countries without 
capital controls have grown faster, invested more, or experienced lower inflation. Capital 
controls are essentially uncorrelated with long-term performance once we control for other 
determinants.”20 Corsetti et al. believe that Chile’s economic success has less to do with 
capital controls and more to do with “an effective prudential regulation and supervision of the 
financial system, more than to the presence of controls on short-term inflows”21. Moreover, 
Corsetti et al. provides empirical evidence to argue that the restrictions on capital mobility 
have become less effective over time and favoured large corporations over smaller and 
medium sized ones. Yet capital controls could alternatively be placed on capital outflows in 
the face of a potential crisis.
"Edwards, S. 1998. p.26.
20Corsetti et al. 1998c. p.24.
2,Ibid. p.23.
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Controls on capital outflows
In the face of the Asian financial crisis the orthodox policy response was to tighten monetary 
policy, raising interest rates in an attempt to ensure that investors will keep their money in 
place, thereby contributing to exchange rate stabilisation. However, such a belief has proved 
perverse. The higher interest rates only indicate a declining credit worthiness and greater risk 
of default, whilst also reducing economic activity and the potential for future economic 
growth. But, as the IMF is keen to point out, a reduction in domestic interest rates when 
currency markets are volatile is likely to result in a continued outflow of capital. This will 
cause a further depreciation of the exchange rate and increase the cost of repaying foreign 
currency-denominated loans. Hence, the imposition of controls on capital outflows allows 
domestic policy makers to reduce interest rates with no adverse effects on the value of the 
currency. Such was the reasoning of Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mathathir Mohammad, that 
Malaysia imposed capital controls in August 1998. Similar controls on capital flight had 
previously been imposed by Spain in 1992, Thailand in 1997-98 and Russia in 1998. 
Advocates of these restrictions claim that they provide authorities with time to address 
macroeconomic imbalances and, in the case of Malaysia, successfully lengthened the 
maturity of debt. This represents a significant achievement because the short maturity of debt 
had played a prominent role in the financial crises in Mexico, Asia and Russia.
Under Malaysia’s capital controls, the authorities attempted to control all purchases 
and sales of the ringgit. Malaysian citizens were forbidden to take as little as $100 out of the 
country. Following the imposition of the restrictions on capital outflows, the Malaysian 
government was subjected to much criticism. The more pessimistic analysts believed that the 
restrictions would deter legitimate foreign investments such as FDI and, worse, believed that 
the economy would collapse and hyperinflation ensue. Yet, Malaysia enjoyed a significant 
economic recovery and the controls enabled the authorities to implement significant 
economic reforms, which have strengthened the banking system.
Opposition to controls on capital outflows have focused on a number of arguments. 
Primarily, the opponents consider the imposition of restrictions on capital flows as a refusal 
by the countries authorities to tackle the structural problems evident within the economy. 
Instead, they believe that any policy interventions should aim to improve the regulation and 
supervision of the financial system. Secondly, if foreign creditors anticipate the 
implementation of capital controls in response to capital outflows, such expectations may 
accelerate the withdrawal of foreign funds even before the restrictions are imposed. Indeed, 
when Malaysia and Russia imposed capital controls in August 1998 it damaged investor
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sentiment towards emerging markets worldwide and particularly Latin America. Third, 
according to Corsetti et al., the experience of “capital controls in Latin America in the 
aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis ... was quite dismal. Controls tended to be ineffective, a 
tool of financial repression associated with negative real interest rates ... They eventually led 
to more, rather than less, capital flight”22. Finally, capital controls present ample 
opportunities for corruption and may also encourage rent-seeking activities and induce moral 
hazard.
Nonetheless, Paul Krugman argues that: “Malaysia has proved a point - namely, that 
controlling capital in a crisis is at least feasible. Until the Malaysian experiment, the 
prevailing view amongst pundits was that even if financial crises were driven by self- 
justifying panic, there was nothing governments could do to curb that panic except to 
reschedule bank debts ... and otherwise try to restore confidence by making a conspicuous 
display of virtue.”23
4.iv. Other forms of protection for developing countries 
Foreign exchange reserves 
A key fundamental weakness of Russia and the East Asian crisis-hit countries was the 
inadequate level of foreign exchange reserves relative to foreign currency-denominated short­
term debt. Indeed, foreign short-term debt exceeded available foreign exchange reserves in 
all of the worst hit countries. (See Table 2, p.118.) In contrast, Taiwan and the Chinese 
mainland had a massive supply of foreign reserves relative to foreign short-term debt and 
these were two Asian countries, which escaped the worst effects of the regional crisis. The 
knowledge that there are insufficient foreign reserves to pay back each creditor can accelerate 
the withdrawal of foreign capital as investors rush to be paid back before available foreign 
exchange reserves are exhausted. Therefore, an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves 
relative to short-term debt is an important measure to increase the resilience to financial 
market turmoil.
However, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has many economic costs. 
An economy can accumulate foreign currency reserves by running substantial trade surpluses 
over a number of years. Thus, the country must export more than it imports, which results in 
reduced domestic consumption and investment. Secondly, increasing foreign exchange 
reserves by means of sterilising capital inflows is costly because the return on foreign 
exchange reserves is likely to be far lower than the cost of external borrowing (foreign
22Ibid. p.25.
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reserves often being invested in low-yielding U.S. Treasury Bills). “[Indeed] the cost of 
sterilising private borrowing falls entirely on the public sector whose losses will exceed the 
foreign exchange cost of carrying such reserves since domestic interest rates on government 
debt exceed the rates earned on reserves by a larger margin than borrowing rates in 
international financial markets. This can give rise to large fiscal deficits”24. Moreover, 
sterilization as a means of accumulating foreign exchange reserves implies that an economy 
should borrow simply to amass foreign reserves rather than to promote investment through 
capital inflows. Alternatively, reserves can be accumulated by borrowing over longer-term 
periods whilst making similar investments in easily-marketed, liquid securities. This is 
essentially the method that China has used in amassing over $145 billion of foreign exchange 
reserves. “Peru’s central bank holds foreign reserves equal to 15 months of imports as an 
insurance policy against the sudden capital outflows that financially open economies often 
experience. The opportunity cost of this policy amounts to almost 1% of gross domestic
25product annually - more than enough to fund a generous antipoverty programme” . 
However as pointed out by Michael Naameh of Crown Agents, “having a high level of 
international reserves encourages inward investment, can serve as a deterrent to speculative 
attacks - assuming policy credibility - and can reduce borrowing costs to the whole economy 
and not just the public sector”.
A country’s ultimate source of liquidity is the central bank. The central bank is able 
to prevent or at least contain bank runs by fulfilling its role as ‘lender of last resort’ where it 
provides emergency liquidity to its domestic banks. However, when banks have borrowed in 
foreign currency the central bank is unable to print that currency and act as ‘lender of last 
resort’. Furthermore, there is no international ‘lender of last resort’ who can intervene by 
printing money and provide emergency liquidity to countries in financial distress. The only 
organisation that can be considered similar is the IMF. But, in contrast to a central bank 
which can print unlimited quantities of domestic currency, the IMF can only provide a 
limited amount of dollars or euros due to the IMF’s limited capital resources.
Introduction of a collateralised credit facility27 
Vast amounts of available liquidity is an effective tool to counteract currency speculators. 
However, there are significant costs involved in hoarding large quantities of foreign exchange
23Krugman, P. 1999b.
24Akyuz & Comford. 1999. p.20.
“ Rodrik, D. 2001. p.57.
26Naameh, M. 2001.
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reserves. As was discussed above, this is primarily because the reserves must be held in 
extremely liquid low-risk and thus low interest-bearing investments, so that they can be 
drawn upon at short notice. The concept of a collateralised credit facility would enable 
countries to borrow large quantities of foreign exchange at short notice. Therefore, if the 
credit facility were large enough and had sufficient resources it could almost eliminate the 
need for countries to maintain large supplies of foreign exchange reserves and thus the costs 
of hoarding foreign reserves. Access to such a facility must only be granted if economic 
behaviour is deemed appropriate and only in the face of destabilising financial markets. 
Martin Feldstein argues that such a facility would be successful because of the high value that 
creditors place on sound collateral rather than perceived virtue. Thus, the collateralised credit 
facility would almost certainly provide time for a developing economy to reschedule its 
debts. The most appropriate collateral for this facility would be trade receivables (hard 
currency export earnings of domestic firms). This collateral is commonly used in private 
credit agreements between developing economy enterprises and their advanced country 
creditors. The collateral cannot be in the form of the developing country’s domestic assets 
because this would make it difficult for creditors to both obtain and then convert into foreign 
currencies. Martin Feldstein reckons that: “With collateral there is no need to argue about 
whether a country is unable to meet its debt service requirements or is just unwilling to do so. 
Done properly, such a facility could substitute for an international lender of last resort, 
lending freely at penalty interest rates against good collateral.”28
However, in the face of currency devaluation, I believe that such a facility would not 
necessarily provide sufficient confidence amongst residents to eliminate the selling of the 
local currency, which had such a devastating affect in the Asian region. Moreover, financial 
interference unavoidably promotes the risk of moral-hazard-induced lending, which may 
encourage domestic enterprises to take on even more foreign currency-denominated loans.
Monetary policies to maintain credit lines 
Capital outflows will begin when market participants believe that there are more profitable 
investment opportunities elsewhere. Hence, creditors withdraw their loans in order to 
maximise profits and minimise losses. When the IMF provided loans to assist Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea (which will be discussed in Chapter 6) they demanded that 
interest rates were to be increased in an effort to ensure creditors maintain or even increase 
their exposures given the greater rates of return on offer. But, as previously stated, increased
27Proposed by Feldstein, M. See: 1999a or 1999b.
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interest rates reduced economic activity and may have little affect on creditors lending if they 
believe that such high levels are politically difficult to maintain.
Nonetheless, in the case of Hong Kong SAR, which operates a currency board, the 
persistent application of increased levels of monetary tightening eventually stabilised the 
currency. However, this was achieved by increasing the difficulties of the debtors and by 
multiplying the number of bankruptcies and defaults. This was because the stabilisation of 
the currency was achieved by a reduction in the selling of the domestic currency rather than 
increased purchases. The consequent recession and debt deflation made it increasingly 
difficult for debtors to raise funds and service their debt. Therefore, a persistent tightening of 
monetary emissions will only achieve stabilisation through a depression of the domestic 
economy.
Debtor-creditor burden sharing and debt standstill
The recent financial crises have created mass unemployment and increased poverty levels 
throughout the affected emerging markets. In contrast, the crises have had little affect upon 
the wealthier nations, and more specifically, on the private creditors that provided loans on a 
large scale to the crisis-hit developing nations and then abruptly refused to roll over their 
credits.
In the Asian financial crisis creditors enjoyed a far stronger bargaining position than 
the countries that were facing default. When a country is facing a debt default, the creditors 
can demand full-repayment, or rigid terms for rescheduling the debt, which may include the 
imposition of far higher rates of interest, or the domestic government may guarantee the debts 
of the private sector. A heavily indebted country is only permitted to confirm a default in the 
most extraordinary of circumstances. Only then can the country reorganise and establish its 
intention to pay only a proportion of selected loans back to the foreign creditors.
In light of recent experience, it has been evident that investors have not shared fairly 
in the losses that the borrowing countries have endured. Yet this is not the case in a normal 
commercial market situation where the creditors and borrowers share losses or profits evenly. 
This has prompted some analysts to propose private sector ‘bail-ins’ where private creditors, 
according to previously agreed terms, would be required to maintain or even increase their 
exposure to an economy in financial distress. The creditor ‘bail-in’ concept was applied to 
commercial bank credits during the 1980s debt crisis and resulted in restricted access to 
voluntary private foreign capital. Moreover, an additional problem with “proposals for
28Feldstein, M. 1999b. p.16.
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bailing in the private sector is that they could generate an adverse trade-off between 
mitigating the risks of crises (by discouraging excessive borrowing) and containing crises 
when they do occur. Specifically, application of such mechanisms on a regular basis may
90increase incentives for creditors to flee a country at the first signs of trouble” . This is likely 
to increase the cost of borrowing in many emerging markets due to the greater perceived risk 
that such a mechanism would involve.
When an enterprise is threatened with bankruptcy they often request patience from 
their creditors or appeal for temporary court protection for such assistance. Barry 
Eichengreen, believes that this concept should be extended to international situations to assist 
countries facing debt difficulties. This notion, which is similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
bankruptcy code, will enable an economy facing default to declare a debt standstill while 
providing court approval for protection from creditors allowing for a re-servicing of debts 
and an improvement in the prospects for an economic recovery. Should a standstill on the 
repayment of debt be imposed it would essentially be a restriction on capital mobility and 
thus an effective control on capital outflows. Moreover, the standstill on debt repayments 
would only preclude one type of capital outflow, whilst allowing the country’s residents that 
fear a devaluation to remain free to convert domestic currency into foreign and possibly 
precipitate the very crisis the debt standstill was supposed to prevent. Domestic residents 
were, indeed, the main sellers of the local currency in the worst of the Asian crisis-hit 
countries.
The ‘Tobin’ tax
To reduce the level of speculative capital flows many analysts, particularly in Asia, have 
proposed the implementation of the ‘Tobin’ tax (after the Nobel prize winning U.S. 
economist James Tobin who originally suggested the concept). The Tobin tax would charge 
a tax on short-term foreign exchange transactions. Advocates argue that if the Tobin tax was 
imposed it would reduce the amount of destabilising short-term capital flows (presently over 
a trillion dollars a day30) by making such transactions more expensive. Proponents of the 
Tobin tax claim that it would indirectly encourage long-term capital flows, provide a central 
bank with greater autonomy over the value of the national currency and reduce the adverse 
consequences that currency volatility has inflicted upon developing countries. Additionally 
the tax would generate substantial revenues, which could be used to finance worthwhile
29Mussa et al. 1999. p. 12.
30Ambrose, S. 1998.
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projects promoting environmentally sustainable development and address problems of 
climate change and poverty.
However, if the Tobin tax is to be successfully implemented and reduce the volume of 
capital flows, the tax percentage must be large enough so that overnight speculative 
transactions are reduced. The majority of proposals for the tax have ranged from 0.1%-0.5% 
per transaction, which would create substantial revenues. Some estimates have concluded 
that annual revenues could exceed $100 billion.31 Implementation of the Tobin tax would 
require an effective and efficient institutional framework to regulate and supervise capital 
flows, ensuring that potentially destabilising flows are taxed. The primary recipients of the 
tax revenues should be the economies that are involved with each transaction. However, 
there should also be a fund where a proportion of the tax revenues are allocated to assist less 
developed countries with their development, while also providing rapid response emergency 
action for natural and environmental disaster areas. Universal adoption of the Tobin tax 
should be the ultimate goal but in its transitional stage the tax could effectively reduce global 
flows of ‘hot money’ by the implementation in advanced countries only.
Opponents to the Tobin initiative argue that while the imposition of the tax is in its 
transitional stage and is yet to be universally adopted, the tax could be dodged by moving 
transactions to countries that are yet to impose the tax. But, to dodge the tax in this manner 
would involve additional expense and effort, which may in itself help to reduce short-term 
capital flows. Furthermore, opponents contend that the Tobin tax would not restrict selling of 
the currency by domestic residents, which accelerated the crises in Asia. If the Tobin tax is 
adopted, political will and support by leaders of developed and developing countries is 
paramount to the successful and effective implementation of the tax.
The need for greater transparency and an early warning mechanism 
The Asian crisis-hit countries were severely castigated for both the private and public sectors’ 
inadequate degree of financial transparency and disclosure. Consequently, the Asian crisis 
has intensified initiatives advocating that market participants should receive an early warning 
regarding the condition of key macroeconomic variables. Such a concept is believed to be 
essential for enhanced decision-making by private creditors. In turn this would contribute to 
better market discipline, improved financial regulation and supervision and greater policy 
surveillance by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
3lIbid.
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In April 1996, following the Mexican ‘Tequila’ crisis and the desire for improved 
information on key macroeconomic variables, the IMF launched the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard (SDDS). Essentially the SDDS was established to assist member 
countries in the public dissemination of economic and financial data to promote continued 
access to global financial markets. The SDDS and the stringent rules that accompany it were 
supposed to provide an early warning mechanism to market participants and observers who 
could then assist the economy, enabling it to avert a financial crisis. However, the SDDS did 
not help to foresee or even preclude the Asian crisis, which was the least anticipated financial 
crisis in many years.
In response to the inadequate financial disclosure and ultimately the failure of the 
SDDS to anticipate the crisis, the Interim Committee recommended an expansion of the 
SDDS. Recommendations included increasing available financial information, including data 
on private foreign debt, net foreign exchange reserves and any other indicators, which might 
indicate potential financial stability. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the IMF 
examine the need for a code of sound practices on monetary and financial policies, which 
was later adopted in 1999. The code has been established to complement sound practices as 
regards fiscal transparency, which are designed to strengthen both the credibility and the 
general public’s understanding of macroeconomic policies. Additionally, the code is 
perceived to improve the accountability and integrity of the institutions, which are 
responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. Further initiatives have been proposed to 
enhance financial regulation and supervision of capital flows to financial intermediaries.32
Undoubtedly, greater international transparency is desirable and would enable 
creditors to make improved investment decisions, which could promote greater efficiency in 
the allocation of capital throughout the world. Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate that 
while financial transparency in Asia was inadequate, it was not a fundamental cause of the 
regional crisis. Indeed, information was available on the quantity of short and long-term 
foreign debt, the balance of payments and the languishing property sector. Perhaps what was 
actually absent from the onset of the Asian crisis was competent appraisal by market analysts, 
the IMF and the World Bank. In the case of the Russian crisis, a large proportion of the 
purchases of the Russian governments debt took place at a time when information regarding 
the authorities’ inability to improve tax revenues was widely available. And, more generally,
32For a summary of the code of good practices on increased monetary and financial 
transparency, see: J. Drage & F. Mann. ‘Improving the stability of the international financial 
system’. Financial Stability Review. June 1999. pp.44-45.
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there was abundant information concerning the absence of an effective judicial system, the 
dire state of the country’s banks and the pervasive crime and corruption. It would therefore 
appear that increased transparency would not greatly improve the global financial system and 
reduce the frequency of financial crises.
Stronger banking foundations 
In January 2001 amendments to the 1988 Basel Accord were announced. The original accord 
required that banks’ capital was at least 8% of their risk-weighted loans to the non-banking 
private sector. However, this notion of capital adequacy was far too simplistic, assuming that 
the ratio of a bank’s capital to its loans would determine whether or not its capital was 
adequate. This resulted in perverse incentives. “At present banks have an incentive to lend 
to riskier credits when the capital they think they should set aside is more than regulators 
demand; and the reverse is also true”33. In June 1999 the Basel committee recommended that 
capital requirements represent the actual credit risk of their loans, and the details were 
unveiled on January 16th. They primarily address three areas, including minimum capital 
requirements, improved regulation and supervision, and greater transparency and disclosure. 
A final committee meeting will take place in May 2001 and the new timetable for 
implementation is 2005. Any measures that improve the strength of banks should be 
welcomed because “countries with healthy banking systems survived the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-98 much better than those with sickly ones. The banking system acts as a 
shock absorber; if the shock absorber is worn out, then the shocks are magnified”34.
4.v. Conclusion
The sequencing of capital account liberalisation in the Asian region was headlong. Capital 
accounts were liberalised when banking standards and regulatory mechanisms were weak. 
The surge in capital inflows to Asia was greatly in excess of the economies’ ability to absorb 
them productively, which resulted in a deteriorating investment environment. In contrast, 
Chile’s capital controls provided the economy with time to strengthen banking regulation and 
limit foreign currency exposures. Therefore, when Chile liberalised its capital account, good 
banking practices have contributed to the strength of the economy and reduced the 
economy’s vulnerability to financial panic.
The bout of financial crises have shown that financial markets are unstable and that 
capital account liberalisation has precipitated financial crises in Mexico, Asia and Russia. 
International capital markets are prone to excessive optimism followed by excessive
33The Economist. 20 January 2001. p. 18.
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pessimism. Paul Krugman laments that: “When things are going well there is a strong 
tendency to suppose that financial markets can take care of themselves. Well they can’t.”35
I believe that emerging market economies should reduce their vulnerability to a 
financial crisis by implementing restrictions on capital mobility. But capital controls cannot 
be a substitute for sound economic policies. Instead, these controls should be implemented in 
order to provide time for the developing country to strengthen their economic fundamentals, 
prior to the ultimate objective of capital account liberalisation. China has largely been 
insulated from financial market turbulence despite its apparent weaknesses, which are being 
addressed under the protection of capital controls. Capital controls should promote FDI and 
long-term loans.
Liquidity also appears to be an important self-protection measure for emerging market 
economies. But the collection and maintenance of foreign exchange reserves involves 
numerous costs, which would be proportionally greater for smaller, developing nations. 
These costs are why many emerging markets will not attempt to accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves and thus run the risk of a currency crisis. These economic costs would support the 
imposition of capital controls as an alternative self-protection mechanism. Moreover, the 
IMF does not have sufficient available resources to act as an international lender of last 
resort. Thus countries must fend for themselves. Therefore, the introduction of a 
collateralised credit facility would, given the available resources, provide emergency foreign 
exchange and possibly help to mollify erratic financial markets.
Experience has shown that when countries are faced with an impending crisis their 
creditors place demands on the economies that make repayment almost, if not entirely, 
impossible. At the same time, these countries have been led to believe by the U.S. and the 
IMF that implementing controls on capital flight is unthinkable. Consequently, the concept 
of private sector ‘bail-ins’ and concerted bank actions to maintain or increase creditors 
exposure to a country in financial distress has been proposed. But this notion will not address 
the selling of the currency by domestic residents. Besides the concept is comparable to 
controls on capital outflows, which would actually address the problem of domestic selling of 
the currency.
The Tobin tax is a praiseworthy initiative that would reduce the volume and volatility 
of short-term capital flows. However, if the tax is to be successfully and effectively
34Ibid.
35Krugman, P. 2000c.
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implemented it must be widely supported by leaders of advanced and developing economies 
alike, with stringent penalties accompanying evasion of the tax.
European leaders have been quick to recognise the devastation that short-term capital 
flows have caused in the financial crises of recent years. Robert Wade argues that the 
countries of the European Union appear to believe that its sympathy towards Asia’s 
difficulties, together with their policies that favour capital controls and eventually a stable 
euro, will make the euro a more appealing foreign exchange reserve rather than the dollar. 
This would provide Europe with a far greater degree of global economic clout regarding 
decisions that will shape the world economy in years to come.
36Wade, R. 1998-1999.
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Table 1. Net capital inflows to Asia and the Pacific 1996-2000, U.S. $ billion.
‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99e ‘00e
Total Private Capital 
Inflows 176.3 67.9 5.8 39.3 59.4
Bank Loans and other 113.7 10 -54.3 -30.2 -12.6
Portfolio Investment 17.2 6 4.9 14.9 18.4
FDI 45.4 51.9 55.2 54.6 53.6
Net Official Flows 5 36.7 31.2 4.3 8.3
Total Inflows 181.3 104.6 37 43.6 67.7
1999 and 2000 are estimates. 
Source: Williamson, J. 2001. p. 14.
Table 2. East Asia’s short-term debt versus foreign reserves 1990-1997.
Short-term debt, U.S. $ millions.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippine Thailand Total
June‘90 10,360 15,528 1,761 3,019 7,026 37,694
June ‘94 18,882 34,908 8,203 2,646 27,151 91,790
June‘97 34,661 70,182 16,268 8,293 45,567 174,971
International reserves, U.S. $ millions.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippine Thailand Total
June‘90 4,963 14,642 8,114 948 11,882 40,279
June‘94 10,915 21,684 32,608 6,527 27,375 99,109
June‘97 20,336 34,069 26,586 9,781 31,361 122,133
Debt to Reserves Ratio.
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippine Thailand Total
June‘90 2.21 1.06 0.22 3.19 0.59 0.94
June‘94 1.73 1.61 0.25 0.41 0.99 0.92
June‘97 1.7 2.06 0.61 0.85 1.45 1.43
Source: Chang and Velasco. 1998c. p.7.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EXCHANGE RATE DEBATE
Introduction
In this chapter the plausibility of various exchange rate options will be assessed. The choice 
ranges from floating exchange rates (as used by most developed nations, including the U.S. 
dollar, the yen and the euro) to a rigidly fixed regime (such as a currency board system, as 
used in a small number of countries, e.g. Argentina and Bulgaria, or the special 
administrative region of Hong Kong), to ‘dollarization’ (which was recently introduced in 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala). With ‘dollarization’ a country’s currency is 
eliminated and the country adopts a foreign currency such as the dollar as the country’s legal 
tender. The costs and benefits of each regime will be considered.
5.i. The dilemma
The exchange rate dilemma, as described by an article in the Economist, primarily concerns 
the ‘impossible trinity’: “A policy maker trying to design the ideal financial system has three 
objectives. He wants continuing national sovereignty; financial markets that are regulated, 
supervised and cushioned; and the benefits of global capital markets. Unfortunately ... these 
three goals are incompatible. They form the ‘impossible trinity’ that underlies the instability 
of today’s global architecture. Any coherent reform proposal must favour two parts of the 
trinity at the expense of the third. For instance, those who wish to regulate markets and 
maintain national sovereignty must do so at the expense of capital market integration. Those 
who wish to maintain sovereignty and yet allow capital markets to integrate must accept an 
entirely free market at the global level. Those who want capital market integration and 
global regulation must forfeit national sovereignty”1.
The currency crises of recent years have all involved fixed or nominally pegged 
exchange rates. These crises include the E.U’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the 
early 1990s, Mexico in 1994-95, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in early 1999. This 
striking coincidence has led many commentators to conclude that ‘the peg did it’. Moreover, 
there has been a growing trend towards greater exchange rate flexibility. In the mid-1970s, 
86% of emerging markets had some form of pegged exchange rate, but in 1996 less than half 
did, with approximately a third of developing countries claiming to have independently 
floating exchange rates.2 (Table 1, p. 149, illustrates the trend towards greater flexibility 
among developing countries.)
!The Economist. January 30 1999. Global Finance Survey, p.4.
^ h e  Economist. 20 September 1997. p. 139.
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The financial crises in Asia and Russia illustrated that the combination of a pegged 
exchange rate, extensively liberalised capital markets and interest rates above world market 
levels is a policy combination which tends to maximise inflows (and subsequent outflows) of 
short-term capital. There is, indeed, strong evidence to suggest that fixed exchange rates are 
prone to currency crises because they appear to be inconsistent with capital mobility. The 
pegged exchange rate crises of the 1990’s have dramatically changed perceptions toward 
fixed regimes and even the euro floats against other currencies. The more flexible exchange 
rates of the emerging markets of South Africa, Turkey and Mexico allowed these countries to 
adjust accordingly to the financial turbulence following the Asian and Russian financial 
crises. A country’s decision to adopt greater exchange rate flexibility is associated with a 
more liberalised, outward-looking perspective towards trade and investment flows while 
allowing the market to determine both the value of the exchange rate and the level of 
domestic interest rates. However, the adoption of fluctuating exchange rates by some 
emerging markets is often infeasible. This is because their financial markets are often small 
and are, therefore, vulnerable to the volatility that just a few large financial transactions may 
cause. To counteract exchange rate volatility, managed or ‘dirty floating’ regimes may be 
employed. ‘Dirty floating’ occurs when the authorities use official intervention to guide or 
target their exchange rates to some degree and do not make news of their intervention public.
5.ii. Choosing a regime 
Policy makers closely analyse the effects of random shocks to the domestic economy when 
choosing an exchange rate regime. The most appropriate exchange rate will be the regime 
that stabilises the economy’s macroeconomic performance and thus minimises fluctuations in 
consumption, output and domestic price levels. Prior to the recent bout of financial crises, 
policy makers believed that the choice of exchange rate was not simply a choice between 
fixed and flexible regimes; they considered regimes with varying degrees of fixity, such as 
nominally pegged exchange rates (as adopted by Russia and the crisis-hit East Asian 
countries). Since the outbreak of these crises, however, economists have recommended 
exchange rates that are either flexible or rigidly fixed, arguing, that a loosely pegged 
exchange rate soon becomes unsustainable (this is known as the bipolar view, or two-comer 
solution). “Of the 33 countries classified as emerging market economies by J.P. Morgan ... 
the proportion with intermediate regimes fell from 64% to 42% over the decade [1991-1999].
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By the end of 1999, 16 of these countries had floating rates and 3 had very hard pegs in the 
form of currency boards or no legal tender.3
A fixed exchange rate regime is believed to be more desirable if the disturbances that 
a country faces are predominantly monetary (and thus affect the demand for money), which 
will influence general price levels.
In 1995 Russia introduced the rouble corridor, which, together with the tightening of 
monetary emissions, brought the rate of inflation down to around 15% in 1997. The rouble 
acted as an anchor of stability for the economy. It helped to increase confidence among 
investors who were then prepared to lend to Russian banks, enterprises and the Russian 
government. When investor confidence began to dwindle higher rates of interest were 
offered in order to sustain the rouble’s semi-fixed exchange rate. But increased rates of 
interest inevitably reduced real economic activity. Herbert Neiss of the IMF stated that: “A 
fixed exchange rate ... requires a strong, credible government, the willingness to accept very 
high interest rates whenever the peg comes under pressure and plenty of reserves to 
intervene.”4 Neither Russia nor the crisis-hit Asian countries possessed significant foreign 
exchange reserves or strong credible governments, which indicates that the pegged regime 
was inappropriate. Furthermore, Jeffery Sachs has argued that: “It is neither worthwhile nor 
feasible to twist monetary policy to soothe panicky investors, especially at the cost of internal 
depression.”5
Flexible exchange rates, on the other hand, are favoured by many countries because 
they provide a smooth adjustment process to external shocks such as an increase in the world 
price of oil. Moreover, a floating exchange rate regime enables economies to target monetary 
policies to meet domestic objectives, which may include price stability. This is in contrast to 
altering interest rates to maintain the fixed value of a pegged exchange rate. Floating a 
currency will also mean that both investors and firms take precautions against the potential 
for exchange rate losses via exchange rate fluctuations. However, the main disadvantage of a 
flexible exchange rate is the volatility and misalignments, which often occur with such 
regimes. For an emerging market economy (especially the smaller ones), an exchange rate 
misalignment may have a pronounced effect on the economy. If the banking sector has 
significant exchange rate exposure, the country’s banks’ solvency could be jeopardised by a
3Fischer, S. 2001. p. 19.
“Neiss, H. 1998.
5Sachs, J. 1998a. p.24.
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modest depreciation. Exchange rate volatility may also affect the emerging markets’ external 
trade, which, for developing economies, usually forms a large proportion of GDP.
There is no ‘perfect’ exchange rate regime; each system has significant costs and 
benefits. Indeed, Jeffrey Frankel believes that: “No single currency regime is right for all 
countries or at all times.”6 An economy must, therefore, determine which regime 
complements their country’s characteristics best. The key characteristics which will 
determine the authorities decision include the size and openness of the economy, the level of 
inflation, how developed the country’s financial system is, the degree of labour market 
rigidity, the credibility of policy makers and how open the country’s capital market is to 
international capital flows. These characteristics are as follows:
1. The size and openness of the economy is relevant because if trade represents a 
significant proportion of the country’s GDP then fluctuations in the value of the currency 
may result in widespread social consequences. This would suggest that fixed exchange rates 
(such as currency boards) are suited to small, open economies.
2. If a country’s inflation level is far higher than its primary trading partners, its 
exchange rate should be flexible. This should help to prevent its exports from losing 
competitiveness through real exchange rate appreciation (which takes into account relative 
inflation rates). Moreover, in developing countries, wages and prices are lower than those in 
advanced countries. But, in accordance with the Balassa-Samuelson effect*, wages and 
prices will rise faster than the prices in advanced countries as the high-growth developing 
countries catch-up with the advanced countries. This will lead to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Thus, a floating regime will enable a depreciation to offset the inflation 
differential.
3. A floating exchange rate in a country that has an inexperienced and under­
developed financial system could result in extreme volatility of the value of the exchange 
rate. This is because only a small number of large inflows or outflows of capital may be 
sufficient to dramatically alter the value of the currency.
6Frankel, J. 1999.
* The Balassa-Samuelson effect arises because the growth of productivity differs among sectors, while wages 
tend to be less differentiated. Typically, productivity growth is faster in the traded goods sector than in the non­
traded goods sector, such as services. To the extent that the faster productivity growth in the traded goods
sector pushes up wages in all sectors, the prices of non-traded goods relative to those of traded goods will rise.
Thus the faster productivity growth of developing countries, implies that, other things being equal, the consumer 
price index will rise faster in developing countries than in advanced countries.
Definition taken from Szapary, G. 2001. p.27.
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4. A floating exchange rate is more appropriate for an economy that has particularly 
rigid wages. This is because the flexible exchange rate will enable a straightforward 
adjustment to exogenous shocks (which will be discussed in greater detail later in the 
chapter).
5. A country may increase foreign investor confidence by providing a greater degree 
of independence to the country’s central bank. This is because, as stated by Berman and 
McNamara, “foreign investors read central bank independence as a signal of strength of 
domestic proponents of sound monetary policy, both within the government and among 
domestic interest groups”7. Hence, where policy makers’ credibility is weak the country’s 
commitment to fighting inflation can be emphasised by installing a fixed exchange rate peg 
to help contain inflation and enhance confidence in the authorities abilities.
6. In Asia, the extensive liberalisation of the capital account and consequent surge in 
capital inflows made the maintenance of fixed exchange rates difficult. A flexible exchange 
rate will adjust more smoothly to inflows and outflows of capital. Moreover, due to the 
element of exchange rate uncertainty, vast volumes of capital inflows may actually be 
deterred.
The above criteria would suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes were the best 
policy option for the Asian economies, even before they were struck by the regional crisis of
1997. This is because they are relatively small economies. In 1997, imports amounted to 
approximately 40% of GDP in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, twice the average for 
developing economies.8 Wages in these economies are quite flexible and inflation rates were 
far lower than most developing countries. However, the credibility of the region’s central 
banks was not strong enough to convince investors that the pegs were sustainable and the 
heavy weighting of the dollar contributed to exchange rate overvaluations.
A fixed exchange rate regime 
In a fixed exchange rate regime the monetary authorities will determine the value of the 
currency relative to a single currency, such as the U.S. dollar, or a ‘basket’ of currencies. 
While the system remains in operation the economy’s central bank will guarantee to convert 
domestic currency into a fixed quantity of the other currency. As previously noted, long-term 
sustainability of an exchange rate commitment requires a strong government, plenty of 
foreign exchange reserves when the peg is ‘tested’ and the ability to accept high interest 
rates.
7Berman & McNamara. 1999. p.4.
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The introduction of a fixed exchange rate regime can help to improve the credibility 
of domestic policy makers. This is because a pegged exchange rate can act as an ‘anchor’ for 
monetary and fiscal policy by maintaining the value of the exchange rate and thus 
contributing to a reduction in inflation. The peg requires that a country with a poor record of 
controlling inflation subordinates its monetary policy to that of a low inflation economy. 
While the regime remains credible, expectations of high inflation will be reduced. In 
addition, a fixed regime removes trade uncertainties due to the absence of exchange rate 
fluctuations. However, if the sustainability of the exchange rate comes into question the 
currency may be subjected to destabilising speculative attacks, which may force the 
authorities to try to ‘prop-up’ their currency by buying it back in the foreign exchange market 
with their foreign exchange reserves. Alternatively, they may increase interest rates to 
illustrate their commitment to the peg and ward off speculation.
Jeffrey Sachs argues that: ‘The only real exception to floating rates comes at the start 
of stabilization from extreme inflations, when exchange rate targeting is more efficient than 
monetary targeting.”9 Israel and Poland achieved stabilization under a fixed exchange 
regime, and then began the transition to a more flexible regime in 1985 and 1990 
respectively. But the governments of Mexico, Thailand, Russia and Brazil refused to 
introduce greater flexibility to their exchange rate regimes even in the face of deteriorating 
fundamentals. Mr Sachs points out that maintaining an over-valued exchange rate results in 
cheap consumer goods and high real wages in urban areas and policy makers also fear 
political and economic repercussions. Barry Eichengreen laments that: “Transitions from 
pegged to adjustable rates have been anything but smooth.”10 This is primarily because 
transitions have not usually been undertaken in a favourable economic environment, and the 
change of policy is often delayed until a devaluation is forced upon the country, e.g. when 
foreign reserves have been exhausted. Eichengreen and others have shown that a country 
should begin the transition to a more flexible regime after stabilisation has gained sufficient 
credibility and while the currency remains strong. However, at such a time domestic policy 
makers see no reason to pursue greater exchange rate flexibility.
Fixed rates have tended to cause an over-reliance on foreign financing and a refusal 
by the authorities to adopt a system of greater flexibility, even in the face of deteriorating 
economic fundamentals. However, a move towards greater flexibility at a time when the
8The Economist. 20 September 1997. p. 139.
9Sachs, J. 1998a. p.24.
10Eichengreen, B. 1999a. p.c4.
125
quantity of both Asia’s private sector debt and the Russian government’s short-term foreign 
debt exceeded foreign exchange reserves would have been an inherently risky move. 
Moreover, if the exchange rate peg is abandoned, the country loses policy credibility and 
reduces the possibility of implementing an exchange rate peg in the future. Barry 
Eichengreen has drawn a similarity between governments that are trying to increase their 
credibility by imposing an exchange rate peg and a person dieting, arguing that: ‘The 
currency peg is the lock on the refrigerator. Countries that devalue are thus seen as having 
removed the lock from the refrigerator and relapsing to the bad old days of inflationary 
excess, which leads investors to flee.”11 
Pegging: a single currency or a basket of currencies?
If a country wishes to operate a pegged exchange rate it must choose which currency or 
currencies it wishes to adopt as its peg. The choice of pegging between a single currency or a 
basket of currencies is important because the heavy weighting of the U.S. dollar in Asia’s 
exchange rate pegs contributed to the region’s vulnerability to financial crises. The Asian 
countries should have placed more weight on the value of the yen and the major European 
currencies. As it happened the appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the yen and the major 
European currencies contributed to an over-valuation of the Asian currencies and a 
subsequent loss of competitiveness resulting in slowing export production across the region.
The choice of the peg should primarily depend upon what currency the country’s 
external debt is denominated in and the degree of concentration of the country’s trade with its 
various trading partners. Hence, the main case for adopting a single peg is when that 
currency is the domestic economy’s main trading partner and that that currency constitutes 
most of the country’s external debt. The advantage of pegging to a basket of currencies is 
that it should reduce excessive fluctuations in the value of the domestic currency, which can 
occur when an exchange rate is pegged to a single currency. The case for adopting a basket 
of currencies is strongest when the country’s external debt is denominated in a variety of 
currencies and there is no dominant trading partner.
5.iii. Effects of capital flows on exchange rates 
To generate inflows of foreign portfolio capital the domestic level of interest must be greater 
than the world level of interest by at least the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency. Maintaining high levels of interest can have harmful consequences on the 
economy, such as the reduction of public investment, and will also make the servicing of
11 Eichengreen, B. 1998.
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public debt more expensive. Therefore, the requirements of attracting foreign capital is likely 
to reduce economic activity in the host country. However, these adverse factors can be offset 
by an effective utilization of capital inflows.
A flexible exchange rate regime
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an outflow of foreign capital will cause a depreciation 
of the domestic currency and may result in two possible outcomes. Firstly, if exports and 
imports are sensitive to exchange rate movements and domestic exports do not rely heavily 
upon imported goods that form constituent components of the final product, the depreciation 
of the exchange rate may improve the country’s current account. However, if import 
elasticities are not high and export production relies heavily on imported goods as in many 
developing economies, then the depreciation of the currency significantly increases the price 
of imports, which in turn, aggravates inflation. This inflation will lead to an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, which may erode the benefits of the devaluation.
Conversely, inflows of foreign capital will cause an appreciation of the domestic 
currency. In turn, this will make imports cheaper in the domestic market and exports more 
expensive. This will have an adverse effect on the current account balance. Unemployment 
will increase, particularly in the country’s exporting sectors because these industries lose 
price competitiveness as a result of the domestic currency’s appreciation.
However, because the flexible exchange rate possesses significant exchange rate risks 
it may actually discourage domestic enterprises and individuals from borrowing excessively 
in foreign currency-denominated loans. In contrast, the exchange rate pegs in Asia caused 
residents and foreign investors to underestimate exchange rate risks. Thus, a flexible 
exchange rate may reduce potentially large capital inflows. As previously mentioned, a 
flexible exchange rate also makes it far less costly for an economy to adjust to exogenous 
shocks, which would otherwise have serious implications for fixed exchange rates. A 
flexible exchange rate also provides the authorities with autonomy over the conduct of 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, small, open economies that consider adopting a flexible 
exchange rate often have a ‘fear of floating’ due to the volatility that such a regime can 
impinge on a small country.
The Economist argues that: “For large economies, the costs of misaligned exchange 
rates are rarely large enough to warrant sacrificing the benefits of an independent monetary 
policy. For smaller economies, however, the trade-off is different. The benefits of monetary 
independence are smaller, and the costs of misaligned exchange rates potentially far greater.
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Once such countries might have tried to keep their currencies within target bands. But with 
freely mobile international capital, such arrangements are hard to sustain.”12 
Fixed exchange rates
Under a fixed or pegged regime the exchange rate is prohibited from adjusting in response to 
capital inflows or outflows. If the exchange rate is prevented from rising in response to 
capital inflows, inflationary pressures in the economy will increase, and this rise in domestic 
inflation results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER). In an effort to avoid an 
appreciation of the RER central banks have attempted to sterilise these inflows of foreign 
capital. Under sterilisation a foreign loan’s indirect consequence is to increase the central 
bank’s foreign exchange reserves and the domestic money supply.
However, the process of sterilization only works effectively in the short-term for three 
reasons. Firstly, the inflationary pressures that build up as a result of the increased money 
supply mean that nominal interest rates do not fall and thus the country continues to attract 
capital inflows. Secondly, because domestic financial markets are tiny relative to 
international capital flows, sterilization will become less effective over time. Lastly, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, maintaining foreign exchange reserves is costly given that the yields 
earned on foreign exchange reserves are likely to be less than the amount paid on external 
debt denominated in domestic currency. Therefore, the costs of sterilization and maintaining 
foreign exchange reserves grow over time.
The upward pressure on the exchange rate via capital inflows should be limited by 
prudential bank regulation, which has been experimented with in a number of countries. The 
regulations could enforce limits upon the level of foreign currency-denominated loans, which 
would help to reduce exchange rate exposure and the potential for a financial panic. 
Alternatively, some policy makers, such as Indonesia in response to Thailand’s financial 
crisis, have widened the exchange rate trading band. In the face of capital inflows this 
widened trading band will allow for some appreciation of the exchange rate and vice-versa. 
Selective capital controls have also been placed on short-term inflows in a number of 
countries including Chile. However, such controls are unable to distinguish between 
destabilising short-term flows and inflows that are actually desirable and help to stabilise the 
foreign exchange and other markets, whilst also providing liquidity to the currency market. 
Nevertheless, these policies have only a limited effect on easing inflationary pressures and 
have therefore been unable to remove upward pressures on the RER.
12The Economist. 20 November 1999. p. 142.
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When the inflow of foreign capital accelerates, conflicting interests are likely to 
emerge between the policy makers desire for low inflation and the maintenance of the pegged 
exchange rate. If signs of overheating emerge, such as a growing current account deficit, 
creditors will become aware of the two conflicting policy objectives and this may initiate a 
reversal of capital flows. Such a deterioration in investor sentiment poses significant 
problems for developing and transitional economies when they have become dependent on 
foreign financing. In an attempt to maintain the value of the exchange rate the authorities 
may use their foreign exchange reserves to buy the domestic currency back and prop-up the 
currency. However, recent experience suggests that where external short-term debt exceeds 
available foreign exchange reserves there is little an economy can do to preclude a financial 
panic. Moreover, it would appear that even developed countries’ central banks are unable to 
prevent such a panic and maintain the value of their exchange rate, e.g. the U.K’s exit from 
the ERM on 16 September, 1992. In fact the combined reserves of advanced nations central 
banks amounts to $1.6 trillion, which is dwarfed by the quantity of foreign exchange trading 
given that the average daily turnover is around $2 trillion.13 
Sustainability of Exchange Rate Undertakings 
Two factors need stressing:
1. Inappropriate macroeconomic policies.
Macroeconomic policies that result in a continued deterioration of foreign exchange 
reserves are unsustainable once the reserves are exhausted. Thus, the macroeconomy’s 
imbalance cannot be addressed with additional foreign exchange expenditure. An imbalance 
that results in the steady deterioration of foreign exchange reserves is likely to occur from an 
imbalance between the demand for and supply of money balances. Under a fixed exchange 
rate, when the money supply is increased beyond the real demand for money (for instance, 
with excessive capital inflows) it is likely to decrease foreign reserves in two ways. Firstly, 
the increase in the economy’s money balances is likely to increase expenditure on goods and 
services. In turn, this will cause the price of non-tradable goods and services to increase and 
the supply of domestically produced tradable goods would fall because profits in this sector 
are squeezed by the higher wages of the non-tradable sector. The reduction in the output of 
the domestically produced tradables will affect the country’s current account position, which 
may indirectly affect the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Secondly, the excess holdings 
of domestic currency may encourage investors to diversify their exchange rate exposures into
13Ibid.
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foreign currencies and assets. This situation will reduce the demand for the domestic 
currency, which may require intervention in the foreign exchange market to maintain the 
currency’s fixed value and thus a direct depletion of foreign reserves.
2. A change in portfolio preferences.
With substantial inflows of foreign capital the authorities may attempt to sterilise 
these inflows, which increases the country’s money supply and foreign exchange reserves. 
However, if there is a significant change in portfolio preferences and an outflow of foreign 
capital, the money supply will contract in accordance with the outflow of foreign capital. 
Maintaining the fixed exchange rate under these circumstances will lead to a steady depletion 
of foreign exchange reserves, which will become unsustainable when reserves are exhausted, 
as seen in Thailand.
5.iv. The historical perspective of currency boards
In the 1960s currency boards were in operation in just a few economies. They were believed 
to be workable and desirable only in extreme circumstances, for instance, in small and 
extensively liberalised economies of city-states or small islands. Argentina successfully 
implemented a currency board to stabilise the economy following the country’s hyper­
inflation of 1991 and, similarly, Bulgaria did so in 1997. The implementation of a currency 
board has been proposed as a policy response to various economic challenges of developing 
and transitional countries throughout the world. For example, post-war reconstruction in 
Bosnia has been enhanced and a generally successful transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy has been undertaken in Lithuania and Estonia. The adoption of currency 
boards has also been recommended to countries seeking independence such as East Timor 
and Palestine. No currency board has yet been abandoned and the debate on currency boards 
has raged in response to recent economic turmoil in developing countries throughout the 
world, e.g. Indonesia during the Asian crisis in 1997/1998 (Krugman, Schuler), Russia prior 
to the countries financial crisis (Soros) and in the aftermath of the rouble’s devaluation 
(Hanke), and Brazil during the defence of its exchange rate (Dombusch). Advocates of 
currency boards (e.g. Hanke, Walters and Schuler) argue that with strict enforcement, 
currency boards will promote monetary stability and credibility, which is superior to any 
other exchange rate regime. Their adversaries (e.g. Roubini and Schwartz) contend that the 
adoption of currency boards where the banking systems are weak and the economy is fragile 
is a perilous venture, which should only take place in the most desperate of circumstances.
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The currency board regime
A currency board is similar to a fixed exchange rate regime but requires even tighter 
constraints on domestic policy-makers. This improves the credibility of the mechanism, 
which results in lower interest rates than those under fixed exchange rates. A currency board 
is defined as a monetary institution which issues domestic currency entirely backed by the 
equivalent quantity of the foreign anchor currency. The authorities guarantee to convert the 
domestic currency into that of the anchor (or reserve) currency at the fixed rate on demand. 
Hong Kong adopted a currency board in 1982 and has three commercial banks which print 
domestic currency. But, the currency board requirements demand that they may only issue 
additional domestic currency as long as they provide the equivalent quantity of U.S. dollars 
(Hong Kong’s ‘anchor’ currency) to the monetary authorities at the set rate of HK$7.8 to 
U.S. $1.
A currency board regime combines three main characteristics. Firstly, that the 
exchange rate is fixed to an ‘anchor’ currency (although fixing to a basket of currencies 
would also appear to be feasible). Secondly, that of automatic convertibility, which provides 
the right to exchange domestic currency at the fixed rate whenever demanded. Finally, that 
the economy makes a long-term commitment to the system, which is usually laid-out in the 
central bank law.
There are essentially three differences between a pegged exchange rate and a currency 
board. Firstly, “in a currency board arrangement a given monetary aggregate (mostly reserve 
money) is fully covered by foreign exchange. This increases the credibility of the system 
because all outstanding liabilities can, on demand, be exchanged into the peg currency”14. 
Secondly, a currency board is a far more stringent arrangement than a pegged exchange rate, 
given the specified conditions laid-out in the central bank law. Outlining such procedures 
through parliamentary processes and public debates further enhances the credibility of the 
system due to the commitment and length of time that such processes reflect. Finally, an 
economy that has adopted a currency board cannot print money to enhance domestic liquidity 
or act as lender of last resort to financial enterprises, unless the authorities have excess 
reserves. Again this enhances credibility because there is no scope for the monetization of 
fiscal deficits or bank financing. Collectively these elements restrict the operations of an 
active central bank, which, in turn, enhances credibility and makes a distinct commitment to
14Ghosh et al. 2000. p.277.
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pursuing anti-inflationary policies. (Table 2, p. 149, compares a currency board regime to a 
typical central bank.)
The increased popularity of currency boards has essentially been in response to the 
problem of time inconsistency in monetary policies. Ghosh et al. state that: “This problem 
arises when the central bank is unable to pre-commit to a low rate of monetary growth and it 
imparts an inflationary bias to the economy (Barro and Gordon 1983). As noted by 
Cukierman (1992), the inflationary bias need not be due to an employment creation motive as 
in Barro and Gordon (1983), it may also reflect the desire to inflate away nominal debt or to 
improve the balance of payments. These last considerations are of greater importance to 
developing and emerging-market economies.”15 The introduction of a fixed exchange rate 
lowers anticipated and actual inflation in an economy, which was apparent in Russia 
following the adoption of the rouble corridor in 1995. But empirical evidence shows that 
currency boards have the most significant effect on reducing inflation. From 1975-96 
countries that adopted currency boards had an average annual rate of inflation of just 5.6%, 
pegged exchange rate regimes averaged 22.3% and countries operating floating exchange 
rates averaged 43.1%.16 The lower level of inflation of pegged exchange rates represents 
enhanced discipline on the part of the authorities because money growth is smaller and 
credibility is therefore improved.
However, Nouriel Roubini argues that pegging an economy’s exchange rate, and 
subordinating monetary policy, to the ‘anchor’ currency will not lead to an immediate 
convergence of inflation to the world level for at least three reasons: “[First,] purchasing 
power parity does not hold exactly in the short-run since domestic and foreign goods are not 
perfectly substitutable. So domestic firms will reduce the inflation rate when the exchange 
rate is pegged but may not push immediately down to the world level. [Secondly,] non­
tradable goods prices do not feel the same competitive pressures as tradable goods prices, 
thus inflation in the non-traded sector will fall only slowly. [Third,] since there is significant 
inertia in nominal wage growth, wage inflation might not fall right away to the world level. 
Many wage contracts are backward looking and the adjustment of wages will occur only 
slowly. Also, in countries where there is formal indexation of nominal wages, wage inflation 
is based on past (higher) inflation rather than current (lower) inflation; domestic inflation 
does not converge immediately to the world level when the exchange rate parity is fixed, a 
real appreciation will occur over time. This appreciation of the RER implies a loss of
15Ibid. p.279.
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competitiveness and the current account over time. Even small differentials between 
domestic and foreign inflation rates can compound rapidly into a substantial real 
appreciation”17. Roubini then uses the examples of Estonia and Lithuania, two transitional 
economies, which adopted currency boards in 1992 and 1994 respectively. Roubini claims 
that in both of these countries the change to a fixed exchange rate has been accompanied by a 
substantial appreciation of these countries currencies.
Irrespective of Roubini’s argument the basic problem of monetary policy time 
inconsistency will prevail. To counteract this problem and obtain longer-term credibility 
benefits, the costs of abandoning the currency board must remain high. This underlines the 
authorities pre commitment to anti-inflationary policies. The parliamentary processes and 
public debates make the transition to, and the adoption of a currency board, expensive. In 
turn, this increases the cost of exiting the system and thus improves the regime’s credibility. 
Currency boards can only maintain credibility providing the central bank maintains a 
sufficient quantity of foreign exchange reserves, which at least equal the appropriately 
defined domestic money supply. Market participants, therefore, know that each unit of 
domestic currency is matched by the equivalent quantity of the ‘anchor’ currency. This 
guarantee means that the demand for a currency board currency will be greater than the 
demand for currencies that do not provide such guarantees under their exchange rate regimes. 
This is because investors know that the currency board’s authorities will guarantee to 
exchange their liquid money into a major foreign currency upon demand.
If the currency board is tested, as in Hong Kong in October 1997, advocates argue 
that the systems’ automatic stabilisers will prevent destabilising volumes of capital outflows 
from leaving the economy. The automatic stabilisers of the currency board system work 
through changes in the economy’s money supply. For example, when the domestic currency 
is exchanged for the anchor currency the domestic money supply will contract accordingly. 
In turn, this will prompt interest rates to rise until they are sufficiently high, so that they 
encourage capital to return to the domestic economy.
However, a currency board is unable to adjust smoothly to exogenous shocks and the 
authorities are unable to intervene in the foreign exchange market to maintain the value of the 
currency. Therefore, the economy must suffer the real consequences (nominal wage and 
price adjustments) of the commitment to the monetary regime, for example, through the 
recession, high unemployment and financial distress experienced in Hong Kong throughout
,6Ibid. p.282.
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1998. The currency board’s adjustment mechanism is similar to that of a fixed exchange rate 
where interest rates are used to defend the value of the currency. But what is unique to the 
currency board is the guarantee that such a regime provides to market participants. Only 
when policy makers are unwilling to accept the real consequences of a testing of the system 
is there cause for currency speculation.
Despite currency boards’ recent successes in weathering volatile financial markets 
and enhancing monetary stability in numerous countries, some economists such as Nouriel 
Roubini contend that a country’s economic success has little to do with the adoption of a 
currency board but actually reflects macroeconomic and structural liberalisation policies that 
are consistent with maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Roubini argues that without such 
sound economic policies the currency board or fixed exchange rate would be jeopardised and 
a currency crisis and financial collapse would ensue. Therefore, he believes that 
implementing the correct economic policies for the economy means that there is no need to 
adopt a fixed exchange rate or currency board; an economy may perform well with or without 
one. But a more flexible exchange rate would allow the economy to adjust smoothly to 
exogenous shocks. However, Roubini admits that: “[There are] some marginal benefits of a 
currency board that one can point to: short-run credibility when you start from hyper-inflation 
(like in Argentina), stronger incentives not to monetize and run budget deficits under some 
conditions. But those are all results a country can achieve without a currency board and 
therefore avoid the other costs of having one.”18
Important considerations prior to the implementation of a currency board 
Currency boards require a strong legal and institutional infrastructure. Despite the fact that a 
currency board does appear to be a straightforward monetary regime, various decisions must 
be made regarding its particular features. In particular, the judicial conditions where central 
banking is conducted and the institutional infrastructure for the sound financial management 
of the economy. These time-consuming measures must be resolved, often in full public view 
(such as parliamentary debates), if the country is to maximise the credibility effects, which 
accompany the introduction of a currency board. Parliamentary debates enhance credibility 
because they illustrate widespread support for the currency board. This sends a clear signal 
to market participants that the economy is committed to the currency board. Conversely, a 
lack of political support may trigger self-fulfilling speculative attacks. Credibility is a vital 
part of a currency board arrangement, which means that a sound legal basis is essential for
l7Roubini, N. 1998.
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the sustainability of the system. Thus the country that introduces the currency board may 
wish to include some or all of the regime’s features of a currency board in central bank law. 
This may involve a definition of the exchange rate level, the volume of foreign reserves and a 
definition of the few capabilities that the authorities will possess.
The most obvious decision faced by a country considering the adoption of a currency 
board is the choice of the ‘anchor’ currency and at what level to fix the exchange rate to this 
currency. The most widely used criteria to determine which currency to adopt as the ‘anchor’ 
include the currency’s global usability and strength, but also the inflation level of the anchor 
currency’s country.
These considerations leave only a few currencies, which are used in the fourteen 
countries that currently operate currency boards. These include the U.S. dollar in ten 
countries, the Deutsche Mark in three countries and the Singapore dollar in one country. 
(Table 3, p. 150, outlines currency board countries.) But other considerations should include 
the country’s prevailing and prospective trading partners and other economic linkages such as 
financial ties between the country and the anchor currency country. If the economy has a 
number of major trading partner countries a basket of currencies would appear to be the most 
appropriate option. However, the countries that have so far adopted currency boards have 
simply chosen to peg to just one currency.
Determining the level at which the exchange rate is fixed would, according to Enoch 
and Guide, “appear straight-forward, given that a currency board arrangement by definition 
has to cover a monetary aggregate, usually the full amount of reserve money but sometimes 
narrower definitions of money. Yet the rate at which the central bank’s available 
international reserves cover the monetary aggregate in question varies depending on the exact 
definition of reserves used”19.
A healthy financial system is important for the successful operation of a currency 
board because the regime provides little scope for the authorities to act as ‘lender of last 
resort’ and rescue failing banks. The absence of a lender of last resort removes the potential 
for moral hazard, which is often evident in bail-out loans. But the authorities may be unable 
to prevent a temporary liquidity problem in the banking system, which could develop into a 
larger crisis. Indeed, the anticipated lower level of inflation associated with currency boards 
would be outweighed by a banking crisis. But, Ghosh et al. argue that: “Prearranged credit
18Ibid.
,9Enoch & Guide. 1998. p.43.
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lines with foreign lenders can be used to provide partial lender-of-last-resort functions.”20 
The country adopting the currency board may also decide to maintain a safety margin and 
hold excess foreign reserves of the base money supply, which could then be used to increase 
domestic liquidity. Transparency is essential to maintain credibility and, in turn, the 
sustainability of the currency board. Transparency and accountability were cited as reasons 
why Hong Kong successfully defended their currency board in October 1997. Adequate 
backing of base money by means of foreign reserves represents a strong commitment to the 
currency board.
The initial difficulty of collecting adequate foreign reserves to back the monetary base 
may deter many developing economies from establishing a currency board. However, there 
is an alternative option available to countries that do not have the available quantity of 
foreign reserves. Countries may opt for the untested ‘marginal currency board arrangement’. 
Under this regime only domestic money that has just been issued would be backed by foreign 
reserves. In the long-term, foreign reserve coverage could be built up to exceed the base 
money supply by the interest earned on the central bank’s foreign currency reserves.
The introduction of a currency board system requires clarification of the financial 
relationship between the government and the central bank. To recall, the commitment to the 
currency board reflects tight monetary policy. Hence the central bank is unable to monetize 
budget deficits because this is not consistent with maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Therefore, a currency board will force a government to rectify its deficit. Moreover, laws 
may also be introduced, to reduce real and anticipated inflation, by guaranteeing that the 
central bank will not finance government expenditures. Once again, transparency and 
openness is vital in maintaining the currency board. However, some countries operating 
currency boards continue to administer government accounts, but this would appear to 
jeopardise transparency. Additionally, as stated by Enoch and Guide: “Difficulties may arise 
from the fact that government deposits are callable at short notice, and consistency with 
currency board arrangement rules can be achieved only if such accounts are fully covered by 
foreign reserve holdings.”21 For the above reasons Hong Kong decided to increase the 
transparency and credibility of the economy’s currency board by moving all government 
accounts to commercial banks.
20Ghosh et al. 2000. p.296.
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Currency boards: costs and benefits
Benefits
Strictly enforced currency boards provide enhanced economic credibility, low inflation and 
low interest rates. The empirical evidence given by Ghosh et al. indicates that currency 
boards are more successful at controlling inflation than standard exchange rate pegs and far 
more successful than floating exchange rate regimes. Moreover, Ghosh et al. found that: 
“Growth performance has been better under currency boards than under either standard pegs 
or floating rates, an effect which is robust to allowing for fixed effects, and controlling for the 
rebound effects from the low pre-currency board growth rate ... [However,] modem currency 
boards have a short track record, and a fuller assessment, especially of the downside risks,
99must await the passage of time.” Moreover, currency boards appear to be an exceptionally 
versatile exchange rate regime having been adopted by a variety of countries facing various 
challenges from volatile terms of trade to a post-local war environment or transitional 
economies.
Costs
1. The most significant cost of adopting a currency board system is the restrictions that such 
an arrangement places on a country’s central bank, limiting the bank’s ability to act as ‘lender 
of last resort’. This can undermine the health of the financial sector. However, in a currency 
board country, the financial sector’s resilience can be enhanced by the introduction of a 
prudential framework, which could help to compensate for the absence of a lender of last 
resort. The introduction of firm regulatory and supervisional measures may improve the 
financial management of the banking sector. The following measures could strengthen the 
financial sector. Firstly, an increase in reserve requirement ratios, which would ensure banks 
maintain sufficient liquidity in relation to the bank’s potential requirement for liquidity. 
Moreover, liquidity requirements could be enhanced to complement reserve requirements. 
This liquidity is important because, as noted by Ghosh et al., “most assets - even treasury 
bills in deep markets - are less liquid than reserve requirements”23. Secondly, an increase in 
the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets would provide an additional safeguard against the 
potential for bankruptcy. Finally, the underestimation of exchange rate risks contributed to 
the meltdown of Asia’s banks. Therefore, restrictions may be placed on the volume of 
foreign currency-denominated borrowing and to encourage banks to maintain sufficient
21Enoch and Guide. 1998. p.42.
22Ghosh et al. 2000. p.294.
23Ibid. p.296.
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liquidity in the ‘anchor’ currency. Although the above measures will improve the strength of 
the financial sector, such criteria will impose significant costs on the banking sector including 
a reduction in profits. Therefore, these measures should be regarded as disadvantages that 
are specific costs associated with the adoption of a currency board rather than any other 
exchange rate regime24. Furthermore, maintaining a currency board in the face of 
destabilising speculative pressures results in significant economic costs, which may actually 
undermine the health of the strongest financial sectors. This is because of the way that the 
currency board regime reacts to changes in the money supply. In Hong Kong in October 
1997, capital outflows resulted in increased interest rates, which briefly touched 300% on 
overnight loans. The severe monetary contraction resulted in a domestic recession in 1998. 
The monetary tightening may cause banks to call in loans to domestic enterprises, which may 
go bankrupt in the process. This will damage the health of the financial sector and may even 
induce bankruptcies of domestic banks. In 1995, in the face of large-scale capital outflows, 
Argentina should have reduced the monetary base by the equivalent quantity of outflows. 
However, according to Nouriel Roubini, the authorities realised that to do so would be to 
trigger “a sharp contraction of bank loans and deposits and banking collapse; the monetary 
authorities [therefore] cheated: they cut the monetary base but then they significantly reduced 
the required reserve ratios of the banks to avoid a sharp fall in the money supply, loans and 
deposits”25.
2. Under a currency board arrangement, the authorities forego the ability to introduce 
active monetary policies because the currency board is completely passive to changes in 
monetary conditions. Therefore, the economies’ liquidity will be procyclical, which was 
apparent in Hong Kong. Prior to 1997, the economy was very healthy, capital was flowing in 
supplementing domestic liquidity, interest rates were low and growth was high. However, 
following the Asian crisis, capital began to leave Hong Kong, liquidity dried up, interest rates 
rose dramatically and GDP growth in 1998 was negative. Adherence to the currency board 
regime requires maintenance of the fixed exchange rate, meaning that the authorities cannot 
allow a depreciation of the regime in an attempt to drive economic growth. Thus, economic 
adjustment will occur through wage and price adjustments, which is a slower and more costly 
process.
3. Despite the expected lower levels of inflation, currency boards do not prevent an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and a subsequent loss of competitiveness. Indeed, the
24Ibid. p.297.
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appreciation of Hong Kong’s RER, between 1990 and 1997, was the highest appreciation in 
the Asian region, at just over 30%, twice the weight of average RER appreciations in Asia.26 
The RER will appreciate when the level of inflation in the economy is above the world level 
for a prolonged period of time. Moreover, under a currency board the central bank is unable 
to sterilise the inflows of foreign capital, which may well make the task of managing capital 
flows even harder. When capital flows into the country, the authorities are unable to offset 
the increased demand for the domestic currency by sterilising the capital inflows. This may 
result in excessive monetary growth, which may lead to overheating and higher inflation. 
Conversely, when capital leaves the economy, the outflows may significantly reduce the 
monetary base and interest rates will increase, in turn, reducing economic activity.
A number of commentators (most notably the currency speculator George Soros prior 
to the August 1998 devaluation) proposed that Russia should adopt a currency board system 
to enhance economic credibility and control inflation. But this option was rejected. Firstly, 
this was because Russia had reduced inflation substantially since 1995. Secondly, Russia has 
for many years exhibited large volumes of capital flight. Under a currency board 
arrangement capital outflows would reduce the money supply and increase interest rates 
dramatically, which would have had a devastating effect on Russia’s fragile banking system 
and weak economy. Moreover the former European Union monetary affairs commissioner, 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy, argued that three required conditions for the successful 
implementation of the currency board were not fulfilled by Russia. ‘These were adequate 
hard currency reserves, a ‘credible and sound’ economic programme to inspire market 
confidence, and a sufficient well-established domestic banking system”27. Furthermore, to 
maximise the credibility effects of a currency board arrangement, the time-consuming 
implementation of required legal and institutional changes must take place, which confirms 
the country’s commitment to the currency board. But if a currency board had been 
implemented in Russia in response to the looming crisis the legal and administration 
processes would have been rushed in an effort to obtain the credibility benefits of the 
currency board. This hasty response may well have undermined the country’s commitment 
to the currency board because the policy makers would have appeared to have been seeking a 
quick fix to Russia’s economic difficulties.
“ Roubini, N. 1998.
26Ibid.
27Blandinieres, J. P. 1999. p.7.
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Enoch and Guide believe that: “[The above prerequisites] to establishing a currency 
board may, in many cases, be too involved and take too much time to make it advisable for a 
country to attempt to do so during a macroeconomic crisis.”28 
Longer-run considerations
Some economists consider currency boards to be a permanent method of achieving monetary 
stability. But, I believe that currency boards should only be considered as a medium-term 
arrangement that enables a developing country to achieve a consistent record of monetary 
stability. Bulgaria has achieved stabilisation following the introduction of a currency board 
in response to hyperinflation, unrestrained central bank lending to banks and excessively high 
interest rates on government debt. The results have been striking. (Table 4, p. 151, illustrates 
Bulgaria’s experience before and after the adoption of a currency board.) This track record, 
therefore, improves the country’s hold on investor confidence making the transition to a 
flexible regime less hazardous. Developing economies are likely to benefit greatly from the 
increased credibility that a currency board provides. Flexible exchange rates are rarely 
appropriate for developing countries because they are rarely considered to pursue sound 
macroeconomic policies. For many developing economies floating regimes may be 
inoperable without restrictions on capital mobility. But a currency board would improve 
credibility and enable the country’s capital account to remain open. Moreover, the 
‘confidence effect’ of a currency board arrangement would reduce risk premiums and, the 
regime, may also strengthen the economy’s financial sector. This then prepares the country 
for the transition, to what is often considered to be the ultimate goal, of a floating exchange 
rate and independent monetary policy.
A rapid shift from a currency board to a flexible exchange rate may risk a significant 
depreciation of the currency value, which may bankrupt financial intermediaries that possess 
significant exchange rate exposures. However, this swift approach would alleviate the 
potential for a run on the currency that may take place under a more gradual transition. The 
slower approach would change the currency board to a straightforward pegged exchange rate, 
which has been the chosen method of exit by classical currency board economies. Ghosh et 
al. stated that: “Available records do not suggest that exits from currency boards to pegs were 
accompanied by panics, suggesting that the credibility difference between a locally operated 
peg and an externally administered board was in fact perceived to be quite small.”29 
However, the authors acknowledge that the classic exits took place “in the euphoria of
28Enoch and Guide. 1998. p.43.
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national independence, and against a background of decades of stability, and of much smaller 
international capital flows.” But, to date, no modem currency board economy has began the 
transition to an alternative regime, although, Argentina has been considering various exit 
strategies, including that of dollarization.
Striking economic achievements have been realised in many of the countries, which 
have adopted currency boards. Lower inflation (than that achieved by pegged or floating 
regimes) and reduced expectations of future inflation even after prolonged hyperinflation 
appear to be the most immediate benefits of adopting a currency board. Moreover, according 
to Ghosh et al., the better inflation performance has not been at the expense of lower GDP 
growth. They have found that currency board countries output growth has surpassed growth 
under pegged or floating exchange rate regimes. Further benefits include a greater incentive 
not to mn or monetize budget deficits.
But, when a currency board economy is struck by exogenous shocks the effects on 
real economic activity can be devastating as the money supply tightens and interest rates rise, 
which in turn, increases unemployment and jeopardises the health of the banking system.
Yet the credibility benefits that accompany currency boards can, according to 
Roubini, be achieved through sound economic policies implemented over a number of years. 
Prudent macroeconomic policies and a more flexible exchange rate would allow the economy 
to adjust more smoothly to exogenous disturbances rather than suffering the real 
consequences of the currency board’s self-adjusting mechanism. However, it appears that the 
adoption of a currency board is by far the quickest method of improving a country’s 
economic credibility.
Performance of the macroeconomv under the various exchange rate regimes 
Currency boards and fixed exchange rates have a significant effect on reducing inflation in 
comparison with floating exchange rates. Countries that have adopted currency boards 
between 1975 and 1996, according to Ghosh et al., have averaged an inflation level of 5.6% 
per year, countries that operate pegged exchange rates averaged 22.3% per year and those 
economies who administer a floating regime averaged 43.1% per year. Moreover, Ghosh et 
al. believe that: “The better inflation performance does not come at the cost of lower overall 
or per capita growth; countries under currency boards outgrew both pegged and floating rate 
economies, the difference widens once time effects are taken into account. In interpreting 
this finding it must be borne in mind, however, that most modem currency board
29Ghosh et al. 2000. p.275.
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arrangements came into existence in the aftermath of economic crisis. As such, currency 
boards may have benefited from an initial period of ‘soft growth’ as output rebounded to pre­
crisis levels.”30 Caramassa et al. argue that: “Evidence also suggests that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, misalignments and currency ‘crashes’ are equally likely under pegged 
and flexible exchange rate regimes.”31
5.v. Dollarization
The dramatic surge in international capital flows has been accompanied by an increased 
frequency of financial crises, which have cast major doubts on the sustainability of exchange 
rate commitments. Additionally, floating regimes are unsuitable for many emerging markets 
due to potentially destabilising fluctuations in the exchange rate. Such conclusions have led 
analysts to conclude that only extreme measures, such as currency boards are sustainable for 
emerging markets in today’s volatile international capital markets. But more recently another 
alternative has emerged, which involves eliminating the use of the domestic currency and 
adopting the U.S. dollar (or another stable internationally recognised currency) as the 
country’s legal tender. This is known as dollarization and was introduced in Ecuador in late 
2000, in response to the authorities inability to curb pressures on the domestic currency and a 
loss of confidence in the government’s economic policy.
The closest regime to dollarization is a currency board system where the authorities 
guarantee to convert domestic currency into the ‘anchor’ currency at the fixed rate and the 
monetary authorities hold ‘anchor’ currency reserves which often exceed the entire national 
money supply. Under a currency board the authorities forego the ability to increase the base 
money supply, meaning that there is also no lender of last resort. However, the most notable 
difference is that dollarizing an economy will incur the loss of seigniorage revenues for the 
government and this would be a permanent loss. These revenues are received from the 
government’s ability to issue currency and are derived, according to Berg and Borensztein, 
from the “difference between the cost of producing and distributing paper money and coins 
and their (greater) purchasing power. The central bank can use currency, which does not bear 
interest, to purchase interest bearing assets, such as foreign reserves. These seigniorage 
revenues show up as central bank profits and are transferred to the government”32. A 
currency board is often viewed as a temporary arrangement to improve credibility.
30Ibid. p.282.
31Caramazza & Aziz. 1998.
32Berg and Borensztein. 2000. p.39.
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Dollarization, however, is likely to be an almost irreversible process and this substantially 
enhances credibility.
The key reasons for a country to abolish their national currency and impose the U.S. 
dollar as legal tender are that dollarization will enable the country to avoid balance of 
payments and currency crises. The abolition of the domestic currency means that the country 
will no longer be vulnerable to sudden capital outflows motivated by fears of devaluation. 
The consistency of the exchange rate following dollarization will reassure investors that the 
value of their investments will be maintained and this helps to eliminate much of the potential 
for a financial panic. Dollarization has other benefits including a closer economic integration 
with the U.S. and the global economy due to the lower transaction costs and guaranteed price 
stability that dollarization brings. Consequently, dollarization may actually promote 
additional trade ties with the U.S.. Furthermore, dollarization eliminates the possibility of the 
monetization of federal deficits, reducing inflationary impulses and providing an environment 
that promotes a strong financial sector, due to the absence of a ‘lender of last resort’. Alesina 
and Barro argue that: “For many developing countries, dollarization provides a much better 
commitment device than alternative forms of fixed exchange rates.” This is because 
adopting another currency, or creating a currency union with a new currency, makes the costs 
of abandoning the regime extremely high. This provides far greater credibility to the regime 
than a standard currency peg. Many developing countries also lack a firm commitment to 
monetary policies that are consistent with price stability.
However, the elimination of the national currency may be met with reluctance to 
forego a country’s national economic symbol and, more importantly, dollarization would 
eliminate seigniorage revenues for the government. Dollarized countries would forego 
seigniorage revenues and the only way they could obtain such revenues would be if the the 
U.S. were to share a proportion of the extra seigniorage it would obtain from the dollarization 
of other countries. Seigniorage losses in dollarization can be significant. Dollarization 
requires the purchase of domestic currency held by the public and banks with dollars from the 
economy’s stock of foreign reserves or with borrowed capital. Additional seigniorage 
revenues are forgone because new currency is not printed each year to meet the increased 
demand for money. In Argentina, the domestic currency in circulation amounts to 
approximately $15 billion (5% of GDP) and the recent annual increase in demand for the 
domestic currency has averaged approximately $1 billion (0.3% of GDP). Berg and
33Alesina and Barro. 2001. p.382.
143
Borensztein argue that around $0.7 billion (0.2% of GDP) would be lost annually on the 
existing stock of currency if dollarization were implemented. As money demand increases 
the quantity of lost interest earnings would also grow. “Argentina’s seigniorage loss would 
be the United States’ gain”34. Therefore, the authors propose that the U.S. should share the 
additional seigniorage revenues, which the country derives from emerging markets becoming 
dollarized. The revenues should be distributed in accordance with an agreed formula in a 
similar vein to the euro region. But Rudi Dombusch argues that: ‘There is an important 
offset to the loss of seigniorage from the reduction in public debt service costs that result 
from reduced interest rates. This factor is surely far more significant than the 1% or so of 
GDP in seigniorage loss.”35 Furthermore, as noted above, dollarization would tie the hands 
of the country’s monetary and exchange rate policy makers, leaving only fiscal policy 
available as a policy tool to the authorities. Hence, dollarization and the authorities inability 
to use monetary policy largely places the country’s prospects for economic growth in the 
hands of U.S. policy makers. Nevertheless, a country can counteract the absence of a lender 
of last resort by establishing external lines of credit, which could be drawn upon in the event 
of a crisis. Moreover, dollarization may reduce the possibility of bank runs because it is 
unlikely, in a dollarized economy, that there will be a significant mismatch of foreign 
currencies on the banks’ balance sheets. Thus, dollarization may improve the credibility of 
the domestic banking system. Dollarization is also likely to involve an increased role of 
foreign banks in the domestic economy, which would promote sound banking practices.
The countries that are likely to benefit most from dollarizing their economies are 
those that enjoy strong trade and financial integration with the U.S., or, alternatively, 
emerging markets that do not enjoy particularly strong ties with the U.S. but do exhibit partial 
or widespread use of dollarization in domestic goods and financial markets. For such 
economies the benefits of dollarization will be greater and the advantages of keeping their 
national currencies smaller. Additionally, economies which use the dollar extensively in 
domestic transactions would have low seigniorage revenues and the cost of buying back the 
existing stock of domestic currency would be small. Moreover, countries whose financial 
and corporate sectors have substantial dollar debts and also exhibit wage and price stickiness, 
in dollar terms, may have more to gain than to lose by dollarizing their economy. Wage and 
price stickiness and large exchange rate exposures indicate that an exchange rate devaluation 
will not serve as a useful policy tool.
34Ibid. p.40.
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Dollarization: reduced risk and its limitations
The most notable advantage of dollarization is the reduction of currency risks, which, in turn, 
reduces interest rates, thereby increasing investment, economic growth and resulting in a 
lower cost of servicing public debt. The inability of the dollarized country to devalue the 
dollar reduces the overall risk of a debt default, e.g. the Asian devaluations raised the burden 
of dollar-denominated debts and increased the possibility of financial sector bankruptcies due 
to such exchange rate exposures. But sovereign debt defaults can still occur as a result of an 
unsustainable federal budget deficit or a volatile political environment. Therefore, when an 
economy is experiencing market volatility, investors may re-call their loans due to the greater 
perceived risk of default. Thus, dollarized countries are still vulnerable to an adverse turn in 
investor sentiment, but speculative attacks and currency contagion would be avoided.
Opponents to dollarization have argued that dollarization removes the potential for 
stimulating domestic demand through currency devaluations. But, while devaluations are 
considered to be expansionary by advanced economies, such as the devaluation of the British 
pound in 1992, in emerging markets they often induce acute economic pain. True, exports 
are made more competitive and the current account balance will improve, but the banking 
sector and private companies, as in Asia, may be saddled with considerable foreign currency- 
denominated loans. Hence a devaluation may bankrupt banks and companies owing to their 
exchange rate exposure. This suggests that dollarization would not restrict an inherently 
useful policy tool to developing countries. (A discussion on the different perceptions of 
advanced and developing country devaluations will follow in Chapter 6.)
A further disadvantage of dollarization is the potential for exchange rate 
overvaluation, which occurred in Asia and was reflected in deteriorating current account 
balances. Under a dollarized economy real exchange rate overvaluation can occur through 
excessive wage increases or a deterioration in the terms of trade. A flexible exchange rate 
would allow economies to adjust smoothly to such shocks but with dollarization, or a 
currency board regime, the real devaluation has to be achieved through a reduction in 
nominal prices and wages. However, evidence indicates that there is strong resistance to 
such wage and price reductions.
To recall, dollarization appears to be an irreversible process meaning that there may 
be no escape from such economic consequences. Currency boards, on the other hand, can be 
abandoned if the pain of economic adjustment is too great. Indeed, Blandinieres argues that:
35Dombusch, R. 2001. p.239.
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“One reason why every fixed exchange rate regime since (and including) the gold standard 
has ultimately broken down is because over time, differences in productivity growth rates 
between countries need to be reflected in changes in relative prices and allocation of 
resources between the traded and non-traded good sectors. If a country is dollarized, the 
development process will be distorted from what it would be if the relative price in these 
sectors was allowed to evolve according to its own trajectory appropriate for that stage of 
development.”36
Dollarization is a new phenomenon, which is difficult to appraise due to the absence 
of evidence and experience on the subject. Paul Krugman believes that: “[Ecuador’s] 
experience is likely to have a disproportionate effect on how the next [financial] crisis is 
handled.”37
5.vi. An Asian currency union?
The Asian financial crisis brought the Asian region together. This has driven talk of a 
regional currency union comprising the countries of Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) plus the region’s three larger northern neighbours, Japan, South Korea and China. 
An Asian currency union would integrate a third of the world’s population and in 1999 the 
combined GDP amounted to $7 trillion.38 This would make the Asian region a challenger to 
the supremacy of the U.S. and the countries of the E.U. The Asian currency union should 
also increase the economic and political stability of the Asian region. Most analysts believe 
that the currency of the union would be the Japanese yen, which has lost global prominence 
since the introduction of the euro in 1999. In a November 1999 summit, ‘ASEAN-plus- 
three,’ agreed to accelerate the removal of tariff barriers reflecting their commitment to an 
Asian free trade zone. The accession of China into the World Trade Organisation will 
improve the economy’s competitiveness and make the country more receptive to investment 
from its regional neighbours. Indeed, Japan and South Korea would increase their (already 
substantial) foreign investment in the Asian region should the single ASEAN market be 
adopted. Yet, South East Asia possesses one of the world’s greatest potential flashpoints in 
the Taiwan straits, where China has threatened to invade Taiwan if the country declares 
independence from the mainland. But other tensions still remain. As noted by the 
Economist: “For South-east Asian countries that have been variously colonised, invaded or 
pushed around by China or Japan in the past, the prospect of either country extending its
36Blandinieres, J. P. 1999. p.8.
37Krugman, P. 2000b.
38The Economist. South East Asia Survey. 12 February 2000. p. 16.
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influence in the region is a highly sensitive issue.”39 Consequently, an Asian currency union 
is unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future.
5.vii. Conclusion
The integration of global capital markets requires stringent macroeconomic discipline by 
developing countries’ policy makers, which must be consistent with the objectives of the 
country. Massive and highly mobile international capital flows mean that countries cannot 
peg or fix their exchange rates and maintain an independent monetary policy. In the light of 
recent experience a new consensus has developed, which advocates that countries must 
choose between the credibility and stability of a rigidly fixed regime (such as a currency 
board or even dollarization) or the autonomy over monetary policy provided by a freely 
floating exchange rates.
A floating exchange rate will allow an economy to adjust smoothly through the 
exchange rate to exogenous shocks. In contrast, under a fixed currency domestic wages and 
prices will be forced to adjust, which may only be achieved through a recession. However, a 
floating exchange rate regime could prove devastating for small developing economies. 
Furthermore, flexible exchange rates have had the highest levels of inflation, which can 
undermine investors’ confidence. To counteract this, the country’s central bank should be 
autonomous, which may improve the policy-makers’ commitment to fighting inflation. Prior 
to the Asian and Russian financial crises analysts believed that the limited flexibility 
approach was a good compromise. However, these crises proved that such a belief was 
mistaken. Even if the current choice of exchange rate regimes has been reduced to a choice 
between fixed or floating, academics still disagree. For example, Jeffrey Sachs favours 
floating regimes (with the exception noted earlier), arguing that it is simply not worth 
restricting growth by the implementation of tight monetary policy in order to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate and investor confidence. In contrast, Rudi Dombusch is adamant that a 
currency board regime is the best option for emerging markets.
Flexible exchange rate regimes are far more appropriate and consistent with the free 
flow of international capital. True, excessive volatility could cause emerging markets serious 
economic pain, but flows of short-term capital can be discouraged by the implementation of 
selective capital controls. This would help to minimise exchange rate volatility while 
providing time for the authorities to strengthen economic fundamentals, such as the banking 
sector. The Chinese currency, the renminbi, was insulated from the Asian crisis as a result of
39Ibid. p. 17.
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the country’s gradual approach to capital account liberalisation and restrictions on financial 
transactions. While such capital controls may induce corrupt practices by officials and 
restrict peoples’ economic freedom, I believe that they are a favourable alternative to 
excessive inflows and outflows of capital, which may precipitate devastating financial crises.
Greater exchange rate flexibility allowed Taiwan and Singapore to weather the Asian 
crisis far better than Hong Kong’s rigid currency board arrangement. Taiwan and Singapore 
allowed a moderate depreciation of their currencies and both countries continued to enjoy 
positive growth in 1998. In contrast, Hong Kong suffered a severe recession, which saw the 
economy contract by 10.4%. While maintaining the Hong Kong dollar’s fixed value was 
undoubtedly the correct choice, the currency board’s economic costs were clearly illustrated 
in Hong Kong. In my opinion, these costs far exceed the mechanism’s shorter-term benefits 
of increased credibility. Flexible exchange rates will not avoid currency or financial crises, 
but I believe that they will provide a softer landing. Indeed, the World Bank has stated that 
over the past thirty years flexible exchange rates have been subjected to more crises than 
fixed exchange rates, though the bank itself admits that fixed exchange rate crises have been 
more severe.40 And this fact may explain the global trend towards greater exchange rate 
flexibility since the 1970s.
Dollarization will have a number of obvious effects on the economy, which will 
include a loss of seigniorage revenues while bringing the benefit of lower interest rates. The 
absence of a dollarization exit option is a considerable disadvantage of the regime because 
the pain of adjustment may become too great. But if dollarization is successful it will 
encourage other developing countries, to follow suit. Indeed, Alesina and Barro believe that 
in the course of the next few decades we will see a transition toward a world in which the 
number of countries greatly exceeds the number of the world’s currencies.41 Moreover, in 
the event of a future emerging market crisis it may inspire policy makers to respond by the 
abolishing the domestic currency. But if Ecuador’s experiment is a failure, dollarization may 
be revoked as a possible policy alternative in response to currency or financial crises.
The Economist argues that: “The best guess at the moment is that emerging markets 
will divide into two groups: those with flexible exchange rates and a relatively low level of 
integration into global capital markets; and those that bind tightly through currency boards or 
currency unions, and as a result have heavily integrated financial systems with strong foreign 
ownership ... Different countries will have taken different routes to achieving the ‘impossible
40The Economist. Global Finance Survey. 30 January 1999. p. 18.
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trinity’ of integration, regulation and sovereignty. Those in regional unions will have given 
up sovereignty for integration; those with floating rates will have maintained sovereignty, but 
often at the cost of restricting integration with the rest of the world.”42
41 Alesina and Barro. 2001. p.384.
42Ibid. p.21.
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Table 1. Developing countries: officially reported exchange rate arrangements 1976-
1996 % of total
‘76 ‘81 ‘86 ‘91 ‘96
Pegged 86 75 67 57 45
U.S dollar 42 32 25 19 15
French franc 13 12 11 11 11
Other 7 4 4 3 4
SDR 12 13 8 5 2
Composite 12 14 18 20 14
Limited
Flexibility 3 10 5 4 3
Single 3 10 5 4 3
Cooperative - - - - -
More
Flexible 11 15 28 39 52
Set to 
Indicators 6 3 4 4 0.2
Managed
floating 4 9 13 16 21
Independent
Float 1 4 11 19 29
No. of 
Countries 100 113 119 123 123
Source: Edwarc s and Savastano. 1999. p.9.
Table 2. Currency board regime versus typical central bank
Currency Board Regime Typical Central Bank
1. Maintains a fixed exchange rate with the 
anchor currency.
Maintains a pegged or floating exchange 
rate.
2. Holds foreign reserves of 100% or more 
of base money or currency in circulation.
Holdings of foreign reserves not based on 
any rules.
3. Has full convertibility of its currency; it 
passively exchanges its liabilities for reserve 
currency at a fixed exchange rate without 
limit.
Convertibility of currency is a policy 
decision.
4. Unable to pursue an independent 
monetary policy. Cannot engage in 
sterilised intervention.
Ability to pursue discretionary monetary 
policy.
5. Since it cannot create credit, it cannot be 
a lender of last resort for the government, 
nor the banking sector.
Fulfils a lender of last resort role.
Source: Blandinieres, J. P. 1999. p5.
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Table 3. Currency boards in operation
Country Years in Operation Peg Currency Special Features
Antigua and 
Barbuda
35 U.S.dollar Member of ECCB
Argentina 9 U.S.dollar
One-third of 
coverage can be in 
U.S.dollar 
denominated bonds
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 4 Deutsche mark
Brunei Darussalam 33 Singapore dollar
Bulgaria 4 Deutsche mark
Excess coverage in 
banking department 
to deal with banking 
sector weaknesses
Djibouti 51 U.S. dollar
Changed peg 
currency from 
French france to U.S 
dollar
Dominica 35 U.S. dollar Member of ECCB
Estonia 9 Deutsche mark
Excess coverage for 
domestic monetary 
interventions.
Grenada 35 U.S. dollar Member of ECCB
Hong Kong SAR 17 U.S. dollar
Lithuania 7 U.S. dollar
Central bank has the 
right to appreciate 
the exchange rate
St. Kitts and Nevis 35 U.S. dollar Member of ECCB
St. Lucia 35 U.S. dollar Member of ECCB
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 35 U.S. dollar Member of ECCB
ECCB (East Caribbean Central Bank). 
Source: Enoch and Guide. 1998. p.40.
151
Table 4. Macroeconomic indicators before and after Bulgaria’s adoption of a currency
board 1995-1998
‘95 ‘96 ’97 Q1 ‘97 ‘98
Real GDP 
Growth 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5
Inflation* 32.9 310.8 2,040.4 578.5 1
Fiscal 
Balance % 
of GDP
-6.4 -13.4 -52.1 -2.1 1.3
Bank 
Financing of 
Fiscal 
Balance
4.9 14.5 40.7 -3.2 -0.3
Growth in 
Reserve 
Money
50.5 92.4 780 780 9.8*
Growth in 
real broad 
money
5.1 -45.4 -75.3 -32.3 2.8
BNB credits 
to banks (% 
change in 
monetary 
. liabilities
-7.8 122.4 67.5 4.5 -36.6
Foreign 
reserves# ($ 
million)
1,546.0 781.0 826.0 2,474.0 3,056.0
In months of 
imports
2.9 1.6 1.7 5.1 6.1
Nominal 
interest rate
differential*
*
19.4 116.6 128.6 0.03 0.38
Exchange
Rate
Lev/U.S$
70.7 487.4 1,021.9 1,776.5 1,675.1
Exchange
Rate
lev/Deutsche
mark.
49.3 313.4 946.9 1,000.0 1,000.0
*12 month change, end of period. # including gold. ** End of year differential between 
three month deposit rates in Bulgaria and Germany. - data not available. BNB (Bulgarian 
National Bank).
Source: Guide. 1999. p.39.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CONTROVERSIAL ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 
Background
The Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997-98 threw the IMF into the international 
spotlight. The IMF is the world’s most powerful financial organisation, receiving the 
majority of contributions from U.S. taxpayers, its headquarters is in Washington. Financial 
assistance from the IMF was accompanied by conditions, which overstretched the Fund’s 
expertise. The Fund’s ‘conditionality’ approach was heavily criticised and aggravated Asia’s 
financial crisis. The Fund has also suffered criticism because its ‘bail-out’ loans have 
arguably induced worldwide moral hazard. My analysis of the IMF’s performance during the 
recent bout of financial crises indicates that the Fund has been trying to do too much. To be 
more effective its objectives must be reduced.
The IMF ‘bail-out* loans 
On August the 20th 1997, just over a month after Thailand had allowed the baht to float, a 
thirty-four month $17.2 billion standby arrangement was approved by the IMF Board to 
assist Thailand with policy reforms. Yet the U.S. Failed to contribute to the financial 
package. Just over two months later, on October 31st, Indonesia signed for a $40 billion 
package to be disbursed over the course of thirty-six months. Korea was the next recipient of 
an IMF brokered package on December 4th 1997, amounting to $57 billion. (Table 1, p. 175, 
illustrates financial contributors.) The implementation of these financial packages, together 
with the Philippines’ previously pledged assistance programme, meant that four out of the 
five worst hit Asian economies were under the guidance of the IMF. Only Malaysia rejected 
the possibility of IMF assistance, preferring, instead, to insulate the economy by adopting 
capital controls. Russia also received a $22 billion financial package from the IMF prior to 
the country’s default in August 1998.
Prior to the crises in 1997, the IMF enjoyed a strong influence over the development 
policy of Russia and the Asian countries. Thus criticisms of the Fund are not solely 
concerned with the disbursement of ‘bail-out’ loans and their accompanying demands.
6.i. Indiscriminant capital account liberalisation 
The IMF pushed for the liberalisation of Asian and Russian capital accounts before 
regulatory measures had been developed. This premature liberalisation of capital accounts 
contradicts Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty, which outlines the European Union’s 
criterion for development assistance, assuring the community will work towards “the smooth
1 ne controversial Koie or tne international Monetary Jhund.
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and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy”1. But the 
liberalisation of developing countries’ capital accounts has left these economies, which lack 
experience of regulating capital flows, vulnerable to excessive inflows and outflows of 
foreign capital.
Before 1992, the Thai economy was highly regulated. Domestic savings financed 
much of investment, which was supplemented by FDI, and the economy was largely 
insulated from destabilising short-term capital flows. But in 1992 extensive deregulatory 
measures were encouraged by the IMF. Measures included an expansion of banks’ and other 
financial intermediaries’ activities together with looser criteria on capital adequacy levels, the 
elimination of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and a reduced level of control on 
the portfolio management of banks and financial intermediaries. Most significantly, in 1993, 
Thailand established the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), which allowed Thai 
investors to borrow at lower foreign interest rates in offshore markets. (The BIBF was 
discussed in Chapter 1.) The combination of the extensively liberalised capital account and 
the pegged exchange rate regime attracted vast quantities of capital inflows to Thailand over 
a short period of time, a country which had no previous experience of regulating such 
inflows. The majority of foreign capital entering Thailand was channelled through dollar 
loans and amounted to approximately $50 billion between 1993 and 1996. The liberalisation 
of the Thai stock exchange increased portfolio investment dramatically and in late 1996 there 
was around $24 billion in ‘hot money’ deposited in stocks, corporate paper or in non-resident 
bank accounts. Walden Bello of the University of the Philippines argued that: “What both 
the IMF and its Thai pupils failed to foresee was that while the liberalised capital account 
would be the conduit for huge capital inflows when there was confidence in the country, it 
would also be the wide highway through which capital would flee at the slightest sign of 
trouble.”2 Further criticism was attributed to the Fund and the World Bank because neither 
institution managed to foresee the Asian crisis. The Fund was still praising Thailand’s 
“consistent record of sound macroeconomic management policies”3 in late 1996. Thailand’s 
external debt snowballed from $21 billion in 1988 to $55 billion in 1994 to $89 billion by 
1996, yet the IMF was not overly concerned because 80% of Thailand’s debt was held by the 
private sector. The World Bank in 1994, at the height of capital inflows to Thailand, 
commented in its annual report that: “Thailand provides an excellent example of the
'Bullard etal. 1998. p.29.
2Bello, W. 1998b.
3Ibid.
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dividends to be obtained through outward orientation, receptivity to foreign investment, and a 
market friendly philosophy backed up by conservative macroeconomic management and 
cautious external borrowing policies.”4
Criticism of IMF policy towards Russia has been focused on the failure of the 
country’s economic reforms, which were advocated by both the IMF and Western 
governments. Boris Kargarlitsky, one of the State Duma’s chief economic advisers, lamented 
that: “[The August 1998 devaluation] marked the definitive failure of the key strategies that 
the IMF and major world governments had urged on Moscow throughout much of the 1990s 
. . .A great deal of blame lies with the IMF. Not only did the IMF encourage the Russian 
leaders in the illusion that squashing inflation would automatically lead to growth, but IMF 
spokespeople also fed the misconception that if things went wrong, there’d be plenty of 
money in the world financial system to bail the Russians out.”5 However, the former 
managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, argued that: “What Asian countries, 
Russia and too many other countries did not do was build sound financial systems quickly 
enough and give attention to the proper phasing and sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation. Their ‘disorderly’ liberalisation now threatens to give liberalisation itself an 
undeserved bad reputation.”6
The Asian financial crisis caused a slump in the price of global commodities, which 
hit the currencies of commodity producing countries such as Australia, Canada, Mexico and 
Chile. At this stage Russia largely avoided a financial crisis thanks to prearranged assurances 
of IMF financial assistance and strong demand for Russian GKOs. But in the spring and 
summer of 1998 the IMF’s commitment to Russia was tested by the emergence of the 
country’s first post-communist trade deficit and the prolonged existence of a large federal 
budget deficit. Prior to the August 1998 default, the IMF announced a $22 billion package 
for Russia, but the fiscal situation in Russia was so delicate that the market decided that the 
package was not substantial enough to prevent a crisis.
6.ii. Objectives of the Asian ‘bail-out* loans 
The IMF assistance to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea were phased. Not all of the 
money was available at the outset of the crisis and was, therefore, unable to counteract 
market pressures at this time. The financial assistance was provided in tranches. This helps 
to ensure that the countries have an incentive to adhere to the conditions agreed prior to the
4Ibid.
5Kagarlitsky, B. 1998a.
6Camdessus, M. 1998.
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granting of IMF assistance. The initial goal of the IMF packages was to impress the market 
and convince foreign investors to maintain or even extend their credit lines to these countries. 
Yet Korea endured vast capital outflows during the first three weeks of its reform programme 
and default was only avoided by a last minute agreement to reschedule short-term debt.
The financial packages which were granted to the countries of Thailand, Indonesia 
and South Korea had nine key goals: (1). Prevent a default on foreign obligations. (2). 
Limit the extent of currency devaluations. (3). Maintain a fiscal balance. (4). Limit the 
increase in inflation. (5). Replenish foreign exchange reserves. (6). Reform of the banking 
sector. (7). Eliminate monopoly practices and reform the domestic, non-financial, economy. 
(8). Preserve investor confidence and creditworthiness. (9). Minimise the reduction in 
output.7 The attainment of these goals was based on six major policy measures:
1. Prevention of outright default.
With the IMF deal in Korea, creditor governments forced Korean private banks to 
guarantee the repayment of bad debts to private banks in the U.S., Europe and Japan backed 
by the Fund’s ‘bail-out’ loans. Korean taxpayers, therefore, paid taxes amounting to billions 
of dollars to enable the government to make good the bad private loans. Understandably, 
East Asians felt aggrieved by such treatment. “While squeezing local businesses, the IMF 
programmes are serving as a safety net for the big Japanese, European and American banks 
that have made irresponsible lending decisions ... We are not asking for the IMF to bail out 
our firms, we are simply asking for a sharing of the market’s punishment for making the 
wrong decisions”8. One of the Asian countries key fundamental weaknesses was the fact that 
foreign currency-denominated short-term loans exceeded foreign exchange reserves in all of 
the worst hit crisis countries. The IMF has, therefore, recommended that countries maintain 
adequate levels of foreign exchange reserves. Indeed, foreign exchange reserves increased in 
South Korea from $21.1 billion in December 1997 to $61.3 billion in May 1999, in Thailand 
from $26.2 billion in December 1997 to $30.7 billion in June 1999, and in Indonesia from 
$18.9 billion in October 1997 to $26.3 billion in June 1999.9
2. To minimise currency depreciation and inflation.
In response to capital outflows interest rates inevitably rose, but the IMF demanded 
additional increases in interest rates in an effort to minimise the extent of currency 
depreciations and the increase in inflation through imports. This action suggests that higher
7Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.41.
8Bello, W. 1998b.
9The Economist. 14 February 1998 & 28 August 1999.
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rates of interest will lead to either currency stability or currency appreciation and that the 
benefits of currency stability exceed the short-term costs of a reduction in output. However, 
the higher interest rates did not significantly reduce currency depreciations and actually 
worsened the magnitude of the crisis by causing corporate and banking sector bankruptcies 
due to the economies’ declining level of economic activity. Korea, for instance, has one of 
the world’s highest levels of savings, yet the IMF demanded that interest rates be increased. 
They reached 30% in early 1998; at the same time inflation was only about 5%. This 
amounted to a real interest rate of 25%, which put many of Korea’s companies at risk of 
bankruptcy.10
However, it must be acknowledged that a loose monetary policy at the early stage of 
the crises may not have limited the depreciation of the currency and a further depreciation 
would have increased the burden of foreign currency-denominated debt. Thus, the IMF 
argues, an expansionary monetary policy would have had a devastating effect on companies 
and financial intermediaries with significant exchange rate exposures. But Harvard’s Jeffrey 
Sachs argued that maintaining a loose monetary policy would have only resulted in modest 
devaluations and a superior economic environment. At the time of the Asian crisis few 
believed Sachs’s conviction was conceivable. Instead, they believed that such a theory would 
lead to a downward spiral of currency depreciation and surges in inflation. But, following 
Brazil’s crisis in January 1999, Sachs’s view has gained far more credibility.
Following the Russian crisis in August 1998, investors began to withdraw their credit 
lines from Brazil, believing that the country had a number of similar fundamental weaknesses 
(most notably a budget deficit) that had contributed to Russia’s economic downfall. 
Subsequently, Brazil endured a steady depletion of its foreign exchange reserves, so the IMF 
intervened with its usual prescription of increased taxes, lower spending and higher interest 
rates. Inevitably, a recession ensued and by January 1999 the situation had become 
unsustainable. The Brazilian currency, the real, was floated on January 15th yet the market 
reaction was surprisingly positive. The real dropped by only 10% and the stock market 
soared by 33%. Paul Krugman believes this favourable response was because the market 
thought that the austerity programme would be dropped, allowing interest rates to be slashed, 
and thus resulting in an economic recovery.11 However, the following day, the Brazilian 
government met with senior IMF officials the following day who demanded interest rate 
increases. This depressed the market and the real and the stock market plunged on Monday
10Feldstein, M. 1998. p.29.
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January 18th 1999. It is inconceivable why the IMF officials refused to allow the real to 
float. Paul Krugman suspects that the IMF was afraid to see Jeffrey Sachs proved correct. If 
Brazil could successfully have let its currency float, without raising interest rates, it would 
have meant that the “recession being imposed on Brazil - and perhaps the recessions being 
imposed elsewhere - had been unnecessary, gratuitously imposed on behalf of an incorrect 
theory”12.
3. Fiscal policy.
The IMF claimed that “fiscal policy is the key to the overall credibility of the 
programme”13 and initially demanded a fiscal surplus amounting to 1% of GDP in each of the 
three countries under IMF tutelage. The key objectives of the tight fiscal policy were: firstly, 
to reinforce the monetary contraction and to support the exchange rate and; secondly, to raise 
sufficient funds to provide liquidity and enable effective reform of the financial systems. 
With the tight monetary policy and currency crises the fiscal targets exacerbated the 
contractionary effects of the crisis. It is difficult to understand the demands of the IMF for 
fiscal surpluses because the Asian financial crisis was, after all, a crisis of private sector 
excesses rather than a result of public sector profligacy. Moreover, Nicola Bullard of the 
Thai-based development agency Focus of the Global South, argued that: “The tight fiscal 
requirements of the IMF deepened the crisis by squeezing domestic credit and pushing up 
interest rates, turning what had thus far been a crisis of the financial sector into a crisis of the 
real economy. Real people with real jobs started to feel the pinch.”14 The austere economic 
measures were demanded by the IMF because the Fund believed that the return of foreign 
capital would result in Asia’s economic recovery. When capital returned, the IMF assumed, 
domestic liquidity would be enhanced and currencies would stabilise; in turn, interest rates 
would also decline. Yet capital continued to leave the region, further reducing domestic 
liquidity and forced the IMF’s Asia Pacific Director Herbert Neiss to admit that: “The 
economy had slowed down to such an extent that a continued stringent austerity regime may 
prompt a new economic crisis.”15 This acknowledgement was reflected in the IMF’s policy 
adjustment, which permitted Thailand’s government to run a budget deficit of 1-2% of GDP, 
rather than the 1% surplus the Fund had originally demanded.
n Krugman, P. 2000a. p. 149.
12Krugman, P. 1999a.
13Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.42.
14Bullard et al. 1998. p.33.
15Ibid. p.6.
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It was disconcerting that the IMF’s main policy objective was the return of foreign 
capital, because the Asian governments had no other means of improving the domestic 
economic environment through expansionary monetary or fiscal policies. The health of the 
region now appeared to rely entirely on erratic waves of foreign capital. Moreover, critics 
argued that if foreign capital was to return where would profitable investments be made?
4. Closure of financial intermediaries and the enforcement of capital adequacy standards.
The heart of the IMF’s structural reforms for the three Asian economies were in the 
financial and corporate sectors where insolvent institutions were merged or liquidated. The 
objectives of closing down bankrupt finance institutions was essentially to minimise the 
losses that these intermediaries were accumulating and also to improve market and banking 
sector confidence by illustrating the domestic authorities commitment to reform. But rather 
than restoring confidence, the IMF demands for the abrupt closure of financial intermediaries 
deepened the economic crisis. Thailand had fifty-eight out of ninety-one finance companies 
suspended, and fifty-six of these were subsequently liquidated. In Korea, fourteen out of the 
country’s thirty merchant banks suspended operations and Indonesia had sixteen commercial 
banks closed.16 The IMF directive of suddenly closing down sixteen Indonesian banks 
actually caused a bank run on approximately two-thirds of the country’s other banks, 
additionally undermining both the health of the Indonesian financial sector and market 
confidence.17 The bank run occurred because Indonesians do not enjoy Westem-style 
guarantees of deposit insurance. Fearing that their bank would be closed next, depositors 
shifted their capital from private banks to state-owned banks believing that the state owned 
banks provided more guarantees. The New York Times wrote that: “A confidential report by 
the IMF on Indonesia’s economic crisis acknowledges that an important element of the IMF’s 
rescue strategy backfired, causing a bank panic that helped set off financial market declines 
in much of Asia ... These closures, far from improving public confidence in the banking 
system, have instead set off a renewed ‘flight-to-safety’. Over two thirds of the country’s 
banks were affected, and more than $2 billion was withdrawn from the [Indonesian] banking 
system.”18 Indonesian bank closures should instead have been phased over a longer period of 
time, rather than at the height of the financial crisis. This would have provided more scope 
(and time) for bank restructuring.
16Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.42.
"Bullard et al. 1998. p.9.
l8Sanger, D. 1998.
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The second measure of structural reform was to establish a firm base for the financial 
sector and, most notably, improve regulatory and supervisional procedures. This area of 
reform is inter-linked with the first because only profitable institutions should have been 
allowed to continue operations, while the development of sound regulatory measures should 
have strengthened the financial sector. Ending subsidies to insolvent institutions was also 
important. Prior to the Thai devaluation, for example, several bankrupt finance companies 
absorbed approximately 17 billion baht in subsidies. The majority of these finance 
companies spent these subsidies on expanding their portfolios and re-lending rather than 
restructuring and cutting their exposures.
Asian banks required recapitalisation as a result of the increase in NPLs due to both 
the crisis and high interest rates. The currency devaluations hurt even the strongest of the 
region’s banks due to their exchange rate exposures. In response, the IMF forced a dramatic 
recapitalisation of banks. In Indonesia the central bank demanded that capital adequacy 
levels be raised to 9% by the end of 1997 and to 12% by the end of 2001. Pressuring the 
banks to recapitalise in such a short period of time caused an additional reduction in lending 
of even the healthiest banks, further contributing to the credit crunch. Radelet and Sachs 
argued that: “[If] more forbearance [had] been given on the capital adequacy ratios early in 
the crisis, with a clear and longer-term schedule for otherwise strong banks to return to full 
compliance, the extent of the credit squeeze would have been much less severe.”19
5. Removal of competition impediments.
Measures were taken to reduce or reform state-sponsored monopolies and cartels to 
help improve market competition and attempts to increase the transparency of financial and 
economic information of private enterprises. Moreover, Timothy Lane of the IMF stated 
that: “International trade reforms were aimed mainly at continuing existing liberalisation 
plans to prevent a lapse into beggar-my-neighbour restrictions.”20
6. Reform of the social sector.
These reforms primarily focused on improving and broadening social safety nets. 
Attempts were also made to minimise unemployment by the establishment of training and 
employment schemes and to limit the effect of inflation (as a result of the devaluation) on the 
poorest households by continuing to provide subsidies for food, energy, transportation and 
retaining access of the poor to education and health care.
19Radelet & Sachs. 1998. p.48
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6.iii. Did the IMF policies make the crises worse?
Did the IMF exceed its designated purposes?
The IMF exists for the following reasons: (1). To promote international monetary
cooperation through a permanent institution that provides the basis for consultation and 
collaboration on international monetary difficulties. (2). To encourage and promote a 
diversified and sustainable growth of trade, while contributing to increased and maintained 
levels of employment. (3). To support exchange rate stability and to ensure that exchange 
rates between members are appropriate and that member countries refrain from competitive 
devaluations. (4). The abolition of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, which 
impede the diversification and growth of world trade. (5). To allow members to borrow the 
Fund’s capital to enable member countries to correct potential balance of payments deficits 
under adequate safeguards. (6). Accompanying the above practice, to limit the period and 
reduce the degree of disequilibrium in the balance of payments of IMF member countries. 
Nicola Bullard argues that the Fund greatly exceeded its designated purposes. “[The Fund’s 
stated objectives include] nothing about trade and investment liberalisation, privatisation, 
foreign investment or public sector austerity measures, all of which have become central to 
the IMF’s demands in Asia. Article II, however, mentions the Fund’s role in promoting high 
levels of employment and real income - purposes which the Fund has clearly failed to achieve 
in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia”21.
Incorrect diagnosis of the causes of the Asian crisis 
The IMF failed to foresee the Asian crisis and, according to Jeffrey Sachs, “arrived in 
Thailand ... filled with ostentatious declarations that all was wrong and that fundamental and 
immediate surgery was needed ... The IMF deepened the sense of panic not only because of 
its dire pronouncements but also because its proposed medicine - high interest rates, budget 
cuts, and immediate bank closures - convinced the markets that Asia indeed was about to 
enter a severe economic contraction. Instead of dousing the fire, the IMF in effect screamed 
fire in the theatre”22.
The most obvious criticism of the IMF’s performance in East Asia is that the Fund 
appeared to be treating the crisis as if it was the result of public sector profligacy rather than a 
crisis caused by private sector excesses. The region did not suffer from excessive inflation, 
yet the IMF demanded increases in interest rates, a policy response that is, again, consistent
20Lane, T. 1999. p.46.
21Bullard et al. 1998. p.30.
22In Bello, W. 1998c. p.422.
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with the IMF’s traditional crisis response package. (Table 2, p. 175, shows East Asia’s low 
consumer price index and fiscal surpluses.) The consequence of the Fund’s response was to 
apply additional deflationary pressures to the recessionary effects of the financial crises. 
Leaver and Seabrooke argued that: “These measures (intended to deflate the ailing economy 
and its import bill, so producing the current account surplus needed to service external debt)
*y\are believed to have had the effect of converting a liquidity crisis into an insolvency crisis.” 
Despite the fact that budget deficits were not a concern of the market, the IMF 
believed they soon would be arguing that the cut back of government expenditures would 
illustrate the virtue of the authorities and their opposition to crony capitalism. Perhaps a 
more appropriate response to the financial crises would have been to allow the Asian 
governments to increase expenditures to counteract the reduction in private sector economic 
activity.
IMF assistance programmes have been significantly influenced by the United States
The United States is the most powerful member country of the IMF, holding 18% of the 
overall member countries vote; together the countries of the European Union control 29% of 
the vote.24 Since the Reagan administration in the mid-1980s, the U.S. has aggressively 
promoted the globalisation of trade and investment flows through the country’s foreign 
economic policy. The main objective has been to eliminate both protectionism and the 
subsidisation of domestic producers, thus removing the obstacles faced by outward looking, 
market-orientated American enterprises and establishing an unbiased global market, which 
minimises distortions and maximises efficiency.
The U.S. accelerated its process of economic liberalisation throughout the Asian 
region in the early 1990’s, culminating in the extensive liberalisation of the East Asian capital 
accounts. Walden Bello argued that: “With structural adjustment programs becoming 
ineffective, Washington relied on other mechanisms, foremost of which were a harsh 
unilateralist trade campaign employing the threat of trade retaliation to open up markets and 
stop unauthorised use of U.S. high technologies; a drive to create an APEC [Asian Pacific 
Economic Co-operation] free trade area with a comprehensive liberalisation program leading 
to borderless trade among eighteen countries; and a strong push on the Asian countries to 
implement the GATT Uruguay round agreements that eliminated trade quotas, reduced
23Leaver & Seabrooke. In: ‘Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital 
Markets.’ 2000.p.l54.
^Bullard et al. 1998. p.29. 1 ^  V j& A *  '
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tariffs, banned the use of trade policy for industrialisation purposes, and opened up 
agricultural markets.”25
Many Koreans believe that the U.S. and IMF have exploited the region’s misfortune 
to impose a programme of liberalisation and deregulation of trade, investment and finance 
that Washington’s economists had been advocating prior to the Asian crisis with little 
success. The then U.S. trade representative, Charlene Barshefsky, told the U.S. Congress 
that: “Policy-driven rather than market-driven economic activity ... meant that U.S. industry 
encountered many specific structural barriers to trade, investment and competition in Korea.
For example, Korea maintained restrictions on foreign ownership and operation, and had a 
list of market access impediments ... The Korea stabilisation package, negotiated with the 
IMF in December 1997, should help open and expand competition in Korea by creating a 
more market-driven economy ... If it continues on the path to reform there will be important 
benefits not only for Korea but also the United States.”26
The United States’ free-market philosophy has for many years been concerned with 
the degree of market penetration that it has allowed the East Asian economies in the U.S. 
market. In contrast, the U.S., despite the liberalisation of the Asian capital accounts, has been 
unable to penetrate Asian markets due to state intervention, mercantilism and protectionism, )
which has curbed U.S. exports to and investments in East Asia. However, the Asian crisis 
provided the U.S. with the opportunity to gain greater influence in and impose the U.S. free- 
market philosophy on the region. The IMF stabilisation programmes demanded a reduction 
in protectionism and state intervention. Thailand removed all restrictions on foreign 
ownership of Thai financial intermediaries. Korea raised the limit of foreign ownership of 
corporate stocks to 55%. It also allowed the establishment of foreign financial enterprises, an 
agreement ending government-directed lending and also the full liberalisation of the capital 
and financial markets.
Harvard’s Martin Feldstein commented that: “Several features of the IMF plan are 
replays of the policies that Japan and the U.S. have long been trying to get Korea to adopt.
These included accelerating the previously agreed upon reductions of trade barriers to 
specific Japanese products and opening capital markets so that foreign investors can have 
majority ownership of Korean firms, engage in hostile take-overs opposed by local 
management, and expand direct participation in banking and financial services.”27 Both
25Bello, W. 1998a.
26Bello, W. 1998c. p.425.
27Feldstein, M. 1998. p.32.
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market analysts and Koreans believed that these features of the IMF programme were an 
abuse of the IMF’s authority, forcing Korea, in the midst of a crisis, to accept policies that the 
country had previously refused to implement.
Jeffrey Garten, the former under-secretary of commerce during Bill Clinton’s first 
term as president, stated that: “There is going to be a significantly different Asia in which 
American firms have achieved much deeper market penetration, much greater access.”28
Moreover, the U.S. has a strong interest in the preservation and diversification of free 
global capital mobility because America’s current account deficit is financed by external 
borrowing. Furthermore, the low level of U.S. savings (see Chapter 4) means that the U.S. 
economy must supplement these savings with foreign capital inflows to maintain the 
economy’s high level of consumption. It is, therefore, in America’s interest for developing 
economies to play by American rules.
Political influence within the Fund should be distributed according to the principle of 
equal national representation. Instead, IMF voting power is essentially allocated in 
proportion to the quota subscriptions made by member countries to the IMF. These 
subscriptions are determined by the economy’s relative importance within the global 
economy. This fact helps to explain the dominance of American influence on the conduct of 
the IMF. But the fact that the U.S. dominates the IMF’s policy conduct seems perverse, for 
the U.S. is the world’s largest debtor country (running the world’s largest current account 
deficit). Yet it still dominates the IMF modus operandi. Leaver and Seabrooke commented: 
“Don’t creditors rather than debtors usually run banks? ... How is it that the normal operating 
procedures that are implemented so mechanically for other deficit economies can be entirely 
waived for the U.S?”29
The double standard of international capital markets 
Paul Krugman has argued that: ‘The real critique of the IMF, the one we should worry about, 
is the accusation that it failed to understand the panic element in the Asian crisis, and that it 
concentrated on disciplining countries when it should have concentrated on reassuring 
markets ... What the Fund should have done in Asia was to treat the crisis as a pure panic, 
completely unjustified by fundamentals. It should, therefore, have acted as a pure lender of 
last resort - making credit lines available to Asian economies with no questions asked.”30
28Garten, J. 1998.
29Leaver & Seabrooke. In ‘Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital 
Markets.’ 2000. pp. 160 & 165.
30Krugman, P. 1998d.
164
However, Mr Krugman admits that the IMF does not have the available resources to act as a 
lender of last resort and that there were fundamental weaknesses evident in the Asian 
economies, which undoubtedly precipitated the crisis. The IMF response of tightening 
monetary and fiscal policy deepened the financial crisis and it remains questionable how 
these measures were supposed to bolster market confidence. Instead, Paul Krugman believes 
that the IMF response only exacerbated the panic by “criticising country policies and 
imposing conditions; the IMF should have acted as a booster: Michel Camdessus and Larry 
Summers should have tried to look happy as they toured Asian capitals, and should have 
declared at each stop that the real economies were in excellent shape”31.
International capital markets respond adversely to developing country devaluations. 
This is because imports usually represent a much greater share of consumption; hence, a 
substantial depreciation will lead to a dramatic rise in inflation. Moreover, developing 
economies’ financial intermediaries often possess significant exchange rate exposures. Thus 
a significant currency depreciation would increase the cost of servicing foreign debt and may 
cause widespread bankruptcies. In contrast, advanced country devaluations are perceived to 
be expansionary and developed countries often gain from a depreciation of their currency. 
For example, the U.S. economy suffered from an increasing and potentially unsustainable 
trade deficit in 1985. In response to growing market pessimism, the Federal Reserve cut 
interest rates, allowing the dollar to fall from 240 yen to 140 and the U.S. economy continued 
to prosper. Moreover, Britain’s exit from the ERM in 1992, resulted in only a 15% 
devaluation, a modest increase in inflation, and a rapid economic recovery.32
Yet the Fund’s response to the emerging market crisis in Asia was to demand higher 
interest rates as a precondition for IMF assistance. The higher interest rates were intended to 
encourage investors to maintain their credit lines and thus arrest any further decline in the 
currency. But, the tight monetary policy, together with fiscal austerity measures, meant that 
Asia’s recovery relied on the return of foreign capital rather than expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. However, there is an additional concern of the IMF and the leaders 
of developing economies, namely that of self-fulfilling speculative crises.
Paul Krugman has compared the slide in the Australian dollar shortly after the Asian 
crisis with the case of Indonesia. Mr Krugman highlights that Australia has a considerable 
dependence on foreign capital because the country has run a current account deficit of 4% or 
more of GDP for decades. But to investors Australia remains a sound country, which is
31Ibid.
i ne ^oniroversiai Koie 01 me iniemauonai monetary runa.
165
economically and politically stable. “[Therefore,] the markets response to a decline in the 
Australian dollar is in effect to say, ‘good that’s over, let’s buy Australian and the economy 
actually benefits. The market’s good opinion is, therefore, confirmed ... On the other hand, 
suppose that despite some twenty years of remarkable progress people are not quite 
convinced that Indonesia is no longer the country of the year of living dangerously. Then 
when the rupiah falls they may say. ‘Oh my god, they’re reverting to the bad old days.’ The 
resulting capital flight leads to financial, economic, and political crisis, and the markets bad 
opinion is similarly confirmed”33.
A self-fulfilling, speculative attack may occur when a developing economy, which 
possesses some fundamental weakness (such as a budget deficit), suffers an adverse turn in 
investor sentiment. This may be due to a crisis in an emerging market possessing broadly 
similar problems, which then highlights the economy’s weaknesses. In normal times 
investors would have maintained their credit lines enabling the economy to address these 
weaknesses, but, instead, they withdraw their credit and the economy endures economic 
difficulties. The stock market nose-dives and interest rates rise in an effort to attract capital. 
The country’s fundamentals remain unchanged, but this situation does not represent an 
opportunity to buy because other investors are also fleeing the country. Banks and corporates 
go bankrupt and the high interest rates aggravate the economic contraction. Therefore, if you 
wish to minimise your losses you should follow the example set by the market and withdraw 
your credit.
The IMF response to the Asian crisis attempted to restore market confidence in 
countries that have a feeble hold on investor confidence. Paul Krugman argues that: 
“Because crises can be self-fulfilling, sound economic policy is not sufficient to gain market 
confidence; one must cater to the perceptions, the prejudices, and the whims of the market. 
Or, rather, one must cater to what one hopes will be the perceptions of the market ... What 
remedy does Washington offer? None. The perceived need to play the confidence game 
supersedes the normal concerns of economic policy. It sounds pretty crazy and it is ... [But] 
as long as capital flows freely, nations will be vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculative attacks, 
and policy makers will be forced to play the confidence game.”34
32Ibid.
33Krugman, P. 2000a. p. 110.
34Krugman, P. 1998d.
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Has the IMF encouraged world wide moral hazard?
Moral hazard has received considerable coverage throughout the 1990s in debates on the 
global financial system and the IMF has endured much criticism for its own contribution to 
the role of moral hazard. According to Bordo and Schwartz, “emerging countries may 
believe that they have an implicit contract with the IMF to be saved from their own folly. 
This is an expansion of the original terms of the Articles of Agreement at Bretton Woods that 
established the IMF as a social insurance fund in which members contributed resources, 
which would be made available to them or other members as needed”35. Therefore, the 
prospect of an IMF ‘bail-out’ loan may encourage domestic authorities to pursue reckless 
economic policies, increasing the country’s vulnerability to a financial collapse. Walden 
Bello believes that the IMF has provided a “safety net for the global financial elite”36. 
Furthermore, “lending to Russia has been known in the markets from time to time as the 
‘moral hazard play’”37.
The concept of IMF induced moral hazard, suggests that both debtors and creditors 
are encouraged to act irresponsibly due to the prospect of a ‘bail-out’ loan. This has led 
Schultz, Simon and Wriston to conclude that: “[IMF] interference will only encourage more 
crises.”38 According to this notion, the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995 led to the Asian 
crisis in 1997, which then precipitated the Russian financial crisis in 1998. In July 1998, 
Russia secured a $17.1 billion rescue package from the IMF, prompting Jeffrey Sachs to 
write: “U.S. investors wanted to get their money out of Russia ... without devaluation losses, 
[so the IMF stepped in believing it could] outsmart the market.”39
Nevertheless, concerns regarding moral hazard can be greatly exaggerated. Firstly, 
on the debtor side, IMF rescue packages are accompanied by many stringent conditions that 
cause pain and upheaval in the domestic economies; this per se may deter domestic policy 
makers from pursuing inappropriate policies. Moreover, governments of countries that 
request assistance from the IMF do not usually survive politically, so the prospect of an IMF 
‘bail-out’ loan would hardly appear to be an incentive for governments to behave recklessly. 
Secondly, moral hazard is often regarded as the lesser evil, for if the IMF were abolished the 
absence of a lender of last resort may result in worse consequences. Without the Fund’s 
provision of international liquidity a financial crisis in an emerging market may result in
35Bordo & Schwartz. 1998. p.45.
36Bello, W. 1998b.
37The Economist. 17 February 2001. pp. 107-8
38In: Haas & Litan. 1998. p.5.
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economic turmoil, significant increases in poverty, prolonged dislocation from international 
capital markets and a perpetuated economic contraction. Such a devastating crisis would also 
lead to contagious effects through the host country’s financial and trade ties, while also 
increasing the possibility of additional financial panics. Third, capital from the IMF should 
be available when the financial markets behave unexpectedly or irrationally to help restore 
market confidence. For example, when foreign loans were called in from Asia it resulted in a 
liquidity crisis, which may have been ameliorated if the market had had the confidence to 
lengthen maturities of the region’s debts.
Arguments against moral hazard from a creditor’s perspective have centred on two 
particular areas. Firstly, there is little evidence to suggest that the rise in capital flows to Asia 
was due to an implicit guarantee from the IMF to provide an international rescue loan if the 
region suffered a crises. This notion has been suggested by some economists due to the IMF 
rescue loan in response to the Mexican crisis, where owners of Mexican government debt 
were perceived to have been bailed out by the IMF. Secondly, the IMF has often made a 
point of illustrating that many investors suffered losses during the Asian crisis, particularly 
foreign equity investors. (There are various proposals to make creditors share the costs of 
financial crises more evenly, including private sector bail-ins and a standstill on debt 
repayments. See Chapter 4.)
Eliminating the potential for moral hazard is impossible. The IMF, the only 
institution that can effectively provide emergency international liquidity, is urgently needed 
to administer the world’s erratic capital markets and provide capital to economies that suffer 
a contraction of domestic credit. For if the IMF does not involve itself with developing 
country crises the domestic crisis would become deeper and longer and may also spread to 
neighbouring countries. Liquidity is the key that enables emerging markets to sustain market 
confidence. Countries that choose not to maintain substantial quantities of foreign exchange 
reserves have no other choice but to call on the IMF when they experience destabilising 
speculative pressures. The Russian and Asian economies found themselves drastically short 
of liquidity when investors began to recall their loans. Hence, the recent crises highlight the 
need for emerging markets to maintain large quantities of foreign exchange reserves relative 
to short-term debt.
In my opinion, the IMF’s austere response to the Asian crises will reduce the 
possibility for government-related moral-hazard plays because the Fund’s conditionality has
39Sachs, J. 1999a.
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served as a warning to other emerging markets. Thus, developing economies will be 
encouraged to follow prudent macroeconomic policies so to avoid calling upon the Fund.
An Asian Monetary Fund?
The absence of an American contribution to the IMF’s ‘bail-out’ loan to Thailand, together 
with the harsh demands of the Fund, prompted Japan to propose an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF), which would disperse capital to its regional members more leniently. The AMF 
would have a potential capitalisation of $100 billion (provided by Asian member countries.)40 
This capital would be available to provide emergency liquidity, enabling Asian countries to 
rectify macroeconomic imbalances and provide loans for long-term economic adjustment 
programmes. However, the former managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, argued 
that the establishment of and the provision of financing by the AMF would not ensure that 
tough economic reforms are implemented effectively. Yet few believed the IMF claims. The 
reality is that the AMF would establish an institution that could directly compete and thus 
jeopardise the monopoly of the IMF in policy making in the face of financial crises.
Has the IMF outlived its usefulness?
The IMF was established in 1947 following the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. At the 
time the IMF’s role was to supervise the newly introduced adjustable peg exchange rate 
system. But the IMF has also attracted criticism precisely because it was conceived to help 
sustain pegged exchange rates, which are inconsistent with today’s world of high capital 
mobility. Indeed, when the IMF was established international capital movements were small 
due to both the Great Depression and World War Two. Consequently, critics have argued 
that these factors promoted an inability of the IMF to see beyond the economic conditions 
prevailing at the time of the Bretton Woods negotiations. Moreover, the negotiations took 
place when the U.S. enjoyed a position of economic supremacy even greater than that 
enjoyed today. At the time, the U.S. held 30% of the voting powers and America’s economy 
was ten times larger than, today’s second largest economy, Japan. In 1990 it was only 1.5 
times larger.41
6.iv. The IMF’s response to criticisms
The IMF managing director at the time of the Asian crisis, Michel Camdessus, responded to 
the Fund’s critics with the following statement: “As soon as it was called upon, the IMF 
moved quickly to help Thailand, then Indonesia, and then Korea formulate reform
40Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p. 119.
41 Leaver & Seabrooke. In ‘Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Capital 
Markets’. 2000. p. 162.
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programmes aimed at tackling the roots of their problems and restoring investor confidence. 
In view of the nature of the crisis, these programmes had to go far beyond addressing the 
major fiscal, monetary or external balances. Their aim is to strengthen financial systems, 
improve governance and transparency, restore economic competitiveness, and modernise the 
legal and regulatory environment.”42
Stanley Fischer the then deputy director of the Fund, opposed the belief of many 
economists, including Jeffrey Sachs, who claimed that the IMF response to the Asian crisis 
was the Fund’s usual prescription to address a crisis of public sector indebtedness. ‘The IMF 
supported programmes in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea are anything but the usual 
medicine, precisely because of their heavy constructural components, which are included 
because structural problems lie at the heart of the economic crises in the three countries. To 
ignore the structural issues would invite a repetition of the crisis. The macroeconomic parts 
of these programmes consist of a combination of tight money to restore confidence in the 
currency and a modest firming up of fiscal policy to offset in part the massive costs of 
financial restructuring. And the moral hazard concern, while essential to deal with, is easily 
exaggerated”43.
Stanley Fischer stated that the first concern of the IMF was to restore confidence in 
the currencies of Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. Each of these countries had endured 
a substantial drain on foreign exchange reserves and Mr Fischer, therefore, argues that the 
domestic currencies had to be made more attractive to foreign investors. Thus interest rates 
were raised. Therefore, the IMF believes that the short-run costs of higher interest rates 
(further bankruptcies of banks and corporations) are outweighed by the benefits that the 
return of foreign capital will bring, which will eventually allow interest rates to decline. Yet 
it is widely agreed that when interest rates are maintained at levels beyond an emergency 
scenario they will induce debilitating effects. Interest rates in Korea and Thailand fell to pre­
crisis levels in the summer of 1998, but at the time these countries were enduring a credit 
crunch unrelated to the level of interest rates. Corsetti et al. argued that: “[Instead,] it has 
more to do with the inability of financially distressed banks to lend to a corporate sector 
labouring under the weight of a severe debt overhang.”44
Stanley Fischer argued that the fiscal programmes varied from country to country and 
were introduced to promote a sustainable balance of payments. Thailand, which had a large
42Corsetti et al. 1998c. p. 15.
43Fischer, S. 1998a. p. 103.
^Corsetti et al. 1998c. p. 17.
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current account deficit, was required to carry out a fiscal adjustment of 3% of GDP, Korea 
V/2% of GDP and Indonesia 1% of GDP. At the time, Mr Fischer believed that the majority 
of these adjustments could be accomplished by abolishing public investment activities 
yielding low rates of return. Yet, Timothy Lane, chief of the Policy Review Division of the 
IMF’s Policy Development and Review Department, admitted: “[With] hindsight, given the 
sharp decline in private sector demand that was under way, fiscal policy should have been 
more expansionary, and there was a major change in course as the situation became clear. 
The deteriorating economic environment led directly to substantial increases in fiscal deficits, 
which, from the beginning of 1998 on, were accommodated by easing the programmes fiscal 
objectives”45.
The IMF believes that the moral hazard issue has been exaggerated. Mr Fischer 
argues that countries will try to avoid calling on the Fund, knowing full well that any loan 
will be accompanied by stringent conditions and, more often than not, a political fall-out. 
Thus, the conditionality that accompanies any financial assistance encourages policy makers 
to follow correct macroeconomic policies.
Stanley Fischer concludes that: ‘The basic approach of the IMF to these crises has 
been appropriate not perfect, to be sure, but far better than if the structural elements had been 
ignored or if the Fund had not been involved. Of course, one cannot know for certain what 
would have happened had there been no official lending.”46
6.v. Reforming the IMP’
The former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers, commented that: “The global economy 
has changed since the World Bank and the IMF were created, and these international 
financial institutions must change as well.”47 Proposed reforms of the IMF have received 
widespread media coverage following the recent bout of financial crises, which have perhaps 
raised the greatest questions about the future role of the IMF. The most extreme proposals 
have called for the abolition of the Fund.
The Meltzer Commission has suggested various reforms of the IMF. The 
Commission is sponsored by Congress and led by the economist Allan Meltzer of Carnegie 
Mellon University. Thus far, the members of the Commission are agreed that both the IMF 
and the World Bank have previously attempted to do far too much. “The IMF, first 
conceived as a provider of liquidity in emergencies, has become a development institution,
45Lane, T. 1999. p.46.
46Fischer, S. 1998a. p.106.
47Summers, L. 2000. p.29.
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advising and requiring borrowers not merely to repay, but to reform the deep micro-structure 
of their economies. It has little expertise in this area; such policies, forced on governments in 
circumstances like these, tend not to stick; and so wide a development remit in any case 
overlaps with that of the Bank ... Most of [the World Bank’s] loans go to countries with 
access to private international capital. The countries that, according to the Bank’s own 
analysis, could make best use of its resources receive a comparatively small share. To be 
more effective, the Fund and the Bank both need to do less”48. The Meltzer Commission is 
recommending that the World Bank alter its title to the World Development Agency, 
indicating that the focuses of the Bank will be specifically directed to assisting the very 
poorest countries. “Overall, the commission’s aim is to render the institutions more effective, 
to reduce overlap and to ensure that policy recommendations do not conflict”49.
Indeed, Lawrence Summers and other critics, such as Jeffrey Sachs, claim that the 
Fund should concentrate its scarce resources on providing short-term emergency loans to 
countries experiencing potentially destabilising speculative attacks. However, emergency 
loans should not be available to rescue irresponsible governments. Mr Summers believes that 
developing economies should borrow primarily from private creditors, thus the IMF should 
only intervene when this private capital is unavailable to the developing country. Stanley 
Fischer responded: “Crisis lending is a critical part of what we do [but] it is far from being 
the only thing we do ... [In general] the Fund is one of the most important ways, possibly the 
most important way, that the international community promotes good macroeconomic 
policies around the world.”50
The Fund is currently addressing the problems that have been caused by the harsh 
conditions, which have accompanied IMF loans. Such demands have been unpopular in the 
emerging economies receiving IMF assistance. The IMF conditions have been similar to the 
foreign policy interests of the Fund’s largest shareholder - the U.S. The new managing 
director of the Fund, Horst Kohler, is attempting to ‘streamline’ IMF conditionality by 
reducing the number of specific requirements prescribed to a country when financial 
assistance is agreed. Mr Kohler, therefore, acknowledges that the Fund has been trying to do 
too much.
The IMF has been developing ambitious early-warning systems to help foresee 
potential crises. However, H'rst Kohler acknowledges that highlighting a country’s
48The Economist. 17 February 2001. p.24.
49The Economist. 17 February 2001. p. 108.
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vulnerability to crisis may encourage self-fulfilling speculative attacks.51 While the IMF is 
keen to demand greater global transparency and accountability to improve the prospect of 
predicting future financial crises, the Fund itself should set an example to its member 
countries and become more transparent. Mark Weisbrot has argued that: ‘The IMF is the 
financial equivalent of the CIA: its documents and proceedings are shrouded in secrecy, its 
bureaucracy is unaccountable, blinded by ideology, and dedicated to protecting the interests 
of the rich and powerful. And the Fund has probably topped more governments, 
democratically elected or otherwise, than the CIA.”52
The strong influence of the U.S. on IMF conduct should be reduced, whilst the 
shareholder rights of countries of the European Union and Asia should be increased. The 
more equal distribution of shareholder rights could help to ensure that the above reform 
proposals are pushed through. In the meantime, regional initiatives like the AMF, should be 
pursued, so that additional supplies of emergency liquidity are available, possibly providing 
an alternative to the narrow policy responses of the IMF.
Presently, doubts remain over the future role of the World Bank and the IMF. 
According to the Economist, “[the U.S. president George W. Bush] will be very interested in 
the report of the Meltzer Commission ... which recommended a dramatic scaling back of the 
activities of both the IMF amd the Bank ... [Although,] the main threat to the institutions 
probably comes not from the White House or the Treasury but from Capitol Hill. Congress 
has little regard for the Fund and the Bank”53.
6.vi. Conclusion
The IMF should have supervised the liberalisation of the region’s capital accounts ensuring 
that sound financial practices were developed. This would have improved the management 
and regulation of financial intermediaries, in turn reducing exchange rate exposures and 
NPLs. It is therefore hypocritical of Michel Camdessus to declare that: “[Asia’s] ‘disorderly’ 
liberalisation now threatens to give liberalisation itself an undeserved bad reputation.”54 For 
these emerging markets were pushed into rapid capital account liberalisation by the Fund.
The primary objective of the IMF’s assistance to Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea was to restore market confidence in these economies, culminating in the return of
50Burgess, J. 2000. p.9.
51Interview with Horst Kohler. 2001. pp.48-49.
52Weisbrot, M.
53The Economist. 17 February 2001. p. 108.
54Camdessus, M. 1998.
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foreign capital. The IMF has forced countries to repay, in an attempt to sustain favourable 
market sentiment. Losses should have been equally attributed to both borrower and creditor. 
The IMF demanded substantial increases in interest rates, assuming that the higher rates of 
return would encourage capital to return and stabilise the region’s exchange rates. This 
seems to illustrate the IMF’s bias towards foreign creditors and free capital mobility rather 
than economic growth and sustained employment in developing economies. But Brazil’s 
brief experience of low interest rates in the midst of the country’s 1999 crisis may well have 
proved the IMF’s theory (of higher interest rates leading to exchange rate stability) incorrect. 
Unfortunately, we may never know.
The Fund’s demands for tightening fiscal policy were arguably unnecessary and only 
worsened the economic contraction. No one else appeared to be concerned with the Asian 
governments’ budgets. The Asian crisis was, after all, a crisis of the private sector. The 
United States and the IMF have used the Asian financial crisis to exploit Asia’s fragility and 
impose policies, which had previously been rejected by, most notably, South Korea.
When Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund, the IMF, rather predictably, re-acted 
with hostility given that the AMF would effectively challenge the IMF’s power and weaken 
American global influence. But I believe the notion of the AMF represents a significant 
problem within the IMF, that of unfair representation of member countries. Perhaps a new 
role for the IMF should be to oversee newly established regional monetary funds such as the 
AMF, a European Monetary Fund and so on. This would help to ensure that the interests of 
regional members are clearly recognised, understood and respected by their regional 
monetary funds. It would also help to remove the current dominance of the world’s number 
one country in IMF policy. After all, just because liberalised trade and investment is the 
most appropriate policy for the U.S. does not mean that such policies are suitable for 
emerging markets.
Jeffrey Sachs believes that: “Complaints about the IMF and World Bank destroy any 
pretence that these are global institutions with more than 180 countries. The truth, of course, 
is that they are the instruments of a few rich governments, which hold a majority of the 
dollar-based votes and would rather pretend that all is well in the world than ask their 
taxpayers to address the urgent problems of the poor.”55 The Economist argues that: “Those
55Sachs, J. 2000.
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beleaguered institutions have enabled America to protect its interests while sharing the 
burden of cost with others.”56
Moral hazard concerns do require attention. But moral hazard is actually the 
preferred alternative to otherwise leaving a country to its own extremely limited resources 
during a financial crisis. Ignoring a country’s plight in the midst of a financial crises would 
exacerbate the crisis, whilst also isolating the economy from international capital markets for 
a prolonged period. One favourable outcome of the Fund’s stringent conditionality is that 
such measures have probably deterred future government-related moral hazard. However, 
the IMF’s bias in favour of international creditors and its desire to maintain market 
confidence regardless of the costs to the developing country, may only have served to 
promote a cavalier attitude among foreign creditors.
The IMF was established to provide emergency liquidity to countries experiencing 
short-term balance of payments problems. It is not a development institution and, according 
to Mr Sachs, “knows very little about economic development challenges”57. The key role of 
the IMF should be the surveillance of the international financial system and the exchange rate 
regimes employed by IMF member countries. The IMF should, therefore, concentrate its 
scarce resources on monitoring international financial markets and providing emergency 
liquidity. In 1999 three new IMF initiatives were introduced: (1). The Supplemental
Reserve Facility, conceived to enable the Fund to react more effectively to financial crises. 
(2). To allow countries the possibility of applying for Contingent Credit Lines from the IMF, 
to instil confidence amongst foreign creditors regarding the strength and responsibility of 
their economic policies. (3). The expansion of the Special Data Dissemination Standard to 
improve public dissemination of economic and financial data, to promote continued access to 
global financial markets.
Ultimately the IMF would like to eliminate the possibility of future financial crises, 
but this appears impossible.58 The financial turmoil of the late 1990’s, precipitated by erratic 
flows of international capital and the integration of ever more countries into the global 
financial system, means that a reformed IMF is needed now more than ever before.
56The Economist. 17 February 2001. p. 108.
57Sachs, J. 2000.
58The Economist. 17 February 2001. p. 107.
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Table 1. The IMF ‘bail-out* Loan Contributors, $ billion.
Thailand Indonesia Korea
The IMF 4 10 21
World Bank and 
Asian Development 
Bank
2.7 8 14
Individual
Governments
10.5 22 22
Total 17.2 40 57
Source: Radelet and Sachs. 1998.
Table 2. % GDP change on Year Earlier, CPI % and Fiscal Surpluses 1995-1997.
GDP _______   CPI  Fiscal Surpluses %GDP
‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97
Indo 8.2 8 5 9 6.6 11.6 0.8 1.4 1.9
Korea 8.9 7.1 5.9 4.7 4.9 6.6 0.4 0.3 -0.5
Malay 9.5 8.6 7.3 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.8 4.2 2.8
Phili 4.8 5.7 5.1 11 5.2 6.1 -1.4 -0.4 -1
Thai 8.7 6.4 0 7.5 4.8 7.7 2.6 1.6 -1.1
H.K 3.9 4.9 5.3 7 6.6 5.2 -0.3 2.2 3.8
Singa 8.7 7 7.6 0.9 2 2 2.7 2.8 1.8
Taiw 6 5.7 6.9 4.6 2.5 -0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2
Japan 1.5 3.9 0.9 -0.1 0.1 1.7 -3.6 -1.1 -0.2
USA 2 2.8 3.8 2.8 2.9 2.3 -1.9 -1.1 -0.2
Source: Radelet & Sachs. 1998.
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CONCLUSION
Financial contagion spread throughout the world following Thailand’s devaluation on July 
2nd 1997. The crisis first hit Thailand’s neighbouring countries before spreading to Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and South Korea. Japan’s prolonged recession, the depreciation of the yen, and 
the Asian crisis exerted considerable pressures on the Chinese renminbi.
Following the Asian crisis, international investors demanded increased risk premiums. 
This made financing Russia’s budget deficit more expensive, and the fall in the world price 
of oil precipitated an unsustainable fiscal situation, culminating in the devaluation of the 
rouble. Meanwhile, the trading rooms of London, New York, Singapore and Tokyo were 
shocked by Russia’s default and devaluation. The investment bank J.P. Morgan even 
predicted a severe American recession in 1999.1 The U.S. Federal Reserve responded by 
cutting interest rates three times between September 29 and November 17 1998.
The economic environment in Latin America also deteriorated. The Mexican peso hit 
record lows against the dollar and interest rates rose to almost 50%. Brazil received a 
financial support programme from the IMF totalling $41.5 billion, but later devalued the real 
in January 1999. Yet the Chinese economy remained largely unscathed from the global 
financial turmoil due to the country’s cautious approach to financial liberalisation.
Proponents of the Western capitalist model continue to argue that the Asian crisis was 
punishment for the sins of excessive government intervention and crony or alliance 
capitalism, which distorted resource allocation and led to speculative bubbles in the stock and 
property markets. But if this is the case, the severe economic crises were entirely 
disproportionate to the cause, particularly given that these evils had existed in the Asian 
economies for decades, during which time growth had been rapid. Moreover, why did the 
IMF and investment analysts fail to foresee the crisis? And worse, just three months before 
Korea’s 1997 crisis, the IMF annual report stated that: “Directors welcomed Korea’s 
continued impressive macroeconomic performance and praised the authorities for their 
enviable fiscal record.” The same report praised “Thailand’s remarkable economic 
performance and the authorities’ consistent record of sound macroeconomic policies” -  
shortly before the devaluation of the baht.2
^ee: Krugman, P. 2000a. P. 135.
2 Wade. The Asian debt-and-development crisis of 1997-?: Causes and consequences. World 
Development, Vol 26, No.8. p. 1537.
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The conflicting view is that the Asian crisis was the result of extensive capital account 
liberalisation in a basically sound but under-regulated economy, which made Asia susceptible 
to a financial panic. The Asian economies were vulnerable primarily because they had 
financed investments with debt rather than equity, and a large proportion of that debt was 
short-term dollar denominated debt.3 Consequently, the devaluation of the Asian currencies 
dramatically increased the real value of the debt, bankrupting banks and companies whilst 
sending the real economy into a tailspin. This is the only explanation that makes sense to me. 
As I see it, the real cause of the crisis was the dramatic liberalisation of the region’s capital 
accounts while supervisory and regulatory procedures remained weak. This provided 
financial intermediaries with the freedom and incentives to become heavily over-extended 
through borrowing in offshore markets.
Placing my argument in the context of the wider debate, concerning the exact cause of 
the Asian crisis, it is clearly evident that Asia’s crisis was borne of a growing vulnerability to 
a financial panic. Throughout my thesis I have argued that it is certain fundamental 
weaknesses that make a developing country vulnerable to a financial crisis. China was 
largely insulated from the Asian financial turbulence precisely because of its closed capital 
account and large pool of foreign exchange reserves. By way of contrast, Russia was 
adversely affected due to its over-reliance on short-term foreign debt, which greatly exceeded 
the country’s meagre supply of foreign reserves. These weaknesses, among others, made 
Russia, which like all developing countries possesses a fragile hold on investor confidence, 
extremely vulnerable to an adverse turn in investor sentiment and a self-fulfilling financial 
panic. This study has illustrated that in order to minimise the possibility of a financial panic 
and ensuing economic crisis, the following vulnerabilities must be avoided:
1. A fixed exchange rate.
A fixed exchange rate has led to an underestimation of exchange rate exposures by 
both debtors and creditors. In turn, this has led developing economies to become over­
dependent on foreign capital. Moreover, the exchange rate peg provides a target for 
speculators in a world where private capital flows dwarf official reserves.
Today’s world of increased capital mobility means that pegging exchange rates soon 
becomes unsustainable. It appears that only flexible or rigidly fixed regimes, such as
3Wade & Veneroso argue that the combination o f high savings and high corporate debt provides a strong 
advantage in terms o f national economic development. They also provide a clear example o f the greater
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currency board arrangements, are consistent with capital mobility. In my opinion, currency 
boards should only be considered as a means of improving credibility before beginning the 
transition to a floating regime, which provides a far smoother adjustment to exogenous 
shocks. Yet there is not one exchange rate regime that is suitable for all economies. Certain 
exchange rates can achieve specific benefits depending on a country’s objectives.
The developing country crises of the 1990s also highlights the inability of emerging 
markets to carry out successful devaluations. When Britain devalued the pound in 1992, 
speculators stopped betting on further currency depreciations. But with emerging markets, 
the abandonment of the exchange rate peg has been perceived as the first of many 
depreciations, resulting in even greater speculative pressures. Paul Krugman believes that 
when developing countries devalue their currencies they must follow certain rules. First, that 
the devaluation is significant enough to restrain expectations of future depreciations. Second, 
following the devaluation, the government must provide clear signals to appease the market; 
assuring investors that everything is under control.4 But all too often emerging markets break 
both of these rules, further deteriorating investor confidence, resulting in a prolonged 
isolation from international capital markets. This severely restricts the policy options of the 
developing country. Their creditors often demand repayment on short notice and their 
difficulties are compounded by the fact that the debts are denominated in foreign currencies. 
In contrast, advanced country devaluations seldom result in isolation from international 
capital markets.
2. Minimise short-term foreign currency-denominated debt.
Short-term capital inflows have proved to be synonymous with pegged exchange 
rates. Because the developing country’s central bank guarantees to convert local currency 
into the foreign anchor currency, exchange rate risks are greatly reduced. Under a flexible 
exchange rate there is no such guarantee. Hence, the potential for exchange rate losses will 
make creditors more reluctant to lend and domestic institutions less willing to borrow.
While it can be argued that flexible regimes would deprive developing economies of 
cheap foreign capital and that many domestic borrowers would be unable to afford the high 
local-currency interest rates, Alan Blinder of Princeton University disagrees for three
vulnerability to shocks involved in a high debt/equity ‘Asian style’ economic system. See The New Left 
Review March-April 1998, pp. 3-23.
4Krugman, P. 2000a. p.52.
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reasons.5 Firstly, a considerable proportion of Asia’s external borrowing was not necessary 
for development (but this was not the case in Mexico or Russia). Mr Blinder points out that 
the Asian economies attracted foreign capital inflows in excess of their ability to absorb this 
capital productively. The result was overcapacity and speculative bubbles in equity and real 
estate markets. Second, if a country’s fundamentals are reasonable, the interest rate for 
borrowing in domestic currency may not be that costly. The author specifies that markets 
were only charging South Africa three percentage points more to borrow in rands rather than 
dollars in 1999. Finally, pegged exchange rate regimes lead to excessive foreign borrowing 
and large exchange rate exposures. For instance, if Thai companies had been forced to 
borrow domestically at greater risk premiums, they would have borrowed far less, which 
would have avoided both the rapid creation of speculative bubbles and the substantial 
exchange rate exposures. The author believes that the wrong people bore the exchange rate 
exposures in the Asian crisis. He argues that international banks should bear the exchange 
rate risks, e.g. by lending the money to Thailand in baht rather than dollars. True, this would 
have resulted in higher risk premiums, but this would have represented the actual risks rather 
than concealing them. However, Mr Blinder admits that no one can force international banks 
to lend to developing countries in local currencies so he proposes lower supervisory ratings 
and greater capital charges on banks that lend in dollars.
3. To maintain foreign exchange reserves in excess of short-term foreign debt.
When foreign exchange reserves exceed short-term debt each creditor knows that the
economy has sufficient liquidity to pay back each and every loan if  they are re-called. But in 
the crisis-hit countries short-term foreign currency-denominated debt exceeded foreign 
exchange reserves by over 100%. Thus, once the financial panic began it became impossible 
to stop. China and Taiwan maintained a large supply of foreign reserves in relation to their 
short-term foreign debt and they escaped the worst effects of the regional crisis. Maintaining 
foreign exchange reserves in excess of short-term debt substantially reduces the potential for 
financial panics.
4. “For emerging markets, an open capital account should be the exception not the
rule”6.
5Blinder, A. 1999. pp. 56-57.
^ichengreen, B. 1998.
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The IMF’s initial desire for all of its member countries to have open capital accounts 
was the central cause of Asia’s crisis. International capital markets are prone to excessive 
optimism followed by excessive pessimism, which poses great dangers for developing 
economies that are ill prepared for global financial integration. Consequently, emerging 
markets should maintain restrictions on capital mobility until their economic fundamentals 
are strengthened. In my opinion, capital controls should be effective while also minimising 
the restrictions that they actually place on economic freedoms. Hence, I favour Chilean-style 
restrictions on short-term capital inflows rather than draconian controls on capital flight.
Asia’s capital account liberalisation was poorly sequenced. The economies’ capital 
accounts were dramatically liberalised while banking standards and regulatory mechanisms 
were weak. The surge in capital inflows, and the combination of both deficient supervisory 
structures and moral-hazard-induced lending, resulted in a dramatic expansion in bank 
balance sheets and significant exchange rate exposures. Capital account sequencing, instead, 
should be a long-run process, continually addressing weaknesses until the economy is 
prepared for full liberalisation. Global financial integration should not be considered as a 
substitute for a development strategy.
China (despite some notable weaknesses) has avoided a financial crisis, precisely 
because its capital account remains closed. China’s inconvertible currency has indirectly 
strengthened China’s external fundamentals resulting in a current account surplus and low 
levels of short-term foreign debt. Capital controls have prevented weak Chinese banks from 
borrowing in foreign currencies, whilst also restricting speculative behaviour towards the 
renminbi.
5. Imprudent macroeconomic objectives.
An additional fundamental weakness has been the absence of sound monetary and 
fiscal policies. Asia failed on the monetary front, running large current account deficits prior 
to the crisis. Thailand’s peaked at 8% of GDP.8 Russia’s inability to collect significant tax 
revenues resulted in a budget deficit of 6.5% in 1997 9 These deficits were financed by 
borrowing in international capital markets. Trade flows are now dwarfed by international 
capital flows, so these deficits could actually have been sustained over many years. But 
developing countries have a fragile hold on investor confidence. Consequently, economies
7See: Rodrik, D. 2001.
8Kotler & Kartajaya. 2000. p.3.
conclusion.
181
that have become overly dependent on foreign-financing are vulnerable to an adverse change 
in investor sentiment. The lesson is clear: emerging markets must avoid substantial 
macroeconomic imbalances.
6. Weak financial sector.
Capital was not efficiently allocated in Asia’s crisis-hit economies. They did not possess 
sound financial infrastructures and the absence of transparent and efficient domestic asset 
markets resulted in an inefficient and often corrupt allocation of resources. The currency 
strategist Callum Henderson argues that prior to capital account liberalisation “deep and 
liquid capital markets have to be created first ... [along with] the appropriate regulatory 
bodies to oversee both the capital market and the domestic banking industry”10. In Thailand, 
financial intermediaries borrowed dollars to lend baht to drive a construction boom. In Korea 
state-directed lending led to an increasing number of non-performing loans. Mr Henderson 
asserts that: “It is no coincidence whatsoever that the least degree of economic structural 
damage as a result of the Asian crisis occurred in Singapore and Hong Kong where the 
degree of institutional infrastructure development was the greatest and the extent of 
regulatory supervision the most vigilant.”11
The need for greater transparency was also re-emphasized following Asia’s crisis: 
While enhanced international transparency may improve the allocation of international 
capital flows, I do not believe that it will greatly improve the ability to foresee potential 
financial crises. Indeed, the Special Data Dissemination Standard (discussed in Chapter 4), 
was established to provide an early warning mechanism to market participants, but failed to 
recognise the looming crisis despite information being widely available on the level of short 
and long-term debt and the balance of payments. Moreover, a large proportion of Russian 
government debt was purchased while information regarding the authorities’ inability to 
collect sufficient tax revenues was widely available.
However, it is clear that foreign fund managers must lend more responsibly, whilst 
appreciating that developing countries lack maturity in a number of areas where investment is 
needed. These include political, legal, social and administrative spheres. But instead, foreign 
creditors characterise developing countries as emerging markets suggesting that they are 
countries who are ready for various business and financial investment where high investment
9RET. March 1998. p.l.
,0Henderson, C. 2000. p.6 .
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risks are offset by high profits owing to the fast rates of GDP growth. Wade and Veneroso 
commented that “foreign investors were providing funds to Asian firms with debt ratios and 
long-term alliance relationships that would have been unacceptable in the West. When the 
crisis hit, the violence of the outflow owed much to the realisation that much of the capital 
should not have been committed in the first place, according to Western prudential 
standards”.12
The IMF: a more understanding approach?
I have three main criticisms of the IMF’s response to the Asian crisis:
1. Financial crises can and will occur, but what developing economies will need to
help them recover quickly is an IMF which provides remedies tailored to that country’s
particular weaknesses. For example, the Fund was correct to demand fiscal and monetary
austerity from Latin American governments which fuelled inflation by monetising large
budget deficit in the 1980’s. But Asia’s crisis was a result of private sector over-
indebtedness; most of the region’s governments possessed budget surpluses prior to the crisis
and inflation was relatively low. The IMF austerity demands only exacerbated the
contractionary effects of the crisis.
The IMF philosophy regarding the defence of exchange rates through higher interest
rates should also be addressed. First, if exchange rates were flexible there would be no target
to defend and no need for higher interest rates. The Fund is quick to point out that further
currency depreciations would have raised the burden of dollar-denominated debts. But if
developing country’s implement controls on capital inflows while maintaining a flexible
exchange rate this would substantially reduce dependence on foreign capital. Second, as
noted by Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs, “it is neither worthwhile nor feasible to twist monetary
11
policy to soothe panicky investors, especially at the cost of internal depression” .
The IMF must realise that today’s global macroeconomic environment is 
fundamentally different from the conditions in the 1970s and 1980s. Alan Blinder argues 
that: “Inflation - which was the bane of the 1970s and 1980s, and the other rationale for 
austerity - is no longer a problem. Instead, a worldwide shortage of aggregate demand has 
emerged as the world’s premier macroeconomic malady. Programmes that force austerity 
everywhere aggravate this problem rather than ameliorating it. In a world with floating
"ibid.
12 Wade and Veneroso. The Economist, p.26.
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exchange rates and low inflation, fiscal and monetary austerity ought to be prescribed far 
less”14
2. The IMF has clearly favoured international creditors rather than developing 
country borrowers who have been forced to guarantee the repayment of bad debts to Western 
private banks. Martin Khor reckons that: “Foreign banks will, in short, be given large 
susbsidies so that they don’t have to carry the costs of their mistakes, while local banks and 
companies are forced to go under. No wonder the IMF’s main role in Asia is increasingly 
seen as chief debt collector for international banks.”15 Foreign banks that made irresponsible 
lending decisions should share both the profits and losses of their commercial risks. As it is, 
the IMF may only have served to create a cavalier attitude amongst international creditors.
3. The IMF saw additional capital account liberalisation as part of the solution to 
Asia’s crisis rather than its direct cause. The expansion of international trade and capital 
markets is consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the IMF’s largest contributor, the 
United States. The IMF should actually reflect the objectives of all o f its member countries 
rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to global capitalism.
A stronger infrastructure for global capitalism?
If emerging markets can avoid the fundamental weaknesses that I have outlined throughout 
my study they will be far less vulnerable to future financial crises. In my opinion, the two 
most important principles are to avoid pegging the exchange rate and to minimise short-term 
foreign debt. These two measures reinforce one-another for borrowing (or lending) in 
foreign currencies would be far less attractive if the exchange rate is flexible. China’s 
experience illustrates the usefulness of employing capital controls and a gradual approach to 
capital account liberalisation. But, developing country crises will occur and what will be 
needed is an IMF that recognises the country’s specific problems. The Fund should then 
resolve the economy’s weaknesses in unison with the developing country rather than issuing 
their usual crisis response package, which is shrouded in secrecy and rarely negotiated with 
the governments that are recipients of IMF loans.
Jeffrey Garten argues that: “The crucial challenge facing policy makers and financiers 
is the development of a stronger infrastructure for global capitalism ... The world economy is 
crisis-prone because it is evolving at breakneck pace and has many seriously weak economic
13Sachs, J. 1998a. p.24.
14Blinder, A. 1999. p.59.
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and political links. The crisis was the fruit of a general overestimation of the strength of the 
framework for global finance.”16
A final word
As this thesis has been a discursive study, a wide range of highly contentious issues have 
been considered, although I have been unable to go into as much detail as I would like. 
Throughout my paper it has been my intention to provide a fair and concise argument and 
come to independent conclusions. Many of the subject areas are matters for personal 
interpretation and opinion: for example, the extent to which capital account liberalisation is 
desirable for emerging markets, the preferred exchange rate regime, and the IMF’s response 
to the Asian crisis.
The exact causes of the Asian financial crisis have received widespread scrutiny. The 
opinion of commentators, not surprisingly, has varied throughout the world. Radelet and 
Sachs believe that the Asian economies were essentially in good shape and they attribute the 
crisis to a gratuitous financial panic by foreign creditors. In contrast, the IMF reckoned that 
the extent of crony capitalism, and the consequent misallocation of capital, was far greater 
than my analysis implies. Some in Asia even suggest that Washington and the IMF 
conspired with international banks and speculators to cause the region’s crisis. These issues 
will be debated for many years to come. In contrast, the causes of the Russian financial crisis 
are widely accepted among commentators.
The countries of East Asia, China and Russia face many obstacles if they are to 
achieve long-term economic growth. The situation is constantly changing. America’s 
slowdown jeopardises Asia’s recovery; a fall in the world price of oil will reduce Russia’s 
GDP growth, and the competitive benefits of the rouble’s devaluation are already wearing 
off. China, which has performed remarkably well since 1978, must reduce the role of the 
state and transform SOEs into profitable state or private companies. “This is the task that 
proved so difficult in the constituent parts of what was once the Soviet Union and in the 
countries of the European empire”17. The need for effective and swift reforms are 
prerequisites for sustainable economic growth in all of these economies.
Russia’s economic reforms have been too partial and erratic and indirectly resulted in 
a substantial fiscal imbalance. China, on the other hand, was insulated from the world-wide
15In: Biers, D. 1998. p.163.
16Garten, J. 1999. p.85.
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financial turbulence precisely because its reforms have been so cautious. But the fact that 
Russia’s transition experience has been mixed does not indicate that China’s gradualist 
approach is without its problems.18
My study has outlined the devastating macroeconomic effects of the financial crises 
in Asia and Russia. But I have not examined the implications of these crises on many 
innocent bystanders, who should receive greater protection from the fall-out of financial 
crises. Currently, the IMF pays more attention to international creditors than to the 
impoverished. The IMF austerity measures have only worsened the plight of the poor. The 
following situation has occurred in many developing country crises. In a crisis the 
government prepares itself for a major banking ‘bail-out’ strategy. But the IMF demands that 
the overall budget deficit must be reduced. The government is then unable to transfer 
payments to the country’s poor and unemployed. The financial crises also had implications 
for the environment as the increased unemployment levels led to an exploitation of natural 
resources. This was epitomised by the attempts of the Philippine’s former President Fidel 
Ramos to remove the ban on the export of lumber, which had been introduced a decade 
before to protect East Asia’s last remaining forests.
I have not analysed the role of the world’s second largest economy, and Asia’s 
troubled leader, Japan. The economy throughout the 1990s has been in a classical liquidity 
mire straining under a large and increasing debt burden that is a direct result of its asset 
bubble in the 1980s. But a recovery in the Japanese economy will have profound effects on 
both the Asian region and the world economy.
If I were to proceed with my study I would like to pursue the reasons for the wide 
disparities in the economic growth of developing countries. The Asian region has grown 
rapidly since 1965. In contrast, Latin America, according to Radelet and Sachs, has 
effectively stagnated on a par with sub-Saharan Africa despite being more receptive to 
foreign investment, and India, the world’s largest democracy, has only grown by 2.2% per 
year between 1965-1995. (See Table 1, below.) India’s experience over the last fifty years 
reflects a political success but an economic failure.19 China, on the other hand, enjoys rapid 
economic growth and large inflows of foreign investment. But Chris Patten believes that:
17Patten, C. 1999. p. 143.
See: Economies in Transition. 1997. p. 14.
19Patten, C. 1999. p. 197.
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“Democracy and market forces in India will prove a potent combination as fund managers 
will sooner or later realise.”20
I suspect that the role of the ethnic Chinese in Asia has facilitated an environment for 
economic growth. Chinese communities are found throughout the Asian region and form a 
considerable economic and social network commanding an economic clout disproportionate 
to their numbers. (See Table 2, below.)
Table 1. Per capita average annual GDP growth 1965-1995.
Four Tigers* 6.6%
South-east Asia** 3.9
China 5.6
South Asia# 1.9
OECD 2.1
Latin America 0.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2
* Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. ** Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand. # Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Source: Radelet and Sachs. ‘Asia’s reemergence’. Foreign Affairs. November/December 
1997. p. 52.
Table 2. Economic participation of the overseas Chinese
Chinese as % of 
Population
% of M arket Capital 
Controlled by Chinese
Indonesia 3.5 73*
Malaysia 29 69**
Philippines 2 50-60**
Singapore 77 81*
Thailand 10 81*
* of listed firms by market capitalisation. ** of share capital by market capitalisation. 
Source: M. Vatikiotis. ‘The Chinese Way’. Far Eastern Economic Review. 26 February 1998.
20Ibid.
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